Adams v. City of Kan. City
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-CV-00093-W-WBG |
| Parties | CRAIG ADAMS and JOSEPH KNOPP, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Several motions are currently pending before the Court. Docs. 534, 536, 556, 558, 567. This Order sets forth the Court's decisions on Defendant's Motion to Remove Individuals from Conditionally Certified Class (Doc. 534) and Defendant's Motion to Decertify Class (Doc. 536).
Plaintiffs Craig Adams and Joseph Knopp are employed as firefighters with Defendant City of Kansas City, Missouri ("the City"). In January 2019, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed this matter in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, alleging the City erroneously calculated overtime pay for firefighters, violating the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Doc. 1-1.1 In February 2019, the City removed the matter to this Court. Doc. 1.
In November 2019, Plaintiffs moved for conditional certification of an FLSA collective action, which the City opposed. Docs. 23-24, 27, 29. In January 2020, the Honorable John T.Maughmer, United States Magistrate Judge, granted Plaintiffs' motion and conditionally certified a collective action consisting of current and former firefighters employed by the City who received certification or incentive pay at any time since January 10, 2016. Doc. 45. Pursuant to the Court's Order, those firefighters were notified of the collective action and instructed to submit a consent form if they wanted to join the collective action. Id. at 7. According to Plaintiffs' counsel, 474 individuals submitted consent forms by the April 14, 2020 deadline.2 Doc. 531; see also Docs. 49-529 (filed consent forms).
On August 21, 2020, the City filed motions asking the Court to remove individuals from the conditionally certified collective action and decertify the collective action. Docs. 534, 536. On September 10, 2020, the Court granted the parties' joint request to stay briefing in this matter pending mediation. Docs. 545-46. After the mediation, the Court granted the parties' requests for additional time to respond to pending motions and provided a new deadline for dispositive motions. Docs. 548-50. On September 23, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the City's motion to decertify the collective action (Doc. 552) but did not file any opposition to the City's motion to remove individuals from the collective action. The City did not file a reply in further support of its motion to decertify the collective action.
On September 28, 2020, this matter was transferred to the undersigned, and on October 19, 2020, the parties consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction. Docs. 553, 555, 555-1. Since that time, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and Defendant filed a motion for leave to file a sur-reply in further support of its summary judgment, all of which remain pending. Docs. 556, 558, 567. This Order only addresses the City's motion to decertify the collective action andthe City's motion to remove individuals from the collective action. The remaining motions will be decided in a separate order issued at a later date.
The FLSA mandates an employer may not subject non-exempt employees to a work week in excess of forty hours, unless the employee is compensated for his or her overtime with additional pay of at least one and one-half times his or her regular hourly wage. 29 U.S.C. § 207. "[A]ny one or more employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated" may bring a collective action against an employer for unpaid overtime. Id. § 216(b). The FLSA does not define "similarly situated," but the Eighth Circuit has held "Plaintiffs may be similarly situated when they suffer from a single, FLSA-violating policy, and when proof of that policy or of conduct in conformity with that policy proves a violation as to all the plaintiffs." Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotations omitted), aff'd and , 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
As noted in the Court's Order conditionally certifying the collective action, the Eighth Circuit has not adopted a particular standard for certification of a collective action. But this Court and a majority of district courts in the Eighth Circuit3 apply the two-step analysis adopted by the Fifth Circuit. Doc. 45, at 2 (citations omitted); see also Haworth v. New Prime, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1066 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (citations omitted); Larson v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., No. 16-00902-CV-W-ODS, 2018 WL 6495074, at *15 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2018); Fast v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 243 F.R.D. 360, 362-63 (W.D. Mo. 2007) (citations omitted).
The first step involves a motion for conditional certification for notification purposes. Doc. 45, at 2. At this step, the plaintiffs must make a "modest factual showing sufficient to demonstrate that they and the putative class members were victims of a single decision, policy, or plan." Brackett v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, No. 4:12-CV-898-JAR, 2014 WL 1377460, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) (citation and internal quotations omitted). As mentioned supra, section I, the Court conditionally certified this collective action, and potential collective members were notified and given the opportunity to join the collective action.4 Id. at 3-8.
At the second step, the employer may move to decertify the FLSA collective action if, after conducting discovery, the evidence establishes the members of the conditionally certified collective action are not similarly situated. See Fast, 243 F.R.D. at 363. When considering a motion to decertify, the Court weighs factors such as "disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, including whether plaintiffs were affected by a common decision, plan or policy"; "various defenses available to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff"; and "fairness and procedural considerations." See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); Kautsch v. Premier Commc'ns, No. 06-CV-4035-NKL, 2008 WL 294271 at *2 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008); see also Harris v. Express Courier Int'l, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-05033, 2017 WL 5606751, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2017) (citation omitted); Rikard v. U.S. Auto Prot., LLC, No. 4:11CV1580 JCH, 2013 WL 5532688, at*3 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 2013) (citations omitted). When faced with a motion to decertify, the collective action members must "demonstrate a 'reasonable basis' for their claim of a class-wide violation." Kautsch, 2008 WL 294271 at *1 (quoting Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Even if the collective action members' factual and employment settings differ and the employer's defenses are individualized to the plaintiffs, this Court "must balance those factors with the fundamental purpose of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)." Id. at *2 (citation omitted). Section 216(b)'s fundamental purpose is "to lower the costs to the plaintiffs through the pooling of resources" and "limit the controversy to one proceeding which efficiently resolves 'common issues of law and fact that arose from the same alleged activity.'" Id. (quoting Moss v. Crawford & Co., 201 F.R.D. 398, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2000)); see also Morgan v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1264 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)); Rikard, 2013 WL 5532688, at *3 (citations omitted).
The City asks the Court to decertify the collective action because individual defenses predominate, a collective action is not procedurally efficient in this matter, and collective adjudication would violate the City's right to due process. Doc. 536. Plaintiffs oppose the City's motion, arguing the matter should proceed as a collective action. Doc. 552.
(1) Factual and Employment Settings of Individual Plaintiffs
The City's motion to decertify references the first factor this Court must consider when deciding a motion to decertify - i.e., "disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, including whether plaintiffs were affected by a common decision, plan or policy." Doc. 536, at 2. However, the City raises no argument as to why this factor weighs in favor of (or against)decertification. Instead, the "factual background" of the City's motion states certain "credentialed and cross-trained" individuals were allowed "additional compensation" in the form of "special duty, assignment, and certification pay[ ]." Doc. 536, at 1-2 (citation omitted). This statement suggests the collective action members were affected by the same policy.
Plaintiffs' response to the City's motion confirms the collective action members were affected by the same policy. That is, they are or were entitled to a higher rate of pay based on completed certifications, advanced education, executing special duties, and/or fulfilling certain responsibilities. Doc. 552, at 1-2, 6; Doc. 552-1. Although permitted to do so, the City did not file a reply to Plaintiffs' opposition, and thus, did not dispute Plaintiffs' arguments and evidence establishing the collective action members' pay was determined in the same manner and pursuant to the same policy.
Because they were affected by the same policy, the collective action members are similarly situated. See Kautsch, 2008 WL 294271, at *1. The same evidence will be utilized...
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