Adams v. Brenan

• Decision Date: 21 December 1898
• Citation: 52 N.E. 314,177 Ill. 194
• Parties: ADAMS v. BRENAN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

177 Ill. 194

52 N.E. 314

ADAMS

v.BRENAN et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1898.

Appeal from superior court, Cook county; Farlin Q. Ball, Judge.

Bill by John L. Adams against Thomas Brenan and others and the board of education of the city of Chicago. The bill was dismissed, and complainant appeals. Reversed.

Paddock.

Wright & Billings, for appellant.

Tenny, McConnell, Coffeen & Harding, for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

Appellant, a taxpayer of the city of Chicago, suing on behalf of himself and the other taxpayers, filed his bill in this cause March 14, 1898, in the superior court of Cook county, against the board of education of said city of Chicago, John A. Knisely, a contractor, and said city of Chicago, asking to have a contract between the board of education and Knisely declared illegal, and to restrain the defendants from carrying out the same or expending money thereunder. The facts stated in the bill are substantially as follows: In September, 1897, the board of education entered into an agreement with an organization in said city known as the ‘Building Trades Council,’ representing labor or trades unions in said city, by which the board of education on its part agreed to insert in all contracts for work upon school buildings a provision that none but union labor should be employed in such work, and that none but union workmen should be employed and placed upon the pay rolls of said board. The Bryant School, one of the school houses under the care of the board, being in need of repair, the board advertised February 5, 1898, for bids for the construction of a roof on an addition thereto, which advertisement contained the following: ‘Notice: None but union labor shall be employed on any part of the work where said work is classified under any existing union. By order of board of education.’ On February 11, 1898, the defendant John A. Knisely, among other contractors, submitted his bid for the roof, in which he agreed to furnish material and do the work in strict accordance with the plans and specifications prepared and on file in the office of said board for the sum of $2,090, and to be bound by said condition, and further stated: ‘I, the undersigned, will do the above work for the sum of $1,900, provided all conditions as to the employment of none but union labor are stricken from the specifications and contract made accordingly. This last bid is made, not necessarily because the undersigned expects to employ nonunion labor for this work, but because it is worth to him the difference to have the liberty to do so should circumstances make it necessary or advisable.’ On February 23, 1898, the board accepted Knisely's higher bid of $2,090 with the restriction, and awarded to him the contract. About March 1, 1898, the board and Knisely entered into a contract in accordance with the bid so accepted, containing a provision that none but union labor should be employed by him. The work required by the contract was classified under the existing trades unions in the city of Chicago, and the term ‘union labor’ included only the labor of such mechanics and workmen as were members of voluntary associations in the city of Chicago commonly known as labor or trades unions, which did not embrace all the citizens, taxpayers, mechanics, or workmen in said city, a large property of whom do not belong to any trade or labor union. Upon the filing of the bill, application was made for a preliminary injunction, which was heard upon the bill, and affidavits and the record of proceedings of the board of education, which sustained the charged of the bill. The application was denied, and the court dismissed the bill for want of equity appearing upon its face.

The board of education of the city of Chicago is a public corporation, created by legislative authority as an agent of the state for the purpose of maintaining public schools and school buildings within that subdivision of the state. For the purposes of that function, it receives from the taxpayers, and holds as a trustee, the school fund, and is bound to administer it for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust. The taxpayers are, in equity, the owners of the fund, and the board can only hold and apply it to legitimate purposes of the trust. The law is established, beyond doubt or controversy, that a bill to enjoin public officers so situated from misappropriating the fund in their charge is a proper remedy for a taxpayer. Courts of chancery will interfere to restrain such authorities from a misuse of the fund intrusted to them, or its appropriation to a purpose not warranted by law. Colton v. Hanchett, 13 Ill. 615;Perry v. Kinnear, 42 Ill. 160;Beauchamp v. Supervisors, 45 Ill. 274;Jackson v. Norris, 72 Ill. 364;Board v. Weider, 64 Ill. 427;Chestnutwood v. Hood, 68 Ill. 132;Wright v. Bishop, 88 Ill. 302;Board v. Arnold, 112 Ill. 11;Stevens v. Training School, 144 Ill. 336, 32 N. E. 962.

The bill charges that this board has negotiated a sort of treaty with the Building Trades Council, a private organization, representing particular laborers or associations of workmen, and constituted for the furtherance of the interests of such laborers and workmen, the effect of which is to give those persons a monopoly of the work to be done for the public under the charge of the board. The record of the board shows an application by a committee of this Building Trades Council for the adoption of the provision in question. The provision was adopted by resolution of the board, with an agreement on the part of the Building Trades Council to call off a strike; and a reason given in the application to the board for the adoption of the clause was that it would do away with strikes upon school buildings, and thereby save the board much annoyance and delay. Ordinarily, the restraining power of a court of equity should be directed against the enforcement, rather than the passage, of unauthorized orders and resolutions; and, if this resolution was unlawful, it is a proper time to enjoin its enforcement when a contract like the one in question is made under it. Stevens v. Training School, supra. In the execution of this agreement and resolution, the board of education...