Adams v. Fort Madison Community School Dist. in Lee, Des Moines and Henry Counties

• Decision Date: 15 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 54061,54061
• Citation: 182 N.W.2d 132
• Parties: Lyle E. ADAMS, Richard P. Canella, James L. Cook, JoAnn P. Dickinson, Mary E. Jenkins, John A. Keenan, Barbara E. Mansheim, and Rosma J. Stigall, Individually and/or Representative of a Class of Voters in the Forst Madison Community School District, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The FORT MADISON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT IN the COUNTIES OF LEE, DES MOINES, AND HENRY, in the State of Iowa, and the Board of Directors Thereof, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 132

182 N.W.2d 132

Lyle E. ADAMS, Richard P. Canella, James L. Cook, JoAnn P. Dickinson, Mary E. Jenkins, John A. Keenan, Barbara E. Mansheim, and Rosma J. Stigall, Individually and/or Representative of a Class of Voters in the Forst Madison Community School District, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The FORT MADISON COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT IN the COUNTIES OF LEE, DES MOINES, AND HENRY, in the State of Iowa, and the Board of Directors Thereof, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 54061.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1970.

Pollard, Deitchler, Thomas & Lawse, Fort Madison, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fehseke & Fehseke, Fort Madison, for defendants-appellees.

Marvin R. Adams, Des Moines, Richard C. Bauerle, Ottumwa, Richard, C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth A. Nolan, Asst. Atty. Gen., amici curiae.

UHLENHOPP, Justice.

The question before us is whether the legislature can constitutionally require an extra majority vote in order for bond proposals to carry.

In a bond election in the Fort Madison Community School District, 53.1% Of those voting voted 'yes.' At least a 60% Affirmative vote is required by Code, 1966, §§ 296.6, 75.1. Several voters who voted 'yes' bring this suit challenging those statutes.

In 1963, the United States Supreme Court announced the principle of one person, one vote in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821. This court has consistently applied that principle in accordance with the spirit of the Gray decision. Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 257 Iowa 1315, 136 N.W.2d 546; Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 79, 17 L.Ed.2d 80; Meyer v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 1346, 152 N.W.2d 617; Mandicino v. Kelly, 158 N.W.2d 754 (Iowa); Gradischnig v. Polk County, 164 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa); In the Matter of Legislative Districting of General Assembly of Iowa, 175 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa).

Several courts have dealt with various extra majority requirements since the one person, one vote principle was announced. Rimarcik v. Johansen, D.C., 310 F.Supp. 61 (three-judge court) (55% Requirement to adopt home rule charter--invalidated); Brenner v. School District of Kansas City, D.C., 315 F.Supp. 627 (three-judge court) (two-thirds for school bonds--upheld); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal.3d 765, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487 (two-thirds for bonds--invalidated); Bogert v. Kinzer, 93 Idaho 515, 465 P.2d 639 (two-thirds for bonds--upheld); Lance v. Board of Education of Roane, 170 S.E.2d 783 (W.Va.) (three-fifths for bonds--invalidated).

Three main problems are presented by the voting statutes which are now before us: (1) What is the effect of the challenged statutes upon the voting strength of the 'yes' and the 'no' votes? (2) Is the simple majority rule invariable in a democracy? and (3) Does justification appear here for departing from the simple majority rule?

I. Strength of 'Yes' and 'No' Votes. The first problem requires consideration, initially, of the voting decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and then of the actual effect of the challenged statutes upon the 'yes' and 'no' votes.

The United States Supreme Court has held that citizenship, residence, and age requirements may be imposed for voting, but the voting power of an individual voter or group of voters may not be cut down or eliminated by such irrelevant factors as Geographical location of the voters, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506; WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 84 S.Ct. 1418, 12 L.Ed.2d 568; Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 84 S.Ct. 1429, 12 L.Ed.2d 595; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 84 S.Ct. 1441, 12 L.Ed.2d 609; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620; Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632; Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565, 84 S.Ct. 1918, 12 L.Ed.2d 1037; Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376; Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 87 S.Ct. 569, 17 L.Ed.2d 501; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519, reh. denied, 395 U.S. 917, 89 S.Ct. 1737, 23 L.Ed.2d 231; Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 89 S.Ct. 1234, 22 L.Ed.2d 535; Hadley v. Junior College District of Kansas City, 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (U.S.); Military service, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675; Payment of a tax, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169; or Ownership of property or parentage of school children, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647. See also Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 14 L.Ed.2d 477; Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 446, 17 L.Ed.2d 330, reh. denied, 385 U.S. 1021, 87 S.Ct. 719, 17 L.Ed.2d 560; Sailors v. Board of Education of Kent County, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18 L.Ed.2d 650; Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2d 656; City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (U.S.).

