Adams v. John M. O'Quinn & Assocs., PLLC
| Decision Date | 21 March 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-cv-00071-GHD-JMV |
| Parties | RANDY L. ADAMS; DAVID J. AMONS; FREDDIE BOLTON, JR.; WILEY BROOKS; JR., Individually and as Representative of Estate of Wiley Brooks; ESTATE OF WILEY BROOKS; CLARENCE EDWARD BRYANT, SR.; JESSIE L. CARTER, JR.; SHURMON CHAFFEE; ZADIE DYKES, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Billy E. Dykes; ESTATE OF BILLY E. DYKES; CHARLIE HARRIS, JR.; WALTER L. McCOY; PENELOPE McCOY, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Willie J. McCoy; ESTATE OF WILLIE J. McCOY; ANNIE PEARL NEVELS, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Louis Nevels; ESTATE OF LOUIS NEVELS; SELMOND NORALS; RANDOLPH PERRYMAN; JEAN Y. PEYREGNE; JOHN ALEXANDER PRINE; LARRY NOBLE SEWELL, SR.; LUTHER THREET; and BERDELL WILLIS PLAINTIFFS v. JOHN M. O'QUINN & ASSOCIATES, PLLC d/b/a The O'Quinn Law Firm; JOHN M. O'QUINN & ASSOCIATES, L.L.P.; JOHN M. O'QUINN, P.C.; JOHN M. O'QUINN LAW FIRM, PLLC; T. GERALD TREECE, Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, Deceased; RICHARD N. LAMINACK; JOE GIBSON, DANZIGER & DE LLANO, LLP; and ABEL MANJI DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the Court are several motions. On June 23, 2016, Defendant Richard M. Laminack ("Laminack") filed a motion to dismiss [26] for lack of personal jurisdiction. On June 24, 2016, Defendants John M. O'Quinn & Associates PLLC d/b/a The O'Quinn Law Firm, John M. O'Quinn & Associates, L.L.P., John M. O'Quinn, P.C., and John M. O'Quinn Law Firm PLLC (collectively, the "O'Quinn Firms"), as well as T. Gerald Treece, Independent Executor of the Estate of John M. O'Quinn, Deceased ("Treece"), filed a motion to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration and stay the case [28], as well as a motion for a more definite statement and to dismiss fraud-based claims [30]. On June 27, 2016, Defendant Danziger & De Llano, LLP ("Danziger") filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for a more definite statement [34]. These motions are fully briefed and ripe.1 Finally, on July 12, 2016, Defendant Abel Manji ("Manji") filed a motion to retain Plaintiffs' claims against him with the claims against the O'Quinn Firms [54]; Plaintiffs have not filed a response to that motion, and the time for doing so has now passed. Thus, that motion is ripe, as well. Upon due consideration of all the foregoing, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss [26] for lack of personal jurisdiction must be denied; the motion to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration and stay the case [28] must be granted in part and denied in part, specifically, the request to compel arbitration and stay the case must be granted, but the request to dismiss the case must be denied; the motion for a more definite statement and to dismiss fraud-based claims [30] must be denied as moot; and the motion to retain claims against Manji with the claims against the O'Quinn Firms [54] must be granted.2
On March 14, 2016, Plaintiffs, as listed in the case caption above, filed this legal malpractice suit against the O'Quinn Firms and "related entities and persons." Pls.' State-Ct. Compl. [2] ¶ 13. On April 13, 2016, the Defendants timely removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiffs are citizens of Mississippi or Alabama; Defendantsare citizens of Texas. The amount in controversy well exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, as it is undisputed that Plaintiffs seek actual, exemplary, and mental anguish damages in an amount greater than $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Thus, the Court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiffs assert they were exposed to silica dust during their employment in various crafts, such as sandblasting. Due to this exposure, Plaintiffs maintain they were solicited by Defendants as mass tort plaintiffs in silica litigation in the early 2000s when out-of-state law firms came into Mississippi and flooded Mississippi state courts with multiple-plaintiff suits. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants "led clients, the judicial system, defendants in the underlying case, and opposing counsel to believe that its clients had silicosis in order to generate millions of dollars in attorneys' fees and expenses." Id. ¶ 14. According to Plaintiffs, silicosis is a disease caused by the inhalation of silica dust.
Plaintiffs allege that the O'Quinn Firms represented approximately 3,000 clients, who were occupationally exposed to silica-containing products and materials, and that law firms, including Danziger, solicited these Plaintiffs to enter into contracts and promised to litigate their silicosis claims against the silicosis defendants, but subsequently referred the silicosis claims to the O'Quinn Firms. It is undisputed that each named Plaintiff in the case sub judice hired the O'Quinn Firms to represent them in silica-related claims. Id. ¶ 15. It is further undisputed that Plaintiffs signed contracts with the O'Quinn Firms that "hired [the O'Quinn Firms] on a contingency fee basis and issued the [O'Quinn Firms] a Power of Attorney . . . to represent them in any and all claims against the [s]ilicosis [d]efendants" ("Agreements"). Id. ¶ 17; see generallyAgreements [28-1].3
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants improperly billed the amounts they paid to companies for medical screening and/or referrals as expenses in their individual cases. Plaintiffs further assert that although the O'Quinn Firms reached global settlements with several of the silica manufacturers/distributors that were sued, the O'Quinn Firms failed to distribute the settlement proceeds in a timely manner and wrongfully retained portions of those proceeds for their own use. Plaintiffs aver that they were required to pay the O'Quinn Firms a percentage of their settlement proceeds to cover so-called general expenses of the O'Quinn Firms, including referral fees to other law firms and medical screening companies; office overhead and supplies; and costs associated with excessive travel, lodging, and dining. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made multiple errors in processing settlements, including delays and lack of communication, and ultimately failed to fully investigate and assess Plaintiffs' individual claims, including ensuring that settlements were paid in accordance with the severity of Plaintiffs' medical conditions, entering into aggregate or global settlements with silica manufacturers and/or distributors and then intimidating and coercing Plaintiffs into accepting those settlements regardless of the nature and extent of their individual silica-related injuries, permitting the wrongful dismissal of claims against several silica manufacturers and/or distributors, failing to provide necessary paperwork to the courts, failing to process and/or finalize settlement agreements, and attempting to conceal wrongful behavior by sending Plaintiffs deceptive disclosure letters and by destroying and/or altering documents in their files. Plaintiffs assert claims for legal malpractice/negligence, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, constructive fraud, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent supervision.
As stated above, several motions are pending before the Court. The Court addresses the motions as follows.
First, the Court addresses Laminack's motion to dismiss [26] for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Although Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in this determination, they need only present prima facie evidence of personal jurisdiction. See Patterson v. Aker Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Court " 'must accept [Plaintiffs'] uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [their] favor all conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits and other documentation.' " Id. (quoting Revell, 317 F.3d at 469). " " See Hazim v. Schiel & Denver Book Publishers, 647 F. App'x 455, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 445 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2006)).
In a personal jurisdiction determination, the Court first turns to Rule 4(k)(1)(A), which provides that a court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant who would be subject to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute of the state in which the Court sits. Thus, in this diversity action, the Court must conduct a two-prong analysis: first, examine whether Laminack is amenable to suit under the Mississippi long-arm statute, Mississippi Code § 13-3-57; andsecond, determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Laminack would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57. The three prongs of the statute are commonly referred to as the "contract prong," the "tort prong," and the "doing-business prong."
For the court to have personal jurisdiction...
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