Adams v. City of Greensburg

Decision Date14 March 2018
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 17-550
PartiesJUSTIN ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF GREENSBURG, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

Judge Cathy Bissoon

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety (Doc. 1). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED as to the following claims, which will be dismissed with prejudice:

Plaintiff's claims under the 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Fourth Amendment), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA");
Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination under Pennsylvania common law;
Plaintiff's claims for "discrimination," and "hostile work environment"; and
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania common law.

Defendants' motion also will be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint that properly asserts these claims.

Defendants' motion will be DENIED as to all remaining claims. Specifically, Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process claims, §1981 employment discrimination claims) will be allowed to proceed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Justin Adams, an African-American police officer with the Greensburg Police Department, alleges that he faced severe and pervasive race-based harassment at work and that he ultimately was terminated because of his race. (Complaint, ¶¶ 112-113, Doc. 1.) Defendants are police officers employed by the Greensburg Police Department, specifically, Sergeant Jason Gain ("Sergeant Gain"), Patrolman Jason Dieter ("Patrolman Dieter"), and Captain Robert Stafford ("Captain Stafford"); Chad Zucco ("Chief Zucco"), the Greensburg Chief of Police; Robert L. Bell ("Mayor Bell"), the Mayor and City Council President of Greensburg; the Greensburg Police Department ("GPD"); and the City of Greensburg ("Greensburg""). (Complaint, ¶¶ 2-7, 41, 61.)

To state the relevant allegations, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following. Plaintiff was hired by the GPD as a full-time officer on June 21, 2015, through the civil service process. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 13, 15). Throughout his employment, he was the only African-American employee at the police department. (Id. at ¶ 99.) During the first weeks of his employment, Plaintiff alleges that disparaging comments were directed at him relating to his skin color, including "[t]here was one black guy here prior to you for a reason," and "[y]ou know that you can't talk like 'them' while in uniform." (Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.)

Following his hire, the GPD sent Plaintiff undercover "to African American beer gardens . . . to buy drugs." (Id. at ¶ 17.) Patrolman Dieter told Plaintiff that he was good at identifying African-American suspects because "they all look the same." (Id. at ¶ 19.) Patrolman Dieter allegedly made additional disparaging comments concerning Plaintiff's race, such as a comment at a firearms training in mid-September 2015, in front of superior officers including Captain Stafford, telling Plaintiff "you know that we don't hold our gun sideways when we shoot, right?"(Id. at ¶ 61.) On or about January 14, 2016, Patrolman Dieter allegedly asked Plaintiff why "his people" could say the "'N' word?" (Id. at ¶ 63.) Later, on or about April 9, 2016, Patrolman Dieter allegedly told Plaintiff that "[i]t's embarrassing to us when you play that kind of 'stuff' when coming to work," referring to the hip-hop music Plaintiff was playing in his car while arriving at the police station. (Id. at ¶¶ 71-72.) At some point during his employment, in the course of a dinner provided to officers gathered in a break room, Patrolman Dieter allegedly loudly stated "I bet you are disappointed that it is not fried chicken!" causing officers in the room to laugh at Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-76.)

In addition to these comments from Patrolman Dieter, Plaintiff alleges that throughout his employment Sergeant Gain would make derogatory remarks about his race, in public or in front of Plaintiff's superiors. (Id. at ¶¶ 49-51.) For example, he alleges that Sergeant Gain told him, while standing outside of a gas station, that more black people would be able to join the police force "if they weren't so busy doing drugs, and getting arrested." (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66.)

A fellow officer, not a Defendant in this case, allegedly told Plaintiff, in the presence of supervisors, that "if a black man needs a' killing, you are going to have to do it!" to avoid a situation in which the GPD would "make the news." (Id. at ¶¶) 96-98.)

Plaintiff states that, at various times, he asked his superiors for relief from this pattern of behavior, and from the distress he was experiencing. (Id. at ¶ 79.) However, no actions were taken to remedy the situation. (Id. at ¶¶ 87, 100.)

On April 27, 2016, Chief Zucco terminated Plaintiff's employment in a meeting with Captain Stafford and another officer. (Id. at ¶¶ 80-82.) None of the reasons provided for Plaintiff's termination had been previously written up or reprimanded, as required by the GPD's Standard Operating Procedure Manual. (Id. at ¶ 86.)

Based on these facts, Plaintiff's Complaint contains five counts, which collectively assert numerous civil rights claims against all Defendants. Specifically, in Count I, Plaintiff asserts violations of (a) the Equal Protection1 and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, (b) the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, (c) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986, (d) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), and (e) the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a claim of wrongful discharge under Pennsylvania common law. In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff asserts, respectively, a claim of "discrimination" and a claim of "hostile work environment." In Count V, Plaintiff asserts a Pennsylvania law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

ANALYSIS2
I. Claims for Civil Rights Violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation wascommitted by a person acting under color of state law. See Mosca v. Cole, 217 Fed. App'x 158, 163 (3d Cir. 2007). Plaintiff has alleged violations of several rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court will take each of these claims in turn and address whether they are sufficiently stated to withstand Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

A. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. "The central purpose of the Clause is to prevent the States from purposely discriminating between individuals on the basis of race." Johnson v. Fuentes, 704 Fed. App'x 61, 65 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The elements of a valid § 1983 claim for a denial of Equal Protection based on intentional racial animus are that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (3) the defendant treated plaintiff differently because of his race. Id. There are multiple ways for a plaintiff to prove such a claim, including through race-based comments that reveal a discriminatory motive underlying an adverse employment action. Id. at 66 (citing Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 368-69 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is black, that Defendants were public officials acting in accordance with their roles or as city entities, and that Defendants intentionally treated him with racial hostility throughout his employment, eventually terminating him because of his race. Defendants do not address the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in their arguments supporting their Motion to Dismiss, and do not attempt to demonstrate why an Equal Protection claim would not survive. (See Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss,hereinafter "Brief Supporting MTD," Doc. 5). As a result, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim.

B. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. There are two steps to properly asserting a procedural due process claim based on a deprivation of property: (1) alleging a deprivation of a property interest that is encompassed within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) alleging that the procedures attendant to the deprivation were constitutionally deficient. See Iles v. de Jongh, 638 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

Police officers' property interest in their employment status is a matter of state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Under Pennsylvania law, police officers' property interest in their employment is determined by whether an officer "can establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either a contract or a statute." Toth v. Bethel Township, 268 F. Supp. 3d 725, 731 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Pipkin v. Pa. State Police, 693 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. 1997)). The nature of a city officer's interest thus depends on a fact-sensitive inquiry into the applicable city ordinance and the officer's status under that ordinance. Cf. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344-46 (analyzing city ordinance setting conditions of dismissal for police officers and resolving protection of employment interest based on the district judge's construction of a city...

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