Adams v. Canfield
| Decision Date | 15 June 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 53.,53. |
| Citation | 263 Mich. 666,248 N.W. 800 |
| Parties | ADAMS v. CANFIELD. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County; William B. Brown, Judge.
Action by Esther Adams against Ernest S. Canfield. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
McAllister & McAllister, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Rodgers & Dunn, of Grand Rapids, for appellee.
The question is whether the court properly directed a verdict for defendant, on the ground of contributory negligence of plaintiff, in an action arising out of a collision of automobiles.
In the afternoon of a stormy, snowy, blustery day in January, plaintiff was riding in a car driven by her nephew, Wesley Wilkinson, going west on a gravel road in Kent county. They came to the Belt Line, a through highway paved with cement 20 feet wide, and stopped 5 feet from the pavement. They looked both to the right and left and saw no car approaching on the Belt Line. They could see about 180 feet. They started. to cross, attained a speed of 3 or 4 miles per hour at the center of the Belt Line, increased to 4 to 6 miles, and, when they had nearly crossed the pavement, their car was struck at the rear wheel by defendant's automobile, coming from the north at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour. Neither Wilkinson nor plaintiff made any observation to the north after starting the car. Wilkinson did not see defendant before the collision. Plaintiff saw defendant's car an instant before it struck. In 25 feet Wilkinson could have attained a speed of 13 miles per hour, which would have enabled him to cross in safety. At 4 miles per hour he could have stopped instantly. We will assume that defendant was guilty of negligence.
A driver desiring to cross a through or superhighway must stop, make reasonable observation for on-coming traffic, and proceed with reasonable dispatch. He must have in mind the superior rights of drivers on the through highway, that they presumably have the right of way, and that they may and do drive rapidly because they are not obliged to stop at the intersection of inferior roads. Whether a single lookout for traffic constitutes due care, and whether and how fast one shall cross, depends upon how far he can see and what he sees. The crossing is not a place for inattention or loitering.
A rate of speed on a through highway of 45 or more miles per hour is not illegal nor excessive nor uncommon. It...
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Wolfgram v. Valko
...should have costs. KAVANAGH, C. J., and SOURIS, J., concurred with BLACK, J. 1 See Fead, J. writing for the Court in Adams v. Canfield, 263 Mich. 666, 669, 248 N.W. 800, 801: 'In my opinion, the combination of plaintiff's failing to make further observation and of driving at a slow rate of ......
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Carey v. Derose, 36.
...198 N.W. 897; that a state of facts will not be deemed negligence as a matter of law if reasonable minds differ upon it, Adams v. Canfield, 263 Mich. 666, 248 N.W. 800; and that no hard and fast rule exists that speed or statutory right of way is determinative of negligence as a matter of l......
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Stillwell v. Grubaugh
...If so, the evidence should have been submitted to the jury. Detroit & Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99; Adams v. Canfield, 263 Mich. 666, 248 N.W. 800; Davis v. New York Central R. Co., 348 Mich. 262, 83 N.W.2d Clearly, with the dispute and conflict of testimony in this case, ......
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Nielsen v. Richman
...a point seventy to eighty feet from the intersection, the question of contributory negligence was for the jury. See also Adams v. Canfield, 263 Mich. 666, 248 N.W. 800; Calhoon v. D. C. & E. Mining Company, 202 Mo.App. 564, 209 S.W. 318; Page v. Cudahy Packing Company, 31 Cal. App.2d 282, 8......