Adair v. Nashville Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 05 March 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5686 and 6021.
• Citation: 388 F. Supp. 481
• Parties: Charles H. ADAIR and June P. Adair, Plaintiffs, v. NASHVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants. R. L. GARDNER and Ruth Gardner, Plaintiffs, v. NASHVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

388 F. Supp. 481

Charles H. ADAIR and June P. Adair, Plaintiffs, v. NASHVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants.

R. L. GARDNER and Ruth Gardner, Plaintiffs, v. NASHVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. Nos. 5686 and 6021.

United States District Court, M. D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

March 5, 1974.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Granville Clark, Russellville, Ky., for plaintiffs.

Joseph L. Lackey, Jr., Nashville, Tenn., for N.H.A.

Wilson Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for Vanderbilt.

Charles H. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for HUD.

OPINION

DANIEL HOLCOMBE THOMAS, Senior District Judge.

This suit was originally brought on the 26th day of March, 1970, by property owners in the University Center Urban Renewal Project area (hereinafter referred to as "Tennessee R-51") located in Nashville, Tennessee. The present defendants are the Nashville Housing Authority (hereinafter referred to as "NHA"), Jack Herrington, Secretary and Executive Director of NHA, The Vanderbilt University and the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Renewal (HUD). The suit was not brought as a class action.

The cases were tried together before District Judge L. Clure Morton, who, on September 30, 1971, issued a memorandum opinion and order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues favorable to the defendants. Then, however, Judge Morton dismissed the cases for want of a federal question because HUD was not then a party defendant.

On appeal, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (468 F.2d 480) agreed with Judge Morton's rationale but remanded the cases to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to join HUD as a party defendant. This was done. Judge Morton then recused himself and the Honorable Daniel H. Thomas, Senior District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, was designated to hear the cases. In the remanded case the parties have stipulated that the entire record in this cause, including the testimony at the previous hearing, may be considered by the Court. It was further stipulated that the testimony of a HUD witness could be introduced in behalf of HUD and that plaintiffs would have the opportunity to rebut the HUD testimony. All additional testimony was submitted to this Court upon evidentiary depositions, and the entire record in this cause has been considered by this Court in rendering this Opinion.

The Urban Renewal Project Tennessee R-51 was conceived and implemented under the Federal Urban Renewal Act known as Section 112, which is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1463. This statute provides that where an area surrounding an educational or hospital facility is a slum or is blighted and such area has been declared by the local government to be an urban renewal project, that such project, if it meets certain Federal standards, will then qualify for Federal funding.

The attacks made upon Project Tennessee R-51 by the plaintiffs are set forth in a stipulation of issues which was incorporated as follows:

"1. Whether the defendant, The Nashville Housing Authority, and the individual defendant Gimre (Defendant Herrington's predecessor) in his capacity as the Secretary and Executive Director of the Nashville Housing Authority committed a clear and obvious abuse of power in the exercise of their duties under Section 1460, Title 42, USCA, in relation to the adoption of the University Center Urban Renewal Project by Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and what is the scope of review by this Court of the actions of the said defendants in relation to the adoption of said project and the effect of any such abuse on the validity of the project.

2. Whether the defendant, The Vanderbilt University, as part of a conspiracy with defendant Nashville Housing Authority and with Metropolitan Government, deliberately permitted property owned by Vanderbilt in the Project area, which met the standards under the housing codes to deteriorate to substandard housing in order to qualify the area as a blighted or substandard area; and if so, the effect of such conspiracy on the validity of the Project.

3. Whether officials of the defendant, The Vanderbilt University, and the defendant, The Nashville Housing Authority, participated in a conflict of interest in violation of Section 13-910 TCA, which renders void the Project.

4. Whether plaintiffs, Adair and Gardner, in the process of qualifying the Project, were denied hearings before the Nashville Housing Authority, and whether such hearings are required under Section 10 of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act.

