Adams v. Franklin
| Decision Date | 31 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 99-D-815-N.,Civ.A. 99-D-815-N. |
| Citation | 111 F.Supp.2d 1255 |
| Parties | Neal ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. Bill FRANKLIN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Thomas J. Azar, Jr., Azar & Tasheiko, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.
Daryl L. Masters, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court is Defendants Bill Franklin, Garry Bowers, Morris Rogers and Phillip Estes' (collectively "Defendants") Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Mot."), filed January 19, 2000. Plaintiff Neal Adams ("Plaintiff") filed a Response ("Resp.") on February 4, 2000. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants' Motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990). Moreover, all factual allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).
Generally, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). However, in § 1983 actions where government officials sued in their individual capacities have raised the defense of qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has "tightened" the pleading requirements. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998). In Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, the Eleventh Circuit held that in cases where qualified immunity is implicated, "some factual detail is necessary, especially if [the court is] to be able to see that the allegedly violated right was clearly established when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992). Accordingly, in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity, courts must be "guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement." GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1367.
On August 5, 1999, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, as enforced by § 1983, and asserting several state-law causes of action. On October 18, 1999, Plaintiff filed an Amendment To Complaint to add a demand for a jury trial and a request for punitive damages. Thereafter, Plaintiff retained counsel, and on January 10, 2000, the court granted counsel for Plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings claims against the following Defendants: (1) Bill Franklin ("Franklin"), Sheriff of Elmore County, Alabama; (2) Deputy Sheriff Morris Rogers ("Rogers"); (3) Deputy Sheriff Phillip Estes ("Estes"); (4) Deputy Sheriff Garry Bowers ("Bowers"), the jail administrator2; (5) a fictitious party whom Plaintiff identifies as "Dr. Feelgood"3; and (6) the Elmore County Sheriff's Department.4 (2nd Am. Compl. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges as follows:
At approximately 10 p.m. on Friday August 8, 1997[,] I was arrested and literally thrown in the backseat of the Elmore County Sheriff's Department's car driven by Deputy Sheriff Morris L. Rogers. I was taken to the Elmore County Jail. I was placed in a room with a black man lying on the floor. I asked four or five times to make a phone call and was denied. I then asked them to call my doctor because I was having chest pains and shortness of breath. This continued for about two hours with my being denied the request each time. The Deputies told me each time that I just needed another beer. As I continued to beg them to call my doctor as my situation was getting worse. They opened the door, and a heavyset young man in a red T-shirt was introduced as Dr. Feelgood. He put a stethoscope on top of my left shoulder and then on top of my right shoulder and told me there was nothing wrong with me, that I just needed another beer. All deputies in the jail just laughed and joked about my situation. The black man in the room with me asked them several times to get me a doctor. The deputies all continued to laugh and joke. Then Deputy Sheriff Phillip Estes cam[e] into the room and put handcuffs on me, grabbed me by the throat, and slammed me against the wall two times, removed the handcuffs, hit me with his fist in the stomach, and told me if I said another word he would handcuff me to the grate in the middle of the floor where you urinate. Each time they laughed. After the black man in the room with me begged them several more times they call my doctor and he told them to get me to the Baptist Hospital in Montgomery as soon as possible. Haynes Ambulance arrived and took me to the Baptist Hospital where I spent two days in intensive care. I could have died in the Elmore County jail the night of August 8, 1997 because of the stupid Elmore County deputies.
(Id. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint contains six counts against Defendants — two federal causes of action and four state-law claims. Counts 1 and 7 allege federal causes of action pursuant to § 1983 against Franklin, Bowers, Rogers and Estes. In Count 1, Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as enforced by § 1983, "by unlawfully detaining him in the jail, and denying him necessary medical attention under color of law." (Id. ¶ 6.) In Count 7, Plaintiff restates that Franklin, Bowers, Rogers and Estes, acting under color of law, "violated his civil rights pursuant to [] § 1983 by unlawfully detaining him in the Elmore County Jail, and denying him necessary treatment and care." (Id. ¶ 19.)
Counts 3-6 set forth state-law claims against Franklin, Bowers, Rogers and Estes for assault and battery (Count 3), negligence (Count 4), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 5), and outrage (Count 6).5 (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 15, 17.) Plaintiff requests compensatory damages and punitive damages, "plus interest and cost of court," as well as attorney's fees. (Id. at 3-5.) Further, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. (Id. at 2.)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of each count in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in which they are named. The court will address separately each argument raised by Defendants, as those arguments relate, first, to Plaintiff's federal causes of action (Counts 1 and 7) and, second, to Plaintiff's state-law claims (Counts 3-6).
In Counts 1 and 7, Plaintiff brings constitutional claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments, as enforced by § 1983,6 against Franklin, Bowers, Rogers and Estes. (2nd Am.Compl.¶¶ 6, 19.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth amendments rights "by unlawfully detaining him in the jail, and denying him necessary medical attention under color of law." (Id.) In moving for dismissal of Counts 1 and 7, Defendants raise the following three grounds. First, because Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is ambiguous as to which capacity Plaintiff is suing Defendants, Defendants argue that the court should construe Plaintiff's § 1983 action as alleging only official-capacity claims, not individual-capacity claims. (Mot.¶ 2.) Second, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their official capacities are due to be dismissed based on the Eleventh Amendment and because they are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. (Id. ¶ 4.) Third, should the court treat Plaintiff's § 1983 claims as alleging both individual- and official-capacity claims, Defendants assert that they are immune from damages under the well-established doctrine of qualified immunity. (Id. ¶ 7.) The court will address each argument in turn.
As stated, Defendants point out that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is "silent" as to whether Defendants are sued in their individual capacities, official capacities, or both. (Mot.¶ 2.) Defendants urge the court to construe Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint as alleging only official-capacity claims.7 Defendants reason that, because the alleged acts and/or omissions transpired as a result of their work as state officials, said acts and/or omissions "could only have occurred while they were acting in their official capacities." (Id.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, states that, despite a specific designation in his Second Amended Complaint, he is seeking relief from Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. (Resp. at 1-2.) Further, Plaintiff notes...
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