Adams v. All Coast, LLC
| Citation | 420 F.Supp.3d 509 |
| Decision Date | 15 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-1426 |
| Parties | William ADAMS, et al. v. ALL COAST, LLC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Melissa A. Moore, Pro Hac Vice, Curt Christopher Hesse, Pro Hac Vice, Moore & Assoc., Houston, TX, Matthew E. Lundy, Troy Houston Middleton, IV, Lundy Lundy et al., Lake Charles, LA, for William Adams, et al.
Armin J. Moeller, Jr., Ashley Eley Cannady, Pro Hac Vice, Balch & Bingham, Jackson, MS, Matthew Armin Moeller, Moeller Firm, New Orleans, LA, for All Coast LLC.
SECTION: "H"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant's second Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 168) and Plaintiffs' Daubert Motion to Exclude Defendant's Expert Todd Pellegrin (Doc. 170). For the following reasons, Defendant's second Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED , and Plaintiffs' Daubert Motion is DENIED .
This action arises out of Defendant All Coast, LLC's ("All Coast" or "Defendant") alleged failure to pay Plaintiffs overtime compensation as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or "the Act").1 All Coast operates a fleet of liftboats that service offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiffs were employed by All Coast to work aboard the liftboats in different capacities, including cooks, mates, deckhands, ordinary seamen ("OS"), and able-bodied seamen ("AB"). Plaintiff William Adams initially brought this suit as a collective action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees of All Coast to recover unpaid overtime wages.2 The Court subsequently granted conditional class certification for "Cooks; Mates; Deckhands; Ordinary Seaman; and Able-Bodied Seaman employed by All Coast, LLC in the workweeks in which they were employed in these classifications in the [three years preceding November 2017], except for those employees who signed waiver and release agreements."3
All Coast filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim that was subsequently converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment.4 All Coast asked the Court to find that Plaintiffs were exempt seamen under FLSA and therefore not entitled to the Act's overtime requirements. The Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation denying the Motion without prejudice as premature.5 The parties have since conducted significant discovery. All Coast filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, again urging the Court to find that Plaintiffs are exempt from FLSA's overtime requirements because they are seamen.6 Plaintiffs also filed the instant Daubert Motion, seeking to exclude the testimony of All Coast's expert, Todd Pellegrin.7
FLSA requires employers to provide overtime pay to any employee who works more than forty hours per week unless an exemption applies.8 Defendant All Coast argues that Plaintiffs are exempt under the seaman exemption and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims should fail as a matter of law.9 Plaintiffs argue that they are not seamen and are consequently entitled to avail themselves of FLSA's overtime provisions. The Act itself does not define the term "seaman."
Plaintiffs argue that, with the exception of the cooks, the bulk of their jobs involved operating a crane aboard the liftboat as opposed to performing traditional maritime duties. Plaintiffs aver that the significant crane operations they performed render them non-seamen. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are seamen exempt from FLSA's overtime requirements because "[t]he amount of time the plaintiffs spent operating the crane, whether 10% of their time or 100% is irrelevant because crane operation is seaman's work that aids the vessel as a means of transportation."10 The Court agrees with Defendant.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."11 "As to materiality ... [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."12 Nevertheless, a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" such that summary judgment is inappropriate "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."13
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor.14 "If the moving party meets the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial."15 Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case."16 An employer who asserts an exemption from FLSA's overtime wage provisions bears the burden of proof that the exemption applies.17
"In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that evidence supports that party's claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding in favor of the nonmovant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial."18 The Court does "not ... in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."19 Additionally, "[t]he mere argued existence of a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion."20
The determination of whether an employee's activities place that employee within a FLSA exemption is a question of law; however, the question of what an employee's work activities entail is a question of fact.21 22 Further, an employer who claims an exemption under the Act has the burden of showing that it applies.23
While FLSA does not provide a definition for "seaman," the Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations provide some guidance.24 Generally, a vessel's crew members are seamen, so long as they meet the criteria in 29 C.F.R. § 783.31.25 Section 783.31 provides:
[A]n employee will ordinarily be regarded as employed as a seaman if [1] he performs, as master or subject to the authority, direction, and control of the master aboard a vessel, [2] service which is rendered primarily as an aid in the operation of such vessel as a means of transportation, provided he performs no substantial amount of work of a different character.26
The regulations also provide that "work other than seaman work becomes substantial if it occupies more than 20 percent of the time worked by the employee during the workweek."27 Thus, if an employee spends more than 20% of his time doing non-seaman's work, he will not be a "seaman" under FLSA, and consequently, he will not be exempt from its overtime provisions. Courts must "evaluate an employee's duties based upon the character of the work he actually performs and not on what it is called or the place where it is performed."28
The Court will first address the issue of whether All Coast cooks are "seamen" under FLSA. "The term ‘seaman’ includes members of the crew such as ... cooks ... if, as is the usual case, their service is of the kind described in § 783.31."29 "A cook is usually a seaman because he usually cooks for seamen."30 Here, Plaintiffs and Defendant agree that All Coast cooks prepared food for both crewmembers and third parties. If "the cooks spent more than 20% of their time preparing food for non-crew members," then "they are not seamen under the FLSA."31 Only one Plaintiff, Erwin Thibodeaux, was deposed regarding his work as a cook. This testimony reveals that as a cook, Plaintiff Thibodeaux was under the command of the vessel's captain; ate, slept, and lived aboard the vessel; and cooked for crewmembers and third parties.32 Crucially, Plaintiff Thibodeaux testified that for every meal he cooked, All Coast crew members ate.33 While third parties may have been on board at times and consumed the cook's food, the crewmembers were served each and every meal prepared by the cook. Consequently, the Court finds that All Coast cooks are "seamen" for FLSA because they cooked primarily for All Coast crewmembers.
As to the remaining All Coast job positions at issue, the parties do not dispute that the first prong of the seaman exemption is satisfied: each Plaintiff was answerable to the captain of his assigned vessel. The parties also do not dispute what the Plaintiffs' work activities entailed. Instead, the parties dispute whether those work activities, as a matter of law, qualify Plaintiffs as "seamen."
The evidence presented by the parties demonstrates the following undisputed facts. All Plaintiffs, regardless of their position, were assigned to a particular All Coast liftboat vessel as a crew member. The liftboats were chartered by other companies to transport people and equipment on the liftboat to a worksite offshore. While on hitch, Plaintiffs ate all of their meals on the vessel and slept aboard the vessel. Each deposed Plaintiff agreed that the official All Coast job descriptions, whether for the position of Mate, AB, OS, or Deckhand, accurately reflected their job duties and responsibilities.34 However, each deposed Plaintiff also noted that crane operations—not listed on the job descriptions—were a significant part of their job duties. The cranes were used to transport personnel, supplies, and equipment back and forth between the liftboat and the dock, the liftboat and the worksite platform, the...
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