Adams v. Ault, No. C99-2110-MWB (N.D. Iowa 10/3/2001), C99-2110-MWB.
| Decision Date | 03 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C99-2110-MWB.,C99-2110-MWB. |
| Parties | TYRE DAMOND ADAMS, Petitioner, v. JOHN AULT, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Despite the tremendous interest federal courts have in ensuring that constitutional rights have been respected throughout the criminal justice process, petitioners seeking habeas corpus relief often tie the courts' hands by not exhausting their federal claims in state court. Because of its intricacy and complexity, habeas law has been indicted as being what Justice Frankfurter termed "an untidy area of our law." See Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 184 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). By this point in time, however, it is clear that, subject to certain exceptions, petitioners must exhaust their federal constitutional claims in state court before a federal court will be able to grant relief on those claims. It seems to the court that petitioners, or perhaps their lawyers, tend to pursue new and different claims each time a state court rejects a claim. Because of the extreme difficulty in overcoming state procedural defaults, petitioners seeking to preserve the federal habeas remedy should take care to properly exhaust their claims in state court in order to avoid procedural defaults. Or, in other words, they should hold tightly to the adage, if at first you don't succeed, try, try again.
In this action, petitioner Tyre Damon Adams ("Adams") seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his February 18, 1994 convictions in Iowa state court of three counts of robbery in the first degree.1 On March 29, 1994, Adams was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed twenty-five years on each count. Adams's sentences on Counts I and III were to run consecutively with each other, while his sentence on Count II was to run concurrently with the other counts.
Adams filed a direct appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court, raising only one issue for the court's consideration: "He contend[ed] the district court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on counts I and III." Decision Affirming Conviction, State v. Adams, Sup. Ct. No. 94-600 (Iowa Jan. 3, 1995). Adams argued that the sentencing court abused its discretion by considering only the grievous nature of the offense when it refused Adams's plea for a deferred judgment or concurrent sentences. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected Adams's contention and held that the record demonstrated that the sentencing court did not rely solely on the nature of the offense in imposing the consecutive sentences, and, consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentences that were within statutory guidelines. Id.
Upon the rejection of his direct appeal, Adams filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction relief court ("PCR court") heard on January 29, 1998. The PCR court identified Adams's issues for review as follows:
In his application for post-conviction relief, Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel for (1) failing to adequately investigate and impeach Andre Newell, Petitioner's accomplice, (2) failing to move for a mistrial on the basis of an unconstitutional jury selection process, (3) failing to move for a mistrial because a juror was sleeping, and (4) substituting alternate defense counsel for the reading of the verdict rather than being personally present. He also claims that the trial court erred by (1) failing to provide a jury panel which included African-Americans and (2) permitting the State to argue its case during voir dire. Finally, he claims that there was no probably cause for his arrest.
Adams v. State, PCR Hrg. No. PCCV076137 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Black Hawk Cty. Jan. 30, 1998). Adams and his counsel both agreed that these were the issues presented to the PCR court. PCR Tr., at 2-3, ll. 13-3, 6, 16. After receiving evidence, hearing testimony from Adams and his trial attorney, Mr. John Ackerman, and reviewing the trial transcript, the PCR court rejected each of Adams's claims.
Adams next appealed the dismissal of his post-conviction action to the Iowa Court of Appeals, arguing that the PCR court was not fair and impartial. Namely, he asserted that the PCR judge's statement that he hoped Adams's conviction would stand demonstrated impermissible bias that resulted in the denial of due process of law. In rejecting Adams's claim, the appellate court ruled that Adams did not properly preserve his bias claim because he failed to make a timely objection. Further, the court held that, even if Adams had made an objection, he failed to prove the merits of his due process claim.
In his pro se application for habeas relief, Adams asserted myriad myriads of claims. Of the thirteen original grounds asserted, however, petitioner wisely narrowed the focus of his assertions of error and briefed only five of his original claims.2 The issues Adams pursued are: (1) The destruction of a portion of the trial transcripts as a violation of Adams's Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) unconstitutional jury selection, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) conflicted representation, denying Adam's right to conflict-free counsel and due process of law (4) the Iowa sentencing statute's failure to establish guidelines for sentencing judges as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; and (5) the alleged bias of the PCR judge, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Pet.'s Br., at 1 (#31). Further, Adams requested an evidentiary hearing on his claims of conflicted representation and unconstitutional jury selection.
Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss filed a Report and Recommendation on September 5, 2001. In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Zoss concluded that all of Adams's claims were procedurally defaulted with the exception of the PCR court bias claim. With respect to the PCR court bias claim, Judge Zoss found that the Iowa Court of Appeals decided the claim on independent and adequate state grounds, barring federal review. Accordingly, Judge Zoss recommends denial of all of Adams's claims for relief and recommends entry of judgment in favor of the respondent. Judge Zoss further recommends that petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing be denied and that, in addition, a certificate of appealability be denied. Adams filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, through counsel, on September 17, 2001. In his objections, Adams objects to (1) the magistrate judge's inadvertent failure to address Adams's claim that the destruction of the trial transcripts violates his constitutional rights, (2) the finding that his PCR court bias claim was decided on independent and adequate state grounds when the Iowa court also reached the merits, (3) Judge Zoss's recommendation that an evidentiary hearing be denied, because Adams asserts that his habeas petition cannot meaningfully be reviewed absent a hearing concerning the destruction of the trial transcript, and, furthermore, he argues that any procedural default in that regard is due to ineffective assistance of counsel, thus excusing his failure to properly present the issues of conflicted representation and jury selection to the Iowa courts, (4) the conclusion that a federal constitutional issue was not fairly presented to the state court, thereby foreclosing federal review, with regard to Adams's claim that his right to due process was violated when the district court imposed consecutive twenty-five year sentences upon him, and (5) the finding that Adams made no substantial showing of a deprivation of any constitutional right, and, consequently, Adams objects to the recommendation that a certificate of appealability be denied.
The standard of review to be applied by the district court to a Report and Recommendation of a magistrate judge is established by statute:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate [judge].
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that it is reversible error for the district court to fail to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report when such review is required. See, e.g., Hosna v. Grosse, 80 F.3d 298, 306 (8th Cir.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 860 (1996); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994)); Hudson v. Gammon, 46 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 1995) (also citing Belk, 15 F.3d at 815). However, the plain language of the statute mandates de novo review only for "those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Therefore, those portions of the proposed findings or recommendations contained in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no objections are filed are reviewed only for "plain error." See Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1994) (). Adams has filed five objections to the Report and Recommendation, and the court will consider each in turn.
First, Adams points out that the Report and Recommendation fails to address his claim that the destruction of Volume II of the trial transcript substantially prejudiced Adams...
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