Adams v. Adams (In re Adams)
Decision Date | 19 July 2012 |
Docket Number | Bankruptcy No. 11–86523–MGD.,Adversary No. 12–05198–MGD. |
Citation | 478 B.R. 476 |
Parties | In re Melissa Lyn Peterson ADAMS, Debtor. Dirk S. Adams, Plaintiff, v. Melissa Lyn Peterson Adams, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Georgia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dirk S. Adams, Atlanta, GA, pro se.
Howard P. Slomka, Slomka Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court must decide in this adversary proceeding whether the Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Melissa Lyn Peterson Adams (“Defendant”). (Docket No. 5). Dirk S. Adams (“Plaintiff”) initiated this adversary proceeding by filing a Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt (“Complaint”) under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4). (Complaint, Docket No. 1). Section 1328(a)(4) excepts from discharge any debt “for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury to an individual or the death of an individual.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4). Referencing two state-court tort actions pending against Defendant, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable for damages resulting from personal injury to Plaintiff, as defined by § 1328(a)(4). ( Id. at ¶¶ 40–41; 44–45).
In her Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”), Defendant argues that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant's principal argument is that the injuries alleged in the Complaint do not meet the definition of personal injury under § 1328(a)(4). Further, Defendant argues that § 1328(a)(4) is inapplicable because (1) the damages were not awarded before Defendant's bankruptcy petition was filed, and (2) Defendant's conduct was neither willful nor malicious. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following material facts to show that an award for damages against Defendant in the pending state-court actions should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4). Plaintiff is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Home Savings of America (“Home Savings”).1 (Complaint ¶ 9). Defendant made false and malicious statements—intended to damage Plaintiff's reputation—to members of the Board of Directors of Home Savings (“Home Savings Board”); to the Advisory Director of Home Savings; and to other key management-level employees, directors, and shareholders of Home Savings. ( Id. at ¶ 11).
The complaint states several specific instances of allegedly tortious conduct, including the following. First, in a 2009 statement, Defendant contacted each member of the Home Savings Board and made defamatory statements about Plaintiff, calling into question his ability to lead the company. ( Id. at ¶ 14). Second, in July 2009, Defendant telephonically threatened to murder the Vice President of Home Savings as well as her children. ( Id. at ¶ 15). Third, also in July 2009, Defendant, while in California on business, threatened to castrate and kill Plaintiff. ( Id. at ¶ 16). Fourth, in November 2009, Defendant called the Advisory Director of Home Savings and threatened Plaintiff and the company. ( Id. at ¶ 17). Fifth, in early 2011, Defendant intentionally disrupted a business deal between Home Savings and Guggenheim Partners, L.L.C. (“Guggenheim”) by defaming Plaintiff to one of Guggenheim's principals. ( Id. at ¶ 18). Sixth, in March 2011, Defendant sent a text message to the Advisory Director and three other key Home Savings employees. ( Id. at ¶ 19). The text message stated: ( Id.). Seventh, Defendant filed false and malicious complaints with government agencies to tarnish Plaintiff's reputation. ( Id. at ¶ 22). These reports included a complaint to the United States Post Office, alleging Plaintiff was intercepting Defendant's mail; a report to the Federal Trade Commission, alleging that Plaintiff was accessing Defendant's online accounts; and a police report, alleging that Plaintiff posted inappropriate pictures of Defendant on an adult website. ( Id.). Finally, the Complaint alleges that Defendant continues to accuse Plaintiff of “cloning” her cell phone and unlawfully accessing her bank accounts. ( Id. at ¶ 23).
Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff filed two separate civil complaints against Defendant: one in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California (“California Complaint”) and one in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia (“Georgia Complaint”). ( Id. at ¶¶ 24, 31). Plaintiff attached copies of both state-court complaints to the Complaint in this adversary proceeding. ( Id. at Exhibits 1 & 2). Both state-court actions were pending at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed.
The Georgia Complaint asserts three counts. (Georgia Complaint, Exhibit 1, Docket No. 1). Count I is for “Tortious Interference With Business Relations.” ( Id. at p. 3). Plaintiff's claim is based on the text message Defendant sent to the Advisory Director and other key employees of Home Savings, alleging that federal charges were imminent against Plaintiff for harassment, stalking, and financial fraud. ( Id.; Complaint, ¶ 25). Plaintiff alleged that the text message “disrupted [Plaintiff's] efforts to raise capital for Home Savings.” (Georgia Complaint at ¶ 17). Count II is for “Defamation” and is based on the same text message. ( Id. at p. 4; Complaint ¶ 25). Count III requests punitive damages for Defendant's actions. (Georgia Complaint at 4–5). Plaintiff requested damages of $250,000 for Counts I and II and punitive damages of $1 million for Count III. ( Id. at p. 5; Complaint ¶¶ 26–27). The Georgia Complaint is pending in the Superior Court of Fulton County. (Complaint ¶ 29).
The California Complaint asserts six causes of action (“Counts”). (Complaint ¶ 32; California Complaint, Exhibit 2). Count I is for “Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations” and is based on the text message to the Advisory Director and other Home Savings employees; on the statements and threats Defendant made to the Home Savings Board; and on the reports Defendant filed against Plaintiff with government agencies. (California Complaint at ¶ 29). Count II is for “Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage” and is based on Defendant's interference with the business deal between Home Savings and Guggenheim (referred to in the California Complaint as “Firm A”). ( Id. at ¶ 35). Count III is for “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress” (“IIED”) and is based on the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's intentionally tortious actions. ( Id. at ¶ 42).
Count IV is for “Defamation” and is based on the text message to the Advisory Director and other Home Savings employees; on Defendant's statements that interfered with the transaction between Home Savings and Guggenheim; on Defendant's statements to the Home Savings Board regarding Plaintiff; on Defendant's statements that Plaintiff cloned her phone and unlawfully accessed Defendant's bank records; and on the complaints Defendant made against Plaintiff to government agencies. ( Id. at ¶¶ 46–50). Count IV also asserts that Defendant contacted Home Savings's general counsel and alleged that federal charges were being brought against Plaintiff for stalking and financial fraud. ( Id. at ¶ 51). Counts V and VI are for “Conspiracy to Commit Intentional Torts” and “Aiding and Abetting Commission of Intentional Torts,” and assert that Defendant acted with the other named defendants in committing the intentional torts alleged in the complaint. ( Id. at p. 12–13). Plaintiff seeks general, special, and consequential damages of $3 million dollars, in addition to punitive damages and injunctive relief against the Defendant. (Complaint ¶¶ 33–35). The California Complaint is pending in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. (Complaint ¶ 36).
II. LAWA. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable to this Court pursuant to Rule 7012(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, permits a defendant in an adversary proceeding to move for dismissal when a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Fed. Bankr.P. 7012(b). When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249, 1271 (11th Cir.2006). The complaint must contain Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955).
Plaintiff seeks a determination under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4) that a debt Defendant potentially owes to Plaintiff is non-dischargeable. (Complaint, ¶¶ 41, 45). That section provides that any...
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