Adam v. Connecticut Medical Examining Bd.

• Decision Date: 27 February 1951
• Citation: 79 A.2d 350,137 Conn. 535
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ADAM v. CONNECTICUT MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 350

79 A.2d 350

137 Conn. 535

ADAM v. CONNECTICUT MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 27, 1951.

Harry L. Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William L. Hadden, Atty. Gen., on the brief), for the appellants-appellees (defendants).

James W. Carpenter, Hartford (David Cramer, Litchfield, on the brief), for the appellant-appellee (plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., JENNINGS, BALDWIN, and O'SULLIVAN, JJ., and EDWARD J. DALY, Superior Court Judge.

O'SULLIVAN, Judge.

On November 12, 1947, the state commissioner of health filed with the named defendant, hereinafter to be called the board, a verified complaint charging the plaintiff with improper conduct in his practice as a physician and surgeon. The complaint was served upon the plaintiff, and he was summoned to appear to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. After a protracted hearing, the board found him guilty of five charges. It recommended to the defendant state department of health that his license to practice be revoked. The recommendation was carried out. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which found the issues in his favor. From the judgment entered thereon, the plaintiff and the defendants have appealed. The question for determination on the appeal of the latter is whether the court erred in concluding that the defendants acted illegally. Jaffe v. State Department of Health, 135 Conn. 339, 353, 64 A.2d 330, 6 A.L.R.2d 664; Brein v. Connecticut Ecletic Examining Board, 103 Conn. 65, 87, 130 A. 289.

It is unnecessary to recite the subordinate facts which the board found. Since there was evidence to suport them, they must be considered proved. The credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual questions were matters for the board to pass upon. Jaffe case, supra, 135 Conn. at page 343, 64 A.2d at page 333.

The General Assembly has specified the grounds and outlined the procedure for the revocation of a license to practice medicine and sugery. General Statutes, §§ 4358, 4359. The statute requires the department of health to file with the board a verified written charge against the licentiate. § 4359. It further provides that, if the board, after proper notice and hearing, shall by a majority vote find him guilty of any charge preferred, it may, among other available choices, recommend to the department of health that his license be revoked. Ibid.

In arriving at a decision, the board is called upon to weigh evidence and to reach conclusions. In this respect it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. City of Norwalk v. Connecticut Co., 88 Conn. 471, 478, 91 A. 442. It remains, nevertheless, an administrative agency. McNiff v. City of Waterbury, 82 Conn. 43, 45, 72 A. 572; Meffert v. State Board of Medical Registration & Examination, 66 Kan. 710, 715, 72 P. 247, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 811. It possesses no inherent power. Its authority is found in a legislative grant, beyond the terms and necessary implications of which it cannot lawfully function. Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 649, 51 S.Ct. 587, 75 L.Ed. 1324; State ex rel. Woolridge v. Morehead, 100 Neb. 864, 872, 161 N.W. 569, L.R.A.1917D, 310.

While it is stated in various ways, the plaintiff's basic claim is that the recommendation was illegal because the board exceeded its authority. The statute in effect when the commissioner of health filed his complaint listed as grounds for the revocation of a license (1) conviction of certain crimes; (2) immoral, fraudulent, dishonorable or unprofessional conduct; (3) illegal, incompetent or habitually negligent conduct in the practice of the healing arts; (4) habitual intemperance or addiction to drugs; (5) deceptive advertising; (6) abetting the unlawful practice of any branch of the healing arts; (7) failure to record license; (8) insanity; and (9) fraud in obtaining a license. General Statutes, Sup.1941, § 475f, Rev.1949, § 4358. This enactment was at once a grant and a limitation of power. The board was authorized to act upon any one of the enumerated grounds, but it was limited, by the failure or refusal of the legislature to add others, to those specified. Lucier v. Town of Norfolk, 99 Conn. 686, 695, 122 A. 711; Department of Ins. v. Church Members Relief Ass'n, 217 Ind. 58, 60, 26 N.E.2d 51, 128 A.L.R. 635.

This points up one phase of the illegality of the actions of the defendants. The plaintiff was subjected to a hybrid accusation. He was charged, in part, with 'wanton negligence' in the practice of his profession. This charge finds no sanction whatsoever in the statute. Whether wisely or not, the legislature has made but one form of negligence a ground for revocation. This is negligence which is characterized as habitual. All other forms, whether they are described as wanton, gross, heedless or reckless, are excluded from the statute by implication. Young v. Roodner, 123 Conn. 68, 73, 192 A. 710; Davis v. Davis, 119 Conn. 194, 200, 175 A. 574. The board was as unwarranted in finding the plaintiff guilty of wanton negligence as was the commissioner in making the charge.

There is another phase of the accusation which requires discussion. The charge of wanton negligence was not set forth independently but was linked with one alleging 'fraudulent, dishonorable, unprofessional and immoral conduct,' which we shall refer to as the charge of unprofessional conduct, solely as a matter of convenience.

As stated above, five counts are involved. The board found the subordinate facts as to each and then reached the following conclusions: (1) The plaintiff was 'guilty of having treated ...