Adams v. Comm'r of Correction., 31388.

Decision Date03 May 2011
Docket NumberNo. 31388.,31388.
Citation17 A.3d 479,128 Conn.App. 389
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
PartiesSean ADAMSv.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Damon A.R. Kirschbaum, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).Robert J. Scheinblum, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Linda N. Howe, former senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).DiPENTIMA, C.J., and ROBINSON and BORDEN, Js.ROBINSON, J.

The petitioner, Sean Adams, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that the state withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In addition, he asserts that he was deprived of a fair trial by the state's knowing use of false testimony. We reverse the judgment of the habeas court.

The facts surrounding the petitioner's underlying conviction were set forth by this court in State v. Henry, 72 Conn.App. 640, 805 A.2d 823, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 917, 811 A.2d 1293 (2002), a companion case to the petitioner's direct appeal. “At approximately 2 a.m. on December 14, 1996, [Darcus Henry] and three fellow members of a street gang, [the petitioner], Carlos Ashe and Johnny Johnson, went to a housing project in New Haven and fired with automatic or semiautomatic weapons at three unarmed members of a rival street gang. During the attack, [Henry] and his companions killed Jason Smith and seriously injured Marvin Ogman and Andre Clark. The motive for the attack was to avenge the murder of a former member of the [petitioner's] gang, Tyrese Jenkins, by members of the rival gang, one of whom was Clark's cousin.” Id., at 643, 805 A.2d 823.

The petitioner, Henry, Ashe and Johnson were arrested and charged in separate four count substitute informations with murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8 (a), conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 (a) and 53a–54a (a), and two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–59 (a)(5) and 53a–8 (a). The four individual cases subsequently were consolidated and tried jointly before a jury. Clark testified at the criminal trial, and he identified the petitioner as one of the individuals who had been involved in the shooting. The jury found the petitioner guilty of all four counts, and the trial court thereafter sentenced him to a total effective term of 100 years imprisonment. In the petitioner's direct appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. State v. Adams, 72 Conn.App. 734, 735–36, 806 A.2d 111 (2002). Our Supreme Court denied the petitioner's request for certification to appeal from that decision. State v. Adams, 262 Conn. 916, 811 A.2d 1292 (2002).

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the present appeal. On December 16, 1998, Roger Dobris, an assistant state's attorney, filed two substitute informations, charging Clark with one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35 and two counts of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a–277. On that same date, Clark pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine 1 to all three charges. During the plea canvass, the trial court explained that if Clark were to receive the maximum sentence for all three charges, he would face up to thirty-five years imprisonment and $101,000 in fines. The court went on to explain, however, that the sentence would “be a cap of four years with a right to argue for less” and that [t]he cap situation depend[ed] to a large extent on [Clark's] cooperation with the state.” Neither the court nor Dobris indicated what had induced Clark to plead guilty. The court postponed the sentencing hearing until a later date.

Approximately eleven months after Clark had entered his guilty plea, James Clark, a senior assistant state's attorney, called Clark as a witness at the petitioner's criminal trial.2 During his testimony, Clark was cross-examined regarding his pending criminal charges. When asked whether the state had extended any offers of consideration to him in exchange for his testimony, Clark testified in the negative. Clark claimed that he had agreed to testify simply out of a desire for justice. When asked if he expected to receive the full sentence on his pending criminal charges, Clark testified that “you do the crime, you got to do the time, if they give me [the full sentence], they give me [the full sentence]....” Neither Attorney Clark nor Clark disclosed to the petitioner, or to the trial court, that Clark had entered a guilty plea on the pending criminal charges. Moreover, Attorney Clark failed to disclose that the court had indicated that it would impose a sentence cap of four years, conditioned on Clark's cooperation with the state.

On September 14, 2001, approximately twenty-two months after Clark had testified at the petitioner's criminal trial, Clark's sentencing hearing was held. At the hearing, following the request of Dobris, the court vacated Clark's guilty plea with respect to the count of carrying a pistol without a permit and one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell. The state entered a nolle prosequi on both charges. As to the one remaining charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell, Dobris recommended that the court impose an unconditional discharge. After Dobris made a brief statement in support of his recommendation,3 the court imposed an unconditional discharge as to the remaining charge.