5. Whether Section 1463 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code is constitutional as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in its application to the right of the defendant the Nashville Housing Authority, to condemn the property of the plaintiffs for the Urban Renewal Project.

6. Whether the plaintiffs, Adair and Gardner, have standing to raise and try the above issues in this Court."

The relief originally sought by the Plaintiffs was as follows:

(1) to enjoin the defendants from initiating eminent domain proceedings for the purpose of acquiring plaintiffs' property and to recover damages for the amount of dimunition in value of plaintiffs' property;

(2) to be entitled to a declaratory judgment of their respective rights pursuant to Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and an adjudication that 42 U.S.C. § 1463 is unconstitutional.

Additional issues raised on the remand to this Court were: (1) whether there were arbitrary or capricious actions by HUD officials in the implementation of HUD responsibilities in regard to the project; and (2) whether since the plaintiffs did not bring this suit until the project was well on its way toward completion (the initial inclusion of the plaintiffs' property in an urban renewal area having been declared by the Nashville City Council in 1961) the actions are barred by laches.

The background and history of the Project Tennessee R-51 were set forth in detail in the opinion by Judge Morton. This Court adopts that part of Judge Morton's opinion and will not repeat the background and history in this opinion.

Although the scope of review by this Court of the actions of the Nashville Metropolitan Council¹ and the actions of the HUD officials is narrow and limited, as hereinafter discussed, the nature of this case demands a complete review of the entire record, and therefore I have gone beyond this narrow and limited scope of review, and have made factual findings based upon the weight of the evidence.

Before setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is necessary that the Court state the nature of an urban renewal project involved. The type project under consideration here is a creature of the State and local government. The local legislative body (in this case the Nashville Metropolitan Council) must first designate and establish the urban renewal area in accordance with the statutes of the State of Tennessee. Then under applicable Federal statutes, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development and his subordinates must determine whether the particular project qualifies for Federal participation in its funding. Two-thirds of the area covered by the Project was a "rehabilitation area" (wherein all structures, houses and other improvements were required to be brought up to "standards" by their owners) and the remaining one-third of the area adjacent to the Vanderbilt campus was designated a "clearance area" (wherein all of the land was to be acquired by Vanderbilt, all structures removed and the entire area redeveloped by the University). The qualification requirements of the two segments of the Project are different as hereinafter explained.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Court under the issues before it are:

FINDINGS OF FACT

Whether the project, Tennessee R-51, is in fact a slum, blighted and/or deteriorated area within the meaning of the Federal and State urban renewal laws and regulations?²

1. There is a strong preponderance of evidence supporting the determination that the area within the Project is a slum and blighted area so as to qualify for urban renewal treatment within the definitions set forth in T.C.A. § 13-801 et seq. Particularly, the area meets the definition of a slum and blighted area as set forth in Section 13-813 T.C.A.; and therefore the actions of the Nashville Metropolitan Council in constituting the area an urban renewal project were lawful and in accordance with the statutes of the State of Tennessee.

2. A strong preponderance of evidence supports the determination that the Project area also qualifies for Federal funding as "an urban renewal area" in that it meets the requirements of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, 42 U. S.C. § 1463.³ The area also meets the requirements of the HUD Urban Renewal Manual in that at least twenty percent of the buildings in the area contain one or more building deficiencies and the area itself contains at least two environmental deficiencies. The environmental deficiencies existent in the area are: (1) inadequate street layout; (b) incompatible uses or land use relationships; (c) over-crowding of buildings on the land and (d) excessive dwelling unit densities and (e) inadequate and antiquated sewer and other utilities in the area.

3. The area adjacent to the Vanderbilt University qualifies for funding for clearance treatment under the provisions of the Housing Act and under the requirements of the HUD Urban Renewal Manual. In the clearance area there are at least twenty percent of the buildings in structural condition that warrant clearance. There are an additional number of buildings in the clearance area to total at least fifty percent of the total buildings, which because of their blighting influence also warrant clearance.

4. When the Metropolitan...