Adams v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. IP 93-0420-C M/S.,IP 93-0420-C M/S. |
| Citation | 2 F.Supp.2d 1077 |
| Parties | Kim ADAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INDIANA BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. and Ameritech Services, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Mark A. Waterfill, Leagre Chandler & Millard, Indianapolis, IN, David L. Rose, Law Office of David Rose, Washington, DC, C. Warren Holland, Holland & Holland, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs.
Michael Bergin, Ariane S. Johnson, Locke Reynolds Boyd & Weisell, Lee B. McTurnan, Wayne C. Turner, Jacqueline B. Ponder, Steven M. Badger, McTurnan & Turner, R. Anthony Prather, Ameritech Indiana Law Dept., Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.
ORDER ON MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Currently pending before the Court are two dispositive motions on the claims of the plaintiffs brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as several related motions. The plaintiffs have raised both individual and pattern or practice claims of age discrimination, which they maintain occurred during a corporate-wide resizing process in 1992 and 1993 at Ameritech Services, Inc. ("ASI"). The related motions are three motions to strike the evidence plaintiffs plan to offer through their statistics, labor economics, and industrial psychology experts. If granted, the motions to strike will have the effect of excluding a substantial portion of the evidence on which plaintiffs rely in opposition to the pending summary judgment motions. Thus, the Court will first address the issues raised by these motions.
According to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[U]pon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
Generally, motions to strike are considered a drastic remedy, and are strongly disfavored. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Cobb, 738 F.Supp. 1220, 1224 (N.D.Ind.1990); see also New York v. Almy Brothers, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 69, 72 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Accordingly, such motions "are ordinarily not granted unless the language in the pleading at issue has no possible relation to the controversy and is clearly prejudicial." Cobb, 738 F.Supp. at 1224.; Abdulrahim v. Gene B. Glick Co., 612 F.Supp. 256, 260 n. 1 (N.D.Ind.1985). A trial court, however, clearly has discretion to grant a well-taken motion to strike. Mirshak v. Joyce, 652 F.Supp. 359, 370 (N.D.Ill. 1987). In exercising that discretion, the Court must consider the value of the pleading in light of other rules of procedure.
Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show "affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters" presented. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Courts may permit an affidavit to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. Id. Although the evidence presented in opposition to or support of summary judgment does not have to be in admissible form, it must be admissible in content. See Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (7th Cir.1994) (). Examples of such evidence include certified documents or sworn testimony, such as depositions or affidavits. Id. at 1267.
To be admissible, testimony must be relevant to the facts the party intends to prove under the legal theory that has been chosen to support the party's claim. See Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice And Procedure: Evidence § 5162. "Relevance is a relationship between the evidence offered and the fact it is supposed to prove." Id. A piece of evidence may be excluded as irrelevant in one of two ways. First, it may provide satisfactory proof of a fact in dispute, but the fact for which it is offered is not a material fact in the case. Id. Second, it may be directed at a material fact, but not have any value as proof of that fact. Id. A material fact is a "fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." Fed.R.Evid. 401.
Relevant evidence is evidence that has any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of the matter (i.e. "material fact") more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. The term "any tendency" is so broad that it has the effect of allowing admission of evidence that has only the slightest bit of probative worth. Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice § 5165. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has called the definition of relevance under Rule 401 "expansive." United States v. Pollard, 790 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir.1986), overruled on other grnds. by United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir.1987). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. The weight of the evidence, however, is for the jury to decide. Judges may not weigh the evidence when determining its relevance. Thus, arguments about the quality or probative value of the evidence advanced to defeat its admissibility are inapplicable to the inquiry.
Once it is found to be relevant, some evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, if it brings about confusion of the issues, or if it is misleading for the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403. It is in this process that the judge may weigh the evidence. Rule 403 presumes a finding that the evidence in question makes some fact in dispute more or less probable. If not, the court may not consider it under Rule 403. By probable it is meant "uncertain, but likely to be true." Wright & Graham § 5165. The court measures probative value by weighing the evidence in terms of its relationship to the truth or falsity of propositions of fact sought to be proved. Id.
Rule 403 recognizes the discretion of a judge to exclude evidence, but seeks to limit the exercise of that discretion. Id. § 5212. Even though the court's role in determining admissibility is limited, it must "weigh" the evidence to determine if its probative value exceeds any procedural problems it creates. See Wright & Graham § 5165. In doing so, the judge must be careful not to usurp the role of the jury under the guise of determining probative value. A judge may exclude evidence only after balancing the "competing considerations" listed in the rule and finding that the procedural harm caused by the evidence substantially exceeds its probative value. Id.
It is this balancing or weighing that furthers the policy behind Rule 403 of limiting judicial discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence. Id. § 5214. The probative value of the evidence must be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, or by the danger that it might mislead or confuse the jury, before the court would have discretion to exclude it. Id. If the balance goes against the probative worth of the evidence, the court may, but is not required to, exclude the evidence. Id. Thus, application of Rule 403 involves a two-step process: balancing, then exercising discretion.
When balancing evidence, the court should be mindful of the nature of the evidence. For example, evidence that proves an ultimate fact without any inferential step, except for a credibility determination, is deemed at this stage to be more probative than evidence that would require an inference to be drawn before the ultimate fact may be supported. Id. § 5214. The weighing process under Rule 403 requires the judge to assume the credibility of a witness, because to do otherwise would usurp the jury's function. Id. Thus, the probative worth of eyewitness testimony as to an ultimate fact is presumed to be 100%. Id. Nevertheless, very little evidence is of such caliber. More often a witness or document provides circumstantial evidence, or evidence that requires an inferential step before it can prove an ultimate fact. Some evidence may require several inferential steps, which lessens its probative value over evidence requiring none or one. Evidence that requires an inference before it can prove a material fact may be countervailed by offerings of the other party that make the inference less reasonable.
Probative value is not a precise mathematical term. Id. Rather it is a reflection of the economic concepts of supply and demand. Id. The need for the evidence is assessed against the possible supply of alternative means of proving the fact. See id.
Evidence may be entirely relevant to an issue in dispute, but the issue itself may not be material to the action. Such evidence would be deemed irrelevant, but on the basis of the lack of materiality of the ultimate fact it is intended to prove. Materiality is determined with reference to the substantive law being applied, and it depends on the legal theories the plaintiffs seek to employ to support their claims.
Here, the plaintiffs have brought their claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The ADEA provides in part:
the purpose of this chapter [is] to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
* * * * * *
It shall be unlawful for an employer—(1) to discharge any individual or otherwise...
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