Ada County v. Wright

Citation60 Idaho 394,92 P.2d 134
Decision Date30 June 1939
Docket Number6705
PartiesADA COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Idaho, Plaintiff, v. CALVIN E. WRIGHT, State Auditor of the State of Idaho, Defendant
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

STATUTES-MOTOR FUEL TAX-APPROPRIATION TO COUNTIES-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-GENERAL AND SPECIAL LAWS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The provision of statute authorizing appropriations to counties from state highway fund, that amount appropriated should equal 20 per cent of moneys obtained from motor fuels tax that appropriation should be distributed in proportion in which counties shared during preceding year in motor vehicle license fees on passenger vehicles and that state auditor should ascertain amount to be appropriated and remit to each county its pro rata share does not violate constitutional provision requiring every act to be plainly worded. (Sess Laws, 1939, chap. 16, sec. 5; Const., art. 3, sec. 17.)

2. Under statute providing that appropriations should be made to counties from state highway fund equal to 20 per cent of moneys obtained from motor fuels tax, and that distribution should be made among counties in proportion in which they had previously shared in fees for licensing of passenger vehicles, detail of working out manner of distribution was a matter of accounting which could be left to state auditor to work out as a purely ministerial and administrative act. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16, sec. 5.)

3. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties from state highway fund for highway purposes does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting legislature from passing any local or special laws authorizing laying out, opening altering, maintaining, working on or vacating highways, where statute applied to all counties, highways and good roads districts alike. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 3 sec. 19, par. 7.)

4. A "special law" applies only to an individual or number of individuals out of a single class similarly situated and affected, or to a special locality. (Const art. 3, sec. 19, par. 7.)

5. A law is not "special" simply because it may have only a local application or apply only to a special class, if it applies to all such classes, all similar localities and to all belonging to specified class to which law is made applicable. (Const., art. 3, sec. 19, par. 7.)

6. The failure of statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund to require claims to be presented by counties to state board of examiners does not render statute violative of constitutional provision requiring that claims against state be passed upon by board, since if county had a "claim," as term is used in constitutional provision, the Constitution itself required presentation. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 4, sec. 18.)

7. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund of a portion of moneys obtained from motor fuels tax, in so far as it provided for raising revenue and distribution thereof to counties, does not violate constitutional provision providing that legislature might obtain revenue by levying property and license taxes. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 7, sec. 2.)

8. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund recognized that maintenance of roads and highways by state was one of sovereign duties of government, and constituted counties and highway districts agencies of state for carrying out that governmental purpose. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16.)

9. The object to be accomplished by statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund was a "public purpose" within meaning and purview of Constitution. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16.)

10. The legislature possesses plenary power in matter of raising revenue except in so far as it is specifically limited by Constitution. (Const., art. 7, sec. 2.)

11. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund of a portion of moneys received from motor fuels tax concerns distribution of an excise tax and does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, where that provision dealt only with ad valorem taxes. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 7, sec. 6.)

12. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund of a portion of moneys received from motor fuels tax does not direct distribution of tax for county purposes, but directs that expenditures shall be made by counties and highway districts as agents of state and, therefore, statute does not contravene constitutional provision prohibiting legislature from imposing taxes for purpose of any county or other municipal corporation. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 7, sec. 6.)

13. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting legislature from creating a liability against state in excess of $2,000,000, since statute merely appropriated and directed expenditure of motor fuels tax. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 8, sec. 1.)

14. The statute authorizing appropriation to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund of a sum equal to 20 per cent of moneys obtained from motor fuels tax, and providing that appropriation should be not less than $1,000,000, did not impose liability upon state as to moneys obtained from other sources, since appropriation was made specifically out of motor fuels tax. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16.)

15. The constitutional provision authorizing establishment of post roads constitutes a recognition by United States government of public governmental duty of providing highways. (U. S.C. A., Const., art. 1, sec. 8, subd. 7.)

16. Although state has provided a highway system, local communities, as a proprietary enterprise for special benefit of local residents and property owners, may improve service by opening streets in cities, building feeder roads into rural districts and repairing county roads already opened but needing improvement.

17. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund, thereby extending state aid and jurisdiction to all highways, and making counties and road districts agents and representatives of state for carrying on state purpose of maintaining highways, is constitutional, in absence of any provision prohibiting such a plan of public road building. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16.)

18. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund of a portion of moneys obtained from motor fuels tax does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting loaning of credit of state to any individual, association, municipality or corporation. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16; Const., art. 8, sec. 2.)

19. The statute authorizing appropriations to counties for highway purposes from state highway fund does not improperly divert state funds to purposes other than a public or state purpose, since building of highways is of a public and governmental nature when conducted by state in its sovereign capacity. (Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 16.)

20. Where there is room for serious doubt as to unconstitutionality of a legislative act, the doubt should be resolved in favor of act's validity.

APPLICATION for writ of mandate. Alternative writ issued. Heard on answer to writ. Writ made permanent.

Alternative writ issued made permanent. No costs awarded.

Kenneth O'Leary, Prosecuting Attorney, and Eugene H. Anderson, for plaintiff.

A statute is presumed constitutional and all doubts will be resolved in favor of its validity. Invalidity of statute must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. (State v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P.2d 227; Noble v. Bragaw, 12 Idaho 265, 85 P. 903; State v. Dunbar, 39 Idaho 691, 230 P. 33; Smallwood v. Jeter, 42 Idaho 169, 244 P. 149; Curtis v. Pfost, 53 Idaho 1, 21 P.2d 73; Garrett Transfer & Storage Co. v. Pfost, 54 Idaho 576, 33 P.2d 743.)

The state may appropriate moneys to the counties for use by the counties for general state purposes. (Moreton v. Secretary of State, 240 Mich. 584, 216 N.W. 450; McLeland v. Marshall County, 199 Iowa 1232, 201 N.W. 401, 409, 203 N.W. 1; City of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. (2d) 621, 59 P.2d 137, 106 A. L. R. 903; County of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. (2d) 625, 59 P.2d 139.)

The state or subdivision thereof may pay indebtedness of a subdivision or governmental unit within it, if the indebtedness was created for an improvement for the benefit or use and purpose of the state or subdivision making the appropriation or payment. (Thomson v. Harnett Co., 209 N.C. 662, 184 S.E. 490, 106 A. L. R. 602; Salmon RiverGrande Ronde etc. Dist. v. Scott, 145 Ore. 121, 27 P.2d 183; Los Angeles Co. v. Rockhold, 3 Cal. (2d) 192, 44 P.2d 340, 100 A. L. R. 149.)

Chapter 16, 1939 Session Laws, does not loan the credit of the state of Idaho in any manner, as prohibited by section 2 of article 8 of the Idaho Constitution. (Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 65, 115, 126 So. 308; Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 284 P. 203; State v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P.2d 227; State v. Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 74 S.W.2d 367 at 373.)

J. W. Taylor, Attorney General, R. W. Beckwith, E. G. Elliott, Lawrence B. Quinn and D. W. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, for Defendant.

The legislature cannot pass local or special laws authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, working on, or vacating roads, highways, streets, alleys, town plats, parks,...

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