Acuff v. United Papermakers and Paperworkers

• Decision Date: 21 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 26051.,26051.
• Citation: 404 F.2d 169
• Parties: Jerry J. ACUFF et al., Appellants, v. UNITED PAPERMAKERS AND PAPERWORKERS, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

404 F.2d 169 (1968)

Jerry J. ACUFF et al., Appellants, v. UNITED PAPERMAKERS AND PAPERWORKERS, AFL-CIO, et al., Appellees.

No. 26051.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

November 27, 1968.

Certiorari Denied April 21, 1969.

James C. Wood, Simon & Wood, Mobile, Ala., for appellants.

Willis C. Darby, Jr., Mobile, Ala., Warren Woods, Washington, D. C., for appellee Unions.

Marshall J. DeMouy, John Grow, Mobile, Ala., for appellee, Scott Paper Co., Armbrecht, Jackson & DeMouy, Mobile, Ala., of counsel.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and RIVES and McENTEE,^* Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied April 21, 1969. See 89 S.Ct. 1466.

McENTEE, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene in a suit to compel arbitration brought under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185.

During November 1966 an unauthorized work stoppage occurred at the plant of the Scott Paper Company, (the Company) in Mobile, Alabama. As a consequence the Company discharged some sixty-three employees a few weeks later. After the Company refused the Union's demand to arbitrate these dismissals certain affiliates of the AFL-CIO (the Union) brought this suit to compel arbitration.¹ Eventually the Company entered into a stipulation with the Union to arbitrate; whereupon the district court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration but retained jurisdiction over the cause.

The arbitrator denied the grievance of sixteen employees because of their conduct in connection with the illegal strike. He further ordered that the discharge of the other employees be reduced to disciplinary layoff and each such employee was reinstated without loss of seniority but with no back pay. After the issuance of the arbitrator's award, the employees whose grievances were denied entirely and certain of those whose grievances were denied in part filed motions to intervene, together with complaints and motions to vacate the arbitration award.² The district court denied the motions to intervene and this appeal followed.

The issue in this case is fundamental, yet simple. In order to effectuate the purposes of the labor statutes employees are empowered to organize. This, of course, has resulted in enormous benefits but entails certain burdens as well. One of these is that to some extent the interests of particular individuals are subordinated to the interests of the group both at the contract negotiation stage and thereafter. Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, A.F.L.C.I.O. v. N. L. R. B., 5 Cir., 1966, 368 F. 2d 12, 17. This is necessary if a union is to function efficiently As a result, a union may properly determine not to pursue a member's grievance to the arbitration stage at all. "If the individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the contract would be substantially undermined, thus destroying the employer's confidence in the union's authority and returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotiation." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191, 87 S.Ct. 903, 917, 17 L.Ed. 2d 842 (1967). It would be paradoxical in the extreme if the union, which is authorized to decide whether a grievance is to be pursued to the arbitration stage at all, could not be authorized to assume full responsibility for a grievance it did pursue, without the intervention of the individual union members immediately concerned.

This is not to say, however, that we would afford no relief even if a union in refusing to pursue a grievance or in its manner of advocacy were motivated by animus against an individual union member. But a "breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, supra at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. Certainly this is not such a case. Nothing is alleged that plausibly suggests bad faith on the part of the Union. The Union pursued the grievance with energy and indeed, in large measure, with success. The employees cannot equate lack of complete success with bad faith any more than they could if their own lawyers had been involved.³

Not only were appellants represented in good faith, indeed the representation was adequate.⁴ Rule 24(a), however, relied on by appellants, specifies that there can be no intervention as of right if the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. See Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 688, 81 S.Ct. 1309, 6 L.Ed. 2d 604 (1961).⁵

Further, rule 24 in no way speaks to the matter sub judice. The collective bargaining agent is the exclusive representative of the unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Thus, cases such as this differ entirely from situations in which intervention is ordinarily appropriate. The right to arbitration is an incident not of the employment...