Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc.
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | PATTERSON; PARKER; PARKER |
| Citation | Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 576 So.2d 728, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 233 (Fla. App. 1991) |
| Decision Date | 18 January 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-02843,89-02843 |
| Parties | , 16 Fla. L. Weekly 233, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,755 Scott and Denise ADAMS, Appellants, v. G.D. SEARLE & CO., INC., Appellee. |
Michael D. Eriksen of Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Eriksen & Kupfer, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.
A. Broaddus Livingston and Alan C. Sundberg of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.
Scott and Denise Adams brought a product liability action against G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., the manufacturer of Denise's intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD), after Denise became pregnant and suffered a septic abortion. The Adamses alleged in four counts that the IUD was defective and Searle was strictly liable for damages; that Searle failed to test the IUD adequately; that Searle's product labeling inadequately warned physicians and patients of the dangers associated with the IUD; and that Searle fraudulently misrepresented the IUD as safe. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the entire complaint in favor of Searle. We reverse.
Because of unrelated medical difficulties, Denise Adams cannot use oral contraceptives. She selected an IUD as her method of contraception based on the recommendation of her physician, Dr. Helwig. On January 2, 1980, Dr. Helwig prescribed for her and inserted the "Copper 7" (Cu-7), a copper-containing IUD manufactured by Searle. 1
When Denise decided to try the Cu-7, Dr. Helwig gave her a patient brochure which Searle provided in accordance with FDA regulations. This brochure warned of specific dangers associated with IUD's in general and the Cu-7 in particular. It also identified adverse reactions that have been reported with the use of IUD's. Denise read the brochure and signed a card stating, "I received and have read the patient booklet, Cu-7."
Almost a year after Dr. Helwig inserted the Cu-7, Denise became pregnant. Dr. Helwig's normal procedure in such cases is to remove the IUD, because this reduces the risk that the patient will miscarry later in the pregnancy. However, in Denise's case, he found that the IUD's polypropylene removal string had retracted into her uterus. This limited Denise to three options: she could elect to have an abortion; Dr. Helwig could probe for the IUD, which in itself could cause an abortion; or Denise could risk trying to carry the infant to term with the IUD in place. Denise chose the latter, and the pregnancy proceeded.
When she was in the middle trimester, about twenty-four weeks along, Denise began to suffer flu-like symptoms, fever, and premature rupture of membranes. To safeguard her life, physicians induced labor and on April 14, 1981, she delivered a premature infant son who died within hours. The child's death certificate listed the cause of death as premature rupture of the membranes and uterine infection caused by the Cu-7.
On January 21, 1983, the Adamses filed this action against Searle. They sought damages for Denise's permanent injuries, wrongful death of the child, loss of consortium for Scott, mental anguish, loss of support from the child, and medical and burial expenses. In Count I, the strict liability count, they alleged the existence of specific defects in the Cu-7. In Count II, the "negligent failure to test" count, the Adamses alleged that Searle failed to perform tests necessary to discover the Cu-7's defects and dangers. In Count III, the failure-to-warn count, they alleged that Searle knowingly failed to warn either physicians or patients about the defects and dangers. And, in Count IV, the fraud count, they alleged that to induce physicians to prescribe the Cu-7, Searle knowingly withheld facts it knew were material.
Early in the litigation, the trial court dismissed the fraud claim for failure to state a cause of action. However, within the four corners of the complaint, see Geer v. Bennett, 237 So.2d 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1970), the Adamses alleged that Searle misrepresented and omitted specific material facts about the Cu-7 to Dr. Helwig and Denise with the intention to induce them to rely on the misrepresentations and omissions; and that Dr. Helwig and Denise did so to Denise's detriment. These allegations state a cause of action for fraud, and we therefore reverse the dismissal of Count IV.
The remaining counts were disposed of by the trial court's order granting Searle's motions for summary judgment. In discussing whether summary judgment was appropriate as to each count, we address first the claim for negligent failure to test, next the question of failure to warn, and last the matter of strict liability for design defects.
The trial court correctly disposed of the claim for negligent failure to test. That count alleged that Searle negligently failed to perform tests upon the Cu-7 to discover its defects and dangers. We agree with Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 707 F.Supp. 1517 (D.Minn.1989), that a manufacturer's duty to inspect and test is not a separate cause of action. The duty to test, as that court concluded, is a subpart of a manufacturer's duty to design a product with reasonable care, and thus is subsumed in the plaintiffs' claims for defective design and failure to warn. 707 F.Supp. at 1527. We therefore affirm the summary judgment as to this claim.
The trial court, in granting final summary judgment for Searle, found as a matter of law that the Cu-7's product labeling was adequate. Although the adequacy of prescription drug warnings can become a question of law where the warning is accurate, clear, and unambiguous, it otherwise remains a question of fact. See Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So.2d 680, 681-2 (Fla.1990); Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102, 105 (Fla.1989). In this case, the Adamses produced evidence tending to show that the warnings were not accurate, clear, and unambiguous; therefore, the adequacy of the warnings was a question of fact for the jury, and the trial court erred in deciding it as a matter of law. 2
As to the defective design claim, we find that the summary judgment must be reversed. To grant the motion for summary judgment as to this issue, the trial court necessarily must have found that Searle could not be held responsible under strict liability for defects in the design of the Cu-7. It could have arrived at this conclusion only by applying comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1959) section 402A, to the Cu-7. 3
Comment k protects the manufacturers of certain products from strict liability for design defects. It states:
UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCTS. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defective nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines and the like, many of which, for this very reason, cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of the time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug, notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1959) section 402A, comment k. Thus, by its terms comment k applies to products which current knowledge and technology cannot make safe for their ordinary use, but for which society has a need great enough to justify using the product despite its dangers. Comment k increases the standard a plaintiff must meet from that of strict liability to negligence. 4 See Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 112 Idaho 328, 336, 732 P.2d 297, 305 (1987).
Some courts apply comment k uniformly to all prescription drugs. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.3d 1049, 1061, 751 P.2d 470, 477, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 418 (1988); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla.1982); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash.2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978). While we recognize that policy reasons exist to support such an approach, we are disinclined to adopt it for several reasons.
First, the language of comment k indicates that it was not intended to apply to all prescription drugs. 5 It speaks of "some products," "especially common in the field of drugs," "many other drugs," and "many new and experimental drugs." By definition, "some" and "many" are less than all. See Toner, 112 Idaho at 339, 732 P.2d at 308; Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F.Supp. 1293 at 1300 (D.Minn.1988).
Second, the comment itself adopts a risk/benefit analysis in using the Pasteur rabies vaccine as an "outstanding example" of a product which is protected by comment k. It notes that injecting the vaccine may lead to very serious consequences, but because the disease "invariably leads to a dreadful death," the vaccine's marketing and use are justified. Applying comment k...
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