Adams v. Cnty. of Sacramento

• Decision Date: 10 January 2023
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-01499 WBS KJN
• Parties: KATE ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a political subdivision of the state of California; SHERIFF SCOTT JONES in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of the County of Sacramento, and DOES 1-10 Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

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KATE ADAMS, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a political subdivision of the state of California; SHERIFF SCOTT JONES in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of the County of Sacramento, and DOES 1-10 Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01499 WBS KJN

United States District Court, E.D. California

January 10, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Kate Adams brought this action against the County of Sacramento, Sheriff Scott Jones, and Does 1 through 10 (collectively “defendants”), alleging violations of her federal civil rights and of state law stemming from events surrounding her resignation as Chief of Police of Rancho Cordova, California. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) She asserts claims for (1) procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violation of the

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First Amendment; (3) First Amendment conspiracy; (4) false light; (5) false light conspiracy; (6) violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h); (7) violation of the California Public Safety Officer Procedural Bill of Rights (“PBOR”), Cal. Gov. Code § 3300 et seq; (8) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.) Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. (Mot. (Docket No. 7-1).)

I. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff began working for the Sacramento County Sheriff's Office (“Department”) in 1994. (Compl. ¶ 18.) In March 2020, plaintiff was selected as the Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova. (Id. ¶ 34.)

Prior to her selection for Chief of Police, plaintiff was contacted in February 2019 about possible misconduct involving Sheriff's Captain LeeAnneDra Marchese. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff forwarded the allegation to the Department's Internal Affairs Division. (Id. ¶ 29.)

In November 2019, nine months after forwarding the complaint about Marchese, plaintiff alleges she received the first complaint ever filed against her in her 25 years as a law enforcement officer. (Id. ¶ 31.) Shortly after, two more complaints were filed against plaintiff alleging similar instances of misconduct.^[1] (Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.) The Sheriff's

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Department's Internal Affairs Office investigated all threes complaints, formally concluded they were baseless, and cleared plaintiff of any wrongdoing. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 35.) Plaintiff alleges that she grew suspicious that either Marchese or Assistant Commander Gail Vasquez^[2] were responsible for the complaints.^[3] (Id. ¶ 38.)

As a result of these complaints and her growing suspicions about who was responsible, plaintiff submitted a formal complaint with Sacramento County's Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office against Marchese for harassment and retaliatory behavior. (Id. at 42.) Plaintiff alleges that when Marchese was interviewed regarding the EEO complaint, Marchese disclosed that plaintiff had sent text messages which included racist images^[4] to her and Morrissey (Vasquez's husband) seven

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years earlier.^[5] (Id. ¶ 43.) Marchese and Vasquez are the two people plaintiff had suspected were responsible for the three complaints filed against her.^[6] (Id. ¶ 38.)

When Marchese shared the details of the text messages during the EEO investigation interview, she provided printed screenshots. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff alleges that Marchese had “miraculously” printed these screenshots, which failed to include the larger context of the text message conversation, despite having previously disposed of the phone on which she received the text messages. (Id.) Plaintiff similarly alleges that Marchese was also somehow aware that Morrisey had not only received the same text messages but had also printed screenshots. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49.) Plaintiff further alleges that Doe defendants “collectively hid and distorted the original context and language accompanying the images to suggest that [plaintiff] somehow endorsed or supported the images' racist message.”^[7] (Id. ¶ 51.)

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At the time of the text messages, New Year's Eve 2013, plaintiff alleges she and Morrissey had been engaged in a “casual text message conversation,” wishing one another Happy New Year's and sharing videos of plaintiff's children playing. (Id. ¶ 22.). Plaintiff alleges that during this conversation she sent Morrissey the racist image along with the message: “Some rude racist just sent this!!” (Id. ¶ 24.) Morrissey replied: “That's not right.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff replied back with a similar image and text message stating: “Oh, and just in case u [sic] think I encourage this . . . .”^[8] (Id. ¶ 24.) Notably, plaintiff does not mention that she sent the same text messages to Marchese nor who originally sent the racist images to her.

Upon learning about the text messages, the Department shifted its EEO investigation from investigating the anonymous complaints filed against plaintiff into an investigation about the text messages. (Id. ¶¶ 52-53.) Defendant Sheriff Jones selected John McGinnis,^[9] allegedly a close personal friend and political endorser of Jones, to investigate. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff alleges that the standard procedure, however, is for the County's inspector general to conduct these types of explaining that Morrisey was a cell phone forensics specialist for the Department and “possesses extensive expertise in

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investigations. (Id.)

At the conclusion of the investigation, plaintiff alleges the Department presented her with a choice: resign and avoid the racist images from becoming public or be terminated and risk her reputation. (Id. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff alleges the Department wanted plaintiff to resign “out of a desire to conceal from the public the fact that its officers had failed to report a purportedly racist communication by a fellow officer for over seven years”^[10] and “her resignation was the best way to avoid a ‘media circus' that could harm the reputations and political futures of all involved.”^[11] (Id. ¶¶ 59-60.)

On September 12, 2021, plaintiff resigned as the Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants' “threat to make the false allegations public unless she resigned, and the terrifying potential consequences for her family if those allegations played out in the media, was paramount in her decision to retire.” (Id. ¶ 61.) At the time of her resignation, the text messages were not public.

However, on March 4, 2022, the Sacramento Bee (“Bee”)

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published an article about plaintiff's resignation.^[12] (Id. ¶ 71). The Bee article was based on an open letter published by the President of the Sacramento chapter of the NAACP^[13] as well as statements made by a Sacramento County spokesperson in response to the Bee's request for comment. (Id. ¶ 72.) The Bee article stated: “A Sacramento County spokesperson . . . said the outside investigation concluded, and that the involved employee retired voluntarily before the Sheriff's Office could formally hand down discipline.” (Defs.' Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. A, at 6 (Docket No. 7-2).)

Six days after the Bee article was published, William Jessup University requested plaintiff resign from her position as adjunct professor. (Id. ¶ 78.) Roughly a month later, plaintiff was informed by the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards (“POST”) that she could not be hired despite passing

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the entry exam with a score of 90 out of 100. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 79.) Plaintiff alleges that she then decided to “file this lawsuit to defend her reputation . . . .” (Opp'n at 5.)

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal when the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the complaint has alleged “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” id., and thereby stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

B. Procedural Due Process (Claim 1)

To state a procedural due process claim in a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process.” Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Here, defendants do not challenge that plaintiff had a property

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interest in her public employment as chief of police for the city of Rancho Cordova. Rather, defendants argue that plaintiff's procedural due process claim must fail because she voluntarily resigned.^[14]

Plaintiff contends that she did not voluntarily resign but rather she was constructively discharged. (See Compl. ¶ 89.) A resignation “may be involuntary and constitute a deprivation of property for purposes of a due process claim” where “a reasonable person in [that] position would feel [they] had no choice but to [resign].” Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2009) (no constructive discharge where plaintiff resigned to maintain his health insurance coverage because he had not been informed that he would be terminated and he had the ability to oppose investigation) (quoting Kalvinskas v. Cal Inst. of Tech., 96 F.3d 1305, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1996) (constructive...