The challenged statutes do not cut down or eliminate voting strength in any of the ways proscribed by those decisions. In Iowa the qualifications for voting in school elections are the same as in general elections. Code, 1966, § 277.12. Every citizen of the United States may vote who is aged 21 years and has resided in the state six months and in the county 60 days. Iowa Const. art. II, § 1; U.S.Const. Amend. XIX. The vote on bond issues is canvassed and declared for the school district as a whole. Code, §§ 277.19, 277.20. Thus each voter casting a ballot at any place in the district is tallied as one vote.

Nevertheless, 41 'no' voters can prevent adoption of a proposition by 59 'yes' voters. As stated in Note, 70 Columbia Law Review 486, 496 n. 60:

'The discrimination inherent in geographical vote-weighting is different from that of extraordinary majority requirements. The Reapportionment Decisions 'involved problems of discrimination against individuals * * * in the right of franchise based on the chance of geography.' * * * The same statement can be made of Gray. And these problems arose from the classification of voters, In advance of voting, by the place of their residence. The effect of this classification in Gray was that different weights were assigned to the different votes Depending upon the identity of the person who cast them. The effect in the Reapportionment Decisions was that the per capita legislative representation of votes throughout the state varied with the place of residence of the voters being represented. * * *

'Despite these distinctions, however, it seems clear that a requirement for a three-fifths majority places those individual voters favoring the measure in an unfavorable position as compared to those who are opposed to it. And this unfavorable position is not totally unlikely (sic) the position of those individual voters in the disfavored counties in the statewide elections in Gray.'

The conclusion must be that under the statutes before the court the voting power of the 'no' voters is not in proportion to their number, compared with the 'yes' voters.

II. Simple Majority Rule. Implicit in the statement that the 'no' voters have disproportionate power, however, is the assumption that the simple majority rule is to be invariably applied as the yardstick of the outcome of elections. Thus the contention of the 'yes' voters is predicated on two interrelated postulates: each voter must be tallied as one, and the simple majority rule must be applied to determine the outcome--the side which gets 50% Plus one vote must always win. Since voting on bond issues in Iowa is at large and each voter is tallied as one, the first postulate is met. The question, then, is whether the simple majority rule must be invariably applied.

Is rule by simple majority invariable in a democracy? Some think it is. As stated by Drury and Titus, in Legislative Reapportionment in Kansas: 1960, 9--10 (1960), 'Democratic theory rests on the assumption that the people are sovereign. From this fundamental tenet arise two corollary postulates of democracy. The first is that each person in the commonwealth is to count for one, and no more than one. This is the principle of numerical equality. The second is that decisions are reached by counting each person as one to determine which policies are sanctioned by the greater number of people. This is the principle of majority rule.' (Italics added.) Professor de Grazia refers to this as the 'egalitarian-majoritarian view.' Apportionment and Representative Government, 36 (1963). But compare State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Board, 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (involving both elements--each vote required to count as one but extra majority provision applied to determine outcome of election).

Simple majority rule is clearly a basic tenet of our system. It is the basis on which Congress functions. Rules and Manual, U.S. Senate, § 741.13 (1967); Rules and Practice, U.S. House of Representatives, § 508 (91st Cong. 1969). It is spelled out in the organic law of Iowa. The Iowa Constitution is amendable by simple majority vote of the members of both chambers of the General Assembly and of the voters. Iowa Const. art. X, § 1. Laws pass the General Assembly by simple majority vote of the members of the two chambers. Art. III, § 17. Majority rule has been acknowledged generally in the case law. 29 C.J.S. Elections § 242, p. 674; 26 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, § 309, pp. 134--35. It is recognized by the writers. I Bryce, Modern Democracies, 20--22 (1929); Commager, Majority Rule and Minority Rights, chs. I,...