Adamo Demolition Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 150
| Citation | 439 F.Supp.3d 933 |
| Decision Date | 30 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. 19-11999 |
| Parties | ADAMO DEMOLITION COMPANY, d/b/a Adamo Group Inc., and Adamo Group, Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 150 and James M. Sweeney, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Ronald G. Acho, Cummings, McClorey, Livonia, MI, for Plaintiffs.
Benjamin L. King, John R. Canzano, McKnight, Canzano, Smith, Radtke & Brault, P.C., Royal Oak, MI, for Defendants.
Defendants filed a "Joint Notice of Removal" on July 5, 2019, removing the Complaint Plaintiffs filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court to federal court. Defendants assert that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because Plaintiffs' state law claims are preempted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Arguing that their claims are not preempted, Plaintiffs have filed a motion asking the Court to remand the matter to state court. (ECF No. 7.) The motion has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 12, 15.) Because the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs regarding its jurisdiction over the claims in its Complaint, it is denying their motion.
The Court therefore has jurisdiction to also decide Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 6.) Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims because, Defendants argue, they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. Alternatively, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs claims are preempted by the Garmon Doctrine, San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon , 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs cannot assert § 301 claims against an individual and this is further reason to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant James Sweeney. Defendants' motion to dismiss also has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 10, 13.)
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. , 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action ...." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly , "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a "plausible" claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). This presumption is not applicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 668, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Therefore, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
Ordinarily, the court may not consider matters outside the pleadings when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc. , 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Hammond v. Baldwin , 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989) ). A court that considers such matters must first convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P 12(d). However, "[w]hen a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the [c]omplaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to [the] defendant's motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Sixth Circuit has advised that "[w]hen deciding a motion to remand," the court should "apply a test similar to, but more lenient than, the analysis applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 695 F.3d 428, 433 (2012) (citing Walker v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 443 F. App'x 946, 952-54 (6th Cir. 2011) ). The court "may ‘pierce the pleading’ and consider summary judgment evidence, such as affidavits presented by the parties." Id. "The court may look to material outside the pleadings for the limited purpose of determining whether there are ‘undisputed facts that negate the claim.’ " Id. (quoting Walker , 443 F. App'x at 955-56 ).
Thus, while Plaintiffs do not refer expressly in their Complaint to the collective bargaining agreement which Defendants argue leads to § 301 preemption in this case, the Court believes it may consider the existence of the agreement and its terms when deciding the motion to remand. Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations allude to the existence of a CBA between Plaintiffs and Defendant International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150. As will be apparent below, the Court finds that the agreement is central to Plaintiffs' claims.
Plaintiffs Adamo Group, Inc. and Adamo Group are assumed names of Plaintiff Adamo Demolition Company (collectively "Adamo"). (Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 13.) Adamo is a nationwide demolition company. (Id. ¶ 15, Pg ID 21.) Sometime prior to March 2018, Commercial Contracting Corporation ("CCC") awarded Adamo a subcontract to complete a substantial demolition project at the Ford Assembly Plant in Chicago, Illinois ("Ford Project"). (Id. ¶ 21, Pg ID 21.) CCC was the prime contractor on the project. (Id. )
Although not mentioned by Plaintiffs in their Complaint, the Ford Project was governed by the National Maintenance Agreement ("NMA"), a national collective bargaining agreement covering certain projects for large industrial owners, including Ford Motor Company. (Notice of Removal ¶ 15, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 5.) Adamo and Defendant International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 ("Local 150") were bound to the terms of the NMA. (Id. ¶ 16, Pg ID 5.) These terms govern, among other things, the rights and responsibilities of local unions and out-of-state contractors with respect to the hiring and referral of craft workers, such as the machine operators needed for the Ford Project. (Id. ¶ 17, Pg ID 5.) For example, the NMA requires out-of-state contractors to hire craft workers in the area where work is performed in accordance with the hiring procedures in the area. (Id. ¶ 18, Pg ID 5.) These local procedures govern the number of outside employees a contractor may bring in from its own workforce and the number of workers the contractor must accept as referrals from the local union, and the qualifications of those workers. (Id. )
Before starting the Ford Project, Adamo advised Local 150 that Adamo needed approximately eighty-six experienced, trained, and qualified machine operators for the project. (Compl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 21.) Adamo further advised Local 150 that it would provide thirty-five qualified operators and had four operators in place from Local 150. (Id. ¶ 23, Pg ID 21.) Thus, Adamo needed Local 150 to provide an additional forty-seven operators. (Id. )
On multiple occasions, Adamo further informed Local 150 and its President-Business Manager, Defendant James Sweeney ("Sweeney") (collectively "Defendants"), that the Ford Project "was extremely time sensitive and any failure or refusal to dispatch [the required number of] experienced, trained and qualified workers would create significant monetary damages, interfere with, hinder and harm Adamo's ability to meet its contractual obligations to CCC and Ford." (Id. ¶¶ 4, 24, 25, Pg ID 13, 22.) Adamo also repeatedly informed Local 150 "that experienced, trained and qualified workers were indispensable for creating a safe work environment and any failure to provide them would interfere with, harm and hinder Adamo's ability to meet its contractual duties to CCC and Ford." (Id. ¶ 26, Pg ID 22.) Adamo alleges that Defendants nevertheless "willfully refused to provide Adamo contract information for proposed workers, refused to give reasonable assurances to Adamo that operators were experienced, trained and qualified before they were dispatched, and refused to fulfill Adamo's request to verify and confirm [the operators'] qualifications." (Id. ¶ 27, Pg ID 22.) Adamo claims that the operators Local 150 provided were unqualified, and it provides several examples to demonstrate their ineptness. (Id. ¶ 34, Pg ID 23-24.)
According to Adamo, Defendants also "took deliberate steps to actively and purposefully interfere with the [Ford] Project's progression by inhibiting the experienced, trained and qualified union operators Adamo provided." (Id. ¶ 28, Pg ID 22.) Adamo claims that a...
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