Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 15 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–1608.,14–1608.
• Citation: 31 A.D. Cases 1275,789 F.3d 422
• Parties: Andrew ADAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

789 F.3d 422

31 A.D. Cases 1275

Andrew ADAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–1608.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: May 13, 2015.

Decided: June 15, 2015.

Joyce E. Smithey, Rifkin, Livingston, Levitan & Silver, LLC, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Jay Creech, Anne Arundel County Office of Law, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge FLOYD joined.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

Andrew Adams contends that the Board of Education of Anne Arundel County violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). His allegations include interference with his medical leaves, retaliation for taking those leaves, discrimination and retaliation on the basis of his disability, and a failure to accommodate his condition. We find no merit to these related claims and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

A.

On January 19, 2010, Adams was involved in an incident with a student in a hallway at MacArthur Middle School in Fort Meade, Maryland, where he was an assistant principal. Although witness accounts differed significantly, the student initially claimed that Adams “grabbed [her] by the arms, shook her, and pinned her against a wall.” J.A. 145. As a result of the incident, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) launched a child abuse investigation, and the matter was also referred to the school Board's Employee Case Management committee. CPS acts to prevent and investigate incidences of child abuse under the auspices of the Department of Social Services (“DSS”), whereas the Board's Employee Case Management committee has as its focus conduct detrimental to the proper functioning of the school system. Adams was temporarily reassigned from MacArthur in the meantime.

On February 24, Adams met with Board investigators. Adams contends that at that meeting he was shown a document stating he was completely cleared of all charges. The Board denies Adams was shown any such document and claims its independent investigation, which focused on school district policy violations, continued on a parallel track. In all events, the Board transferred Adams back to MacArthur on February 25. That same day, however, he went on medical leave upon the recommendation of Dr. Kim Bondurant, an internal medicine specialist, because he suffered from stress, anxiety, and high blood pressure

, presumably related to the January 19 incident and the child abuse allegation. Adams returned to MacArthur on March 3, but had a panic attack, during which he claims he was berated by Principal Reginald Farrare. Adams took a second medical leave, and Dr. Bondurant referred him to a psychiatrist, Dr. Lawrence Adler. Adams claims that when he came back to work on March 8, Farrare again berated him, this time in front of other staff.

Two weeks later, Adams began his third and final medical leave after Dr. Adler diagnosed him with acute stress disorder

. Dr. Adler informed the Board that, when Adams returned from leave, “he will require assignment to another school,” because being at MacArthur could spur “panic attacks and other manifestations of his illness.” J.A. 36. Dr. Adler later updated the diagnosis to post-traumatic stress disorder, as reflected in the FMLA paperwork that he submitted on May 5. The Board required Adams to attend three sessions during the summer with a specialist of its choosing, psychologist Dr. Anthony Wolff. Dr. Wolff cleared Adams to work on July 28.

The Board's investigative process continued while Adams was on that extended leave. The Board sent a letter to Adams on April 12, notifying him that a pre-disciplinary conference had been scheduled for May 6. The meeting was delayed by four days so that Adams's attorney could attend. Two weeks after the conference, Adams received a letter from the Board formally reprimanding him for “engag[ing] in physical contact by using a technique that escalated a situation that could have been handled differently.” J.A. 584.

Adams began working at a new school, J. Albert Adams Academy (“JAA”), on August 4. The Board had first informed Adams in early June that it intended to transfer him to JAA. However, Adams agrees that the transfer did not occur in practice until August, as he was on leave until late July. In the spring, Dr. Adler had recommended a transfer, and Dr. Wolff later agreed that Adams “would best be assigned to a supportive, lower-stress school environment.” J.A. 194. “Mr. Adams,” Dr. Wolff stated, “is not averse to the possibility of being assigned to a specialized program such as the J. Albert Adams Academy, which has been mentioned as a possibility.” J.A. 194.

The student population of JAA, a specialized middle school for children with behavioral issues, used to reach 120, but now is capped at 80. In contrast, MacArthur has more than 1,000 students and a less favorable staff-to-student ratio. In accordance with a union contract, Adams's salary remained the same for two years and then was reduced by less than one percent because of JAA's smaller size. JAA employees are also ineligible for certain discretionary bonuses available at other schools. Adams has reportedly excelled at JAA. He has received exceptional performance reviews, has served as acting principal for a month, and has not been subject to any further discipline. He has not requested a transfer from JAA.

B.

Adams filed this lawsuit in Maryland state court, and the Board removed the case to federal court. Adams alleged various violations of the FMLA, the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Maryland state law. After allowing Adams to amend his initial complaint, the district court dismissed all of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, except for Adams's FMLA interference and retaliation claims and his ADA discrimination and retaliation claims. See J.A. 61–126. After discovery, the district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on those remaining claims. See J.A. 625–55.

On appeal, Adams presses his various FMLA and ADA claims, all of which arise from the same set of operative facts. We review de novo both the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373 (4th Cir.2013) ; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 400 (4th Cir.2011). Under our summary judgment standard, of course, the facts are generally viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; see Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

II.

Adams contends that the Board both interfered with his FMLA rights and retaliated against him for taking medical leave.

A.

The FMLA grants employees the prescriptive right to take up “to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12–month period” when, inter alia, an employee is burdened with “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform” his job. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). When returning from FMLA leave, an employee is also entitled to be restored to his previous position or an equivalent position, so long as he would have retained that position or an equivalent one absent the taking of leave. Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 546–47 (4th Cir.2006) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) ). That is, there is “no absolute right to restoration to a prior employment position.” Id. at 549. Nonetheless, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” an employee's FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

To make out an “interference” claim under the FMLA, an employee must thus demonstrate that (1) he is entitled to an FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) ); Wonasue v. Univ. of Md. Alumni Ass'n, 984 F.Supp.2d 480, 495 (D.Md.2013).

We begin by noting one salient fact: Adams was not denied FMLA leave. In fact, he took three separate medical leaves totaling well over twelve weeks. The Supreme Court has observed that the “purpose of [an interference claim] is to permit a court to inquire into matters such as whether the employee would have exercised his or her FMLA rights in the absence of the employer's actions.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 91, 122 S.Ct. 1155. Adams has not suggested that the Board denied him any FMLA leave he requested. On the contrary, Adams received more than the statutorily guaranteed amount.

Nevertheless, Adams argues that the Board interfered with his leave in a variety of ways that stopped short of actually denying him leave. In particular, he asserts that the Board took adverse employment actions against him, which interfered with his FMLA rights by discouraging the taking of leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (“ ‘Interfering with’ the exercise of an employee's rights would include, for example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave.”).

Adams first objects that the Board required him to submit to three unnecessary examinations by a Board-chosen specialist. But the FMLA and the applicable regulation explicitly allow employers to seek a second opinion and even a third, if the first two opinions conflict. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c), (d) ; 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(b), (c). Such medical opinions...