Adams v. La. Dep't of Corr.

Decision Date06 February 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 22-20-SDD-RLB
PartiesCOREY MARQUEE ADAMS #357624 v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

NOTICE

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of defendants Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Michael Howard, Chad Darbonne, Luke Rheams John Orr, Matthew Gamble, Thomas Sterling, Roger Young Jeremy McKey, James Arnold, Michael Lollis, Gabriel Hebert, Randy Lavespere, and Tracey Falgout (R. Doc. 19). The Motion is opposed. See R. Doc. 22.

The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 (“RA”) against numerous Defendants,[1] complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference to his health and safety, use of excessive force, and denial of a fair disciplinary hearing.[2] He seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.

Defendants first seek dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities. The plaintiff states in his Complaint that all defendants are sued in their individual capacities under § 1983. Nevertheless, to the extent the plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim for monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities, § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, to the extent the plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim against defendants their official capacities for monetary damages, any such claims are subject to dismissal.

Additionally, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only a “person” may be sued for the violation of an inmate's constitutional rights. Defendant Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Washington v. Louisiana, 425 Fed.Appx. 330, 333 (5th Cir. 2011). The Department is also entitled to sovereign immunity with regards to the plaintiff's § 1983 claims. [T]he Fifth Circuit has squarely held that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections is an arm of the State that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Beyard v. Caddo Parish Com'n, 2007 WL 1741970, at * 2 (W.D. La. April 27, 2007) (citing Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)).

Turning to Plaintiff's claims that are not subject to dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendants next assert, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra, at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows that, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Id. at 679. “Where a Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, [a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed' ... and ‘a pro se Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding, the court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff's Allegations

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: On October 6 2020, the plaintiff and an orderly were involved in a loud “heated” argument. The argument was so loud that defendant Howard and others could hear. A few hours later, defendant Howard came to the plaintiff's cell and put him in restraints. As the plaintiff was being escorted to Disciplinary Court, the orderly told the plaintiff that he would attack him when he returned. Defendant Howard took no action. When the plaintiff returned, the orderly began punching the plaintiff. Defendant Howard stood by and watched without activating his beeper. At some point defendant Howard and Cadet McGee intervened.

The plaintiff was placed in his assigned cell and repeatedly told defendant Howard that he was having severe pain in his ribs. The plaintiff requested a medical evaluation. Defendant Howard told the plaintiff he would be seen by medical then left. Defendant Howard did not contact medical. Approximately one hour later, defendants Darbonne and Gauthier were on the tier and the plaintiff began yelling his requests to speak with them. Defendants Darbonne, Gauthier, Howard and Cadet McGee arrived in front of the plaintiff's cell, and the plaintiff stated that he needed medical treatment due to the attack. Defendant Darbonne asked when the attack occurred since there was no beeper activation and questioned where the orderly was now located. Defendant Darbonne and Defendant Howard then left to speak in private. After defendant Darbonne reviewed the camera footage, he returned to the plaintiff's cell and ordered him to pack his things for transfer to CBC.

The plaintiff told defendant Darbonne that the conditions of CBC were deplorable, extreme, and harsh which would result in the plaintiff engaging in self-harm. Defendant Darbonne left without responding. The plaintiff then cut his left wrist multiple times due to the impending retaliatory transfer. Plaintiff believes that the transfer was retaliatory because the plaintiff had previously filed suit against defendant Darbonne's daughter.

The plaintiff was transferred to CBC. He was then seen by medical and transferred to CBD. He was placed on suicide watch due to his earlier acts of self-harm. The orderly was given a job change, and never received a disciplinary write up for the fight.

On October 7, 2020, defendants Rheams and Orr, along with Sgt Junno and Lt. Blackmore, came to the CBD and stopped by each cell. Plaintiff and other inmates asked defendant Rheams when they would be issued mattresses. The plaintiff was without a mattress from October 6, 2020, to October 12, 2020. Suicide watch checks were not completed every 15 minutes as required. Rain leaked into the cells, and the windows were obscured. Adequate clothing was not provided for the cold temperatures. While in 4-point restraints, the plaintiff was not allowed to eat, shower, or use the bathroom as required. Defendant Rheams and his subordinates deliberately oppressed and abused the prisoners in the CBD. The various conditions of the CBD make the plaintiff feel claustrophobic, which causes him to become depressed. The plaintiff stopped taking his psychotropic medications after being transferred because they cause him to feel drowsy, and since the plaintiff was no...

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