On March 14, 2008, the petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the state had withheld impeachment evidence by failing to disclose to the petitioner that it had agreed to favorably resolve pending criminal charges against Clark in exchange for his testimony against the petitioner.4 The petitioner further alleged that, as a result of this undisclosed agreement, he had been deprived of a fair trial because the state had failed to correct Clark's testimony on cross-examination, in which he denied that he had received consideration in exchange for his testimony.

On April 15, 2008, the habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the amended petition. Attorney Clark testified that, at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial, he was aware that criminal charges were pending against Clark and that Dobris was the state's attorney responsible for handling those charges. He maintained, however, that he had “intentionally set [himself] apart” from Clark's criminal case by telling Dobris that he “did not want to know what was going on,” including whether Clark had made any agreements with the state. Dobris testified that he and Attorney Clark had constructed a “firewall” between one another, whereby neither one shared information regarding Clark or his involvement in the petitioner's case.5 Dobris admitted, however, that he had been present during some of Clark's testimony concerning the December 14, 1996 shooting.

On July 23, 2009, the court denied the amended petition. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that “even if it were presumed that the petitioner met the first two prongs of the Brady analysis, [his claim] must ultimately fail because the state's nondisclosure cannot be deemed material in the constitutional sense.” The court granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that the state withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly concluded that the agreement between the state and Clark was not material evidence. In addition, the petitioner claims that he was deprived of a fair trial because Clark testified falsely on cross-examination that he had not been offered, nor was he expecting, any consideration in exchange for his testimony, and the state failed to contradict this false testimony. The petitioner argues that the state's failure to contradict this portion of Clark's testimony resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

The respondent, the commissioner of correction, counters by arguing that the record is inadequate to permit review of the petitioner's two claims because the habeas court did not make a specific factual finding regarding whether the state and Clark had an agreement, a necessary prerequisite for the petitioner's claims. Notwithstanding this argument, the respondent concedes that by failing to disclose that the trial court had indicated that it would impose a four year cap on Clark's sentence, the state allowed the jury to be presented with false and misleading testimony. Furthermore, the respondent admits that, even in the absence of an agreement, the state had an obligation to correct Clark's testimony.6 The respondent argues, however, that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the state's failure to correct the testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review. “The conclusions reached by the trial court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review.... [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing court] must determine whether they are legally and logically correct ... and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record.... To the extent that factual findings are challenged, this court cannot disturb the underlying...

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5 cases
  • Adams v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 23 Julio 2013
    ...judgment of the habeas court denying the petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 128 Conn.App. 389, 399, 17 A.3d 479 (2011). We granted the respondent's petition for certification, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate......
  • Birch v. Warden, TTDCV01817907S
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • 21 Junio 2016
    ...... apply in an inadvertent suppression situation, Adams v. Commissioner , 309 Conn. 359, 371-73, 71 A.3d 512 (2013). ......
  • Adams v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 23 Julio 2013
    ...judgment of the habeas court denying the petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Adams v. Commissioner of Correction, 128 Conn. App. 389, 399, 17 A.3d 479 (2011). We granted the respondent's petition for certification, limited to the following issue: ''Did the Appella......
  • State v. Arthur
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • 3 Mayo 2011
    ......phone headsets.” On the date in question, Correction Officer Rudolfo Santana observed the defendant “looking over his ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Professional Responsibility Review 2011
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 86, 2012
    • Invalid date
    ...App. 538, 545, 15 A.3d 658, 663 (2011). 69. 238 Conn. 389, 689 A.2d 147 (1996). 70. 21 7 Conn. 419, 432 n.5, 586 A.2d 582 (1991). 71. 128 Conn. App. 389, 17 A.3d 479 (2011). 72. No. CV064001260, 2011 WL 1888411(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2011). 73. Aliano v. Aliano, No. KNOFA104113119S, 2011......

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