Adams v. Comm. on Judicial Conduct & Disability

• Decision Date: 25 February 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-cv-01046-YGR
• Citation: 165 F.Supp.3d 911
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: John Adams, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Committee on Judicial Conduct & Disability, et al., Defendants.

165 F.Supp.3d 911

John Adams, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Committee on Judicial Conduct & Disability, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01046-YGR

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed February 25, 2016

Lawrence Anthony Organ, California Civil Rights Law Group, San Anselmo, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth Shapiro, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Michael Andrew Zee, U.S. Department of Justice, Douglas R. Young, Christoffer Lee, Morgan Todd Jackson, Farella Braun & Martel LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

Order Granting Motions To Dismiss Without Leave To Amend

Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 26

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs John Adams and Shane Castle (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Defendants Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States (“the Committee”) and Cathy A. Catterson, in her official capacity as Circuit and Court of Appeals Executive to the United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit (“Catterson”). The Committee and Catterson each bring motions to dismiss the action pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

, and each joins in the other's arguments in their respective motions. (Dkt. Nos. 25 and 26.) The Committee argues that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claim for violation of the First Amendment because it is completely barred by sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and judicial immunity. The Committee further argues that both Plaintiffs' claims for violation of the First Amendment and for relief under the Federal Records Act are without substantive merit on the face of the complaint. Catterson's motion raises additional arguments for dismissal based upon quasi-judicial immunity and the judicial deliberative privilege.

Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the supplemental briefing, the arguments, and the pleadings in this action, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court Grants in Part the Motions to Dismiss as set forth herein Without Leave To Amend . The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not stated a viable First Amendment violation, which requires dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)

, as well as under Rule 12(b)(1) on sovereign immunity grounds. Moreover, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims against the Committee based upon lack of standing and absolute judicial immunity; and over the claims against Catterson based upon quasi-judicial immunity. The Court further finds that any amendment of the complaint would be futile given the legal bases for dismissal.

I. Background

The complaint alleges as follows: Plaintiff John Adams, a member of the press corps residing in Helena, Montana, is a reporter who received a copy of the email that spawned the complaints and investigation concerning Judge Richard F. Cebull, then-Chief Judge of the United States District Court of Montana. (Complaint ¶¶ 4, 8, 10.) Adams interviewed Judge Cebull on February 29, 2012, and alleges that Judge Cebull admitted to sending the email in question and admitted it was sent from his Court-issued email address. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Adams authored a news story about the email incident and Judge Cebull's response. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff Shane Castle is the executive director of Big Sky Investigative Reporting, a nonprofit investigative media organization in Montana. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

A. Complaint Against Judge Cebull

Complaints were filed and an investigation was launched as to misconduct by Judge Cebull. (Complaint ¶ 10; see also In re Judicial Misconduct , 751 F.3d 611 (U.S.Jud.Conf.2014)

(Memorandum of Decision filed January 17, 2014, by the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States on Proceedings In Review of the Order and Memorandum of the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit on Judicial Council matter numbers 09-12-90026 and 09-12-90032).) The Committee's investigation revealed that Judge Cebull sent “hundreds” of emails with inappropriate comments related to race, sex, national origin, religion, and sexual orientation, as well comments on political issues that might come before the court and showing disdain for liberal political leaders. (Complaint at ¶ 13; In re Judicial Misconduct , 751 F.3d at 616.)

The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council initially issued a decision on the complaints on March 15, 2013 (“March 2013 Decision”), ordering sanctions against Judge Cebull including a public reprimand, a 180-day suspension of assignment of new cases, and required training course on judicial ethics and bias, as well as a requirement that he give a public apology approved by the Judicial Council. In re Judicial Misconduct , 751 F.3d at 614

. On

April 2, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council announced that Judge Cebull had decided to retire effective May 3, 2013. Id. at 615

. The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council vacated the March 2013 Decision, and reissued an amended, much-abbreviated July 2, 2013 order. Upon review, the Committee subsequently ordered that the March 2013 Decision be published and adopted as the final order disposing of the complaints on the merits. Id. at 618. The ultimate decision of the Committee was issued January 17, 2014.

B. Plaintiffs' Request and the Instant Complaint

Plaintiffs allege that, on or about January 13, 2015, they sought copies of the emails written by Judge Cebull by request to Defendant Catterson, and were denied copies of those emails by “Defendants.” (Complaint ¶¶ 4, 5, 14.) They allege that “Defendants” denied the requests based upon 28 U.S.C. section 360

and an exemption for “the courts of the United States” under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. section 551(1)(B) (the “FOIA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 18.) Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” are “a section of the United States Government” and have no compelling interest justifying a prohibition on release of “information contained in the investigative file including the emails independently created or received by Judge Cebull,” in light of the completion of the investigation, and the finding that the complaints against Judge Cebull had merit. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15.)

Plaintiffs allege that “the Defendant Committee” has acted unlawfully by refusing to produce Judge Cebull's emails, since they are not private or confidential documents. (Complaint ¶ 22.) They further allege that, to the extent “Defendants” are relying on statutes to prevent dissemination and review of the discriminatory emails at issue, those statutes are unconstitutional in that they “abridge the Freedom of the Press guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (Id. at ¶ 22.) Finally, they allege that, by withholding access to the discriminatory emails, and thereby preventing these reporters' stories, “Defendants” are abridging freedom of the press. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for: (1) violation of the First Amendment; and (2) violation of 44 U.S.C. section 3101

, the Federal Records Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek: (i) a declaration that section 360(a) and the FOIA's exemption for the judiciary is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs and other members of the press; (ii) an order to preserve all emails written or received by Judge Cebull containing discriminatory or bigoted statements or content; (iii) a declaration that Judge Cebull's emails are subject to disclosure to the press; (iv) an order mandating that the Committee create, manage and maintain a system by which the emails of all Federal Judges, and Judge Cebull's emails in particular, are maintained so that they may be produced in the future in connection with a FOIA request and/or a litigation-related discovery order; and (v) nominal damages and costs of litigation.

II. Legal Standards Applicable to the Motions

A. Rule 12(b )(1)

Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court bears the burden of establishing that the court has the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. Id.

A challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

may be facial or factual. See

White v. Lee , 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir.2000). In a facial attack, the jurisdictional challenge is confined to the allegations pleaded in the complaint. See

Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir.2004). The challenger asserts that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient “on their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. See

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.2004). To resolve this challenge, the court assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing dismissal. See

Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362.

Where both jurisdictional and merits grounds are presented in a motion, the Court looks to the jurisdictional issues first. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. , 549 U.S. 422, 431, 127 S.Ct. 1184, 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007)

.

B. Rule 12(b )(6)

Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir.2003). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Johnson v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 653 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir.2011). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a...