Adams v. Fry, 35014

• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; ARNOLD; WELCH
• Citation: Adams v. Fry, 230 P.2d 915, 204 Okla. 407 (Okla. 1951)
• Decision Date: 01 May 1951
• Docket Number: No. 35014,35014
• Parties: ADAMS et al. v. FRY et al.

Page 915

230 P.2d 915

204 Okla. 407

ADAMS et al. v. FRY et al.

No. 35014.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 1, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Expressions in a classification provision of a statute which when given their literal import would contrary the plain intention of the legislature and destroy the classification otherwise reasonable and valid will be rejected as surplusage and disregarded.

2. The provisions of Section 57, Article 5 of the State Constitution that 'no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be reenacted and published at length', are restrictive and mandatory; and when a section of an act is amended the same must be complete within itself, so that when published as amended it will contain all the law upon the subject embraced in the section.

Hurst & Hurst and Richard B. McDermott, all of Tulsa, for plaintiffs.

Lewis J. Bicking, County Atty. of Tulsa County, Hugh Webster, Asst. County Atty. of Tulsa County, Tulsa, Lewis Raba, County Atty. of Pawnee, County, Pawnee, for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

This is an original action to require payment of claims for judicial salary in addition to that paid by the State as provided by Chapter 10, S.L.1947, p. 592, 74 O.S.Supp. § 251b. The plaintiffs are the District Judges of the 14th District Court Judicial District composed of Tulsa and Pawnee Counties. The foregoing act provides additional payments of salary out of the court funds of said counties. The defendants in the action are the court clerks of the named counties.

Before the passage of the foregoing act provision was made by the legislature for the payment of additional salaries to District Judges in populous areas on classification basis. The original act which became effective January, 1938, provided additional salary payable out of court funds for District Judges in all district court judicial districts having a population in excess of 200,000 and a city therein having a population in excess of 100,000. Falling within this classification were the 7th District Court Judicial Distict (Oklahoma and Canadian Counties) and the 14th District Court Judicial District (Tulsa and Pawnee Counties). Each of those districts had more than the minimum population and each had a city within its boundaries with a population of more than 100,000, and the District Judges of those districts from the effective date of the original act until the effective date of the act under consideration drew the additional salary provided from the court funds of the counties in the district as therein provided. That act was held constitutional and the policy of paying District Judges in populous areas additional salary out of the court funds has been well established in this state.

The legislature no doubt thinking that a further differentiation should be made in the compensation of District Judges in these populous classified areas in 1947 enacted the law under consideration and provided that the District Judges of district court judicial districts having a population in excess of 250,000 and a city therein having a population in excess of 200,000, according to the Federal Census of 1940, or according to any succeeding Federal Census, should receive $4,000 per annum from the court funds of the counties of the districts. The 7th District Court Judicial District (Oklahoma and Canadian counties) falls within this classification. It is the only district at the time of the enactment which had a population greater than 250,000 and a city located within the district with a population greater than 200,000. The act further provided that in District Court Judicial Districts having a population in excess of 200,000 'but not in excess of 250,000' and a city therein having a population of 100,000 'but not in excess of 200,000', according to the Federal Census of 1940, or according to any succeeding Federal Census, the District Judges thereof should receive from the court funds of the counties therein situated $3,000 per annum. By the specific terms of the act its effective date was fixed as of January 8, 1951.

The foregoing statements as to the District Court Judicial Districts falling within the foregoing classification are based upon the 1940 Federal Census. According to the Federal Census of 1950 the population of the 14th District Court Judicial District has increased and in fact now exceeds 250,000, the minimum prescribed for the upper classification. Though the city of Tulsa, therein situated, has increased in population it does not exceed 200,000, the minimum prescribed for the upper classification. The district in population has increased to such extent as to be within the upper classification but the population of the largest city therein has not increased to such extent. That judicial district is not within either classification according to the literal wording of the act quoted above because it now has a district population of more than 250,000.

The primary object of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. In order to ascertain this intent, the statute, and each and every part of it, should be construed as a whole, in the light of the general purpose and object of the act. People v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., 328 Ill. 223, 159 N.E. 266, 62 A.L.R. 318. The legislature fixed certain minimum population requirements as a basis of classification for additional salary payable from the court funds. To be within a classification a judicial district must meet all the minimum population requirements for that classification. It was the intention of the legislature that a district would remain in such classification so long as it possessed all said minimum population requirements and did not possess all the minimum population requirements of a higher classification. Since additional salary payable from the court fund is payable by reason of classification based upon population it is absurd to say that the legislature intended that a greater population in certain respects than the minimum required for a higher classification unclassifies a judicial district. To give full literal import to the language of the quoted expressions would render the classification arbitrary and capricious in that it would unreasonably exclude certain districts within the class as demonstrated by this case. The 14th judicial district fell fully within the class at the time of the enactment but now, according to a succeeding decennial census, it does not fall within any class though it has a greater population than it had at the time the class was created.

Expressions in a classification provision of a statute which when given their literal import would clearly contrary the plain intention of the legislature and destroy the classification otherwise reasonable and valid will be rejected as surplusage and disregarded. 50 Am.Jur. Statutes, Sec. 231, p. 219; People v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co., supra; People of the State of Illinois ex rel Bankers' Company of New York v. Stratton, 335 Ill. 455, 167 N.E. 31, 63 A.L.R. 1046; State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 104 N.W. 709, 113 Am.St.Rep. 612; Kitchen v. Southern Ry., 68 S.C. 554, 48 S.E. 4, 1 Ann.Cas. 747; Trustees' Executors' & Securities Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 53 Okl. 530, 157 P. 293, L.R.A. 1917C, 829.

In 1949 the legislature passed Senate Bill No. 165, 74 O.S.Supp. §§ 250-250.3, which is a general salary act. Therein it is provided that all District Judges shall receive from the state an annual salary of $7200. The act was amended by inserting therein Section 4, 74 O.S.Supp. § 250.3, which reads: 'The provisions of this Act fixing the annual salaries of District Court Judges at Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) shall not operate to increase or change the aggregate annual salaries of the District Court Judges fixed by Chapter 10c, Title 74, page 389, Oklahoma Session Laws 1945, and Chapter 10, Title 74, page 592, Oklahoma Session Laws 1947, but the salaries of each of said Judges payable by the State shall be Seven Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($7,200.00) rather than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), and the salary thereof payable by the counties affected from county court funds shall be One Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, ($1,800.00) and Eight Hundred Dollars ($800.00), respectively, rather than Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) and Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), as provided in said Chapter 10.'

No reference is made in the title of the act to the contents of said Section 4, and Section 4 is the only provision of the act that in any way relates to the subject matter thereof, that is, the amount of additional salary payable from court funds. It is obvious that the foregoing section is not complete within itself. The classification basis of payment of additional salary out of court funds is entirely missing. The source of the additional payments is not mentioned in the section. Certainly there was no intention to repeal Chapter 10, nor is there any repeal of any provision thereof by implication. Though it was obviously the intention of the legislature by the enactment of said provision to reduce the aggregate compensation of District Judges of judicial districts falling within the classification of Chapter 10 to a lesser amount than they would otherwise receive the pertinent and necessary basis of additional salary under Chapter 10 is omitted in Section 4 of Senate Bill No. 165. The inescapable conclusion is that by said Section 4 the legislature was attempting to amend Section 1 of Chapter 10 to reduce the payment from the court funds to a lesser amount.

The Constitution, Article V, Section 57, provides: '* * * and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred...