Adams v. City of Richmond
| Decision Date | 11 November 1960 |
| Citation | 340 S.W.2d 204 |
| Parties | L. C. ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF RICHMOND, Kentucky, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Kentucky |
Thomas D. Shumate, Richmond, for appellants.
Chenault & Coy, H. Douglas Parris, Richmond, for appellees.
CULLEN, Commissioner.
This appeal presents a zoning question with some novel aspects. The appeal is from a judgment upholding the action of the city council of Richmond, a city of the third class, in zoning a parcel of annexed land for commercial use.
Richmond adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1956, under KRS 100.500 to 100.830. In June 1959 the city annexed three vacant lots adjoining the northern boundary of the city, having a frontage of some 82 feet on the east side of U. S. Highway 25, which is West Main Street extended. These lots were owned by Richmond Restaurants Company, and at the time of the annexation the members of the city council knew that the company intended to build a drive-in restaurant on the lots.
Immediately after the annexation the company submitted to the city planning and zoning commission a request for recommendation that the lots be zoned for commercial use. However, the commission recommended that the lots be zoned resi dential, which recommendation was transmitted to the city council. On August 3, 1959, the city council rejected the commission's recommendation and adopted an ordinance zoning the lots for commercial use. Some two weeks later this action was brought by a number of neighboring property owners of the city, alleging that the zoning ordinance was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, and seeking to enjoin the construction and operation of a restaurant on the lots. After a trial the circuit court entered judgment dismissing the complaint. The complaining property owners have appealed.
The evidence shows that from the original city limits on West Main Street (U. S. Highway 25) to a point some six blocks south thereof, the territory on both sides of the street, to a depth varying from one to four blocks, is zoned residential and used for residential purposes, except for one parcel adjoining the city limits on the west side of the street. This parcel, which is diagonally across the street from the lots here in issue, had for many years been occupied by a filling station. There is some indication that the zoning status of this parcel was intended to be that of a nonconforming commercial use in a residential zone, but the zoning ordinance of 1956 actually designates it as a commercial zone.
North of the city limits on the east side of U. S. Highway 25 there are three residential subdivisions occupied in the main by expensive private residences. However, there are in this area a public swimming pool, a state highway department garage and parking lot, a medical clinic and a motel. On the west side of the highway there is a large farm.
The judicial test to be applied to the zoning ordinance is whether or not the ordinance bears any substantial relation to the objects set forth in KRS 100.520, which specifies the purposes of zoning regulations in cities of the third to sixth classes. Bryn v. Beechwood Village, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 395; City of Richlawn v. McMakin, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902. If it has no such relaton it will be invalidated as arbitrary and capricious.
If we limit our consideration to the territory within the present city limits we think it is clear that the zoning ordinance here in question does have a substantial relation to the objects of the statute. Any proper zoning plan makes provision for commercial development in appropriate areas. There appears to be nothing inappropriate in providing for a commercial zone at the edge of the city; in fact, as most cities have grown that is where the commercial development has been. The mere fact that the area running into the city from the limits is residential in nature does not preclude the establishment of a commercial zone on the edge.
Here, there has been a commercial zone of several years' standing on the west side of the highway at the city limits. It appears that the lots on the east side, here in question, were to some extent separated from the property to the south by an old railroad fill, and that the lots required a considerable amount of filling to bring them up to the street level. These facts furnish some justification for placing the lots in a zoning classification different from that of the property to the south.
The zoning of the lots for commercial use cannot be classed as spot zoning because the location of the lots on the edge of the city, across the street from a commercial zone, and the physical characteristics of...
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