Adams v. Ballard
| Decision Date | 12 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-0382 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | DAVID KEITH ADAMS, Petitioner, v. DAVID BALLARD, Warden, Mount Olive Correctional Complex, Respondent. |
Pending is Petitioner David Keith Adams' Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF Nos. 1, 34, 34-1. This action was referred to the Honorable Cheryl A. Eifert, United States Magistrate Judge, for submission to this Court of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate Judge has submitted Findings of Fact and recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 44. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and movant's objections de novo, ADOPTS the Magistrates Judge's Findings and Recommendations and DENIES Petitioner's Amended Petition.
On August 23, 1998, Petitioner Adams ("Adams") met a woman, "S.B," at a bar in Wayne County. The two left the bar together and went to the home of one of Adams'aquaintances. When S.B. asked for a ride home, Adams refused to take her there, instead driving her around in his car. At various points throughout the night Adams forced the victim to perform sex acts, pulled her hair out, threatened to kill her, and forced her into the trunk of his car. Eventually Adams returned S.B. to her house. Three weeks later, S.B. went to Adams' house and confronted his wife, who permitted S.B. to look at the trunk of the car. Later that evening, the State Police arrived and impounded the car, advising Mrs. Adams that S.B. had accused Adams of kidnapping and rape. In November 1998, Adam was indicted on charges of kidnapping and second-degree sexual assault. Adam was convicted of these charges in a May 1999 jury trial, then sentenced to ten to twenty-five years imprisonment with mercy on the sexual assault count, to be served first, followed by life imprisonment with mercy on the kidnapping conviction. The factual history of this matter is given more fully in the Magistrate's Proposed Findings and Recommendations ("PF&R"), ECF No. 44, at 1-6.
Adams filed a Petition for Appeal and Writ of error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in May 2000; the appeal was denied in September 2000. In October 2000, Adams filed a state petition for habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1. Three hearings on the petition were held, and it was denied by written opinion in December 2004. ECF No. 8, Ex. 9. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused an appeal of this decision in November 2005. In May 2006, Adams filed a § 2254 Petition in this district, which Respondent moved to dismiss, arguing that Adams had not exhausted all of his state remedies for some portions of his Petition. In November 2007, Adams moved for and received a stay of his § 2254 Petition so that he could exhaust his state remedies. Adams then filed another petition for habeas corpus relief in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, which was denied (ECF No. 41, Ex. 13), as was his subsequent Petition for Appeal to the West VirginiaSupreme Court of Appeals. On July 1, 2010, the stay in Adams' § 2254 petition was lifted, Adams having exhausted all state remedies. Adams then filed an Amended Petition under § 2254; Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, and Adams responded. On October 31, 2011, Magistrate Judge Cheryl Eifert issued Proposed Findings and Recommendations ("PF&R"), recommending that the Court deny Adams' Petition and grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 44. Adams timely filed Objections to the PF&R (ECF No. 48), so this matter is ripe for resolution.
(1) 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), authorizes a federal court to review a petition for habeas corpus relief from a state prisoner claiming he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Where such claim was first adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding, the reviewing federal court may not grant the writ unless the state court's determination: 1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and (2).
Petitioner's Amended Petition alleges that the state court's determinations regarding his claims involved unreasonable applications of clearly established Federal law.1 Respondentmoved for summary judgment on all of Petitioner's claims, and the Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court grant the motion on all claims. Petitioner broadly objected to all findings and recommendations in the PF&R.
(2) Summary Judgment
To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter[.]" Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the Court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).
Although the Court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor[.]" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Petitioner's allegations can be divided into two groups: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) other claims.
Petitioner first claims that habeas corpus relief is appropriate because his trial counsel was ineffective. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in "all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. If an attorney's performance falls below a certain minimum level of professional competence, it may violate an accused's right to representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). The two-part test set forth in Strickland is used to determine whether an attorney's performance is deficient to the point of violating a defendant's right to effective assistance. Id. at 687. The first prong of Strickland requires the petitioner to show that his attorney committed an error that fell below a reasonable standard for professional competence. Id. The reasonableness standard is an objective inquiry, which contemplates a wide range of acceptable and professional representation. Id. at 689. The second prong of the test requires the petitioner to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. In all cases, however, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and a reviewing court must avoid second-guessing counsel's decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 689.
This standard is deferential, and becomes doubly so when applied in the context of a § 2254 proceeding, where relief from a state court decision may be granted only where the statecourt's determination regarding a federal constitutional claim was objectively unreasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011). In sum, "a state court's determination that [an ineffective assistance of counsel] claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of that decision." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 786-87. Applying this standard, Petitioner's claims for relief must fail.
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in eleven different ways.2 The Magistrate Judge's PF&R closely scrutinized and rejected each claim, and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate's finding that Petitioner does not assert an ineffective assistance of counsel ("Strickland") claim cognizable in this § 2254 proceeding. For the reasons below, and as set forth more fully in the PF&R, all of Petitioner's Strickland claims fail.
Many of Petitioner's Strickland claims can be characterized as complaints about trial counsel's strategic decisions. Such strategic decisions are afforded "enormous deference," and courts are cautioned to avoid second-guessing a trial counsel's assessment of proper litigation strategy. See United States v. Terry, 366 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2004). The claims falling into this category include Petitioner's claims that trial counsel erred in: 1) failing to call a key rebuttal witness; b) introducing prejudicial character evidence; c) allowing Petitioner's wife to testify; d) failing to investigate the credibility of victim testimony; and e) failing to move for suppression of certain evidence.
These claims do not assert a basis for relief given the...
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