Adams v. Kyler, Civil Action No. 01-0627 (E.D. Pa. 8/15/2002)
| Decision Date | 15 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 01-0627. |
| Parties | ANTHONY ADAMS, v. KENNETH K. KYLER, et al. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) |
Anthony Adams ("Adams"), filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeks relief from his state court conviction for third degree murder, carrying a firearm, and possession of an instrument of a crime ("PIC"). Under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72.1(b), Adams' petition was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge James R. Melinson for a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). The R&R concluded the petition should be denied because the federal constitutional claims were procedurally defaulted.
The court, on receiving the R&R, declined to approve it and appointed counsel. Briefing and an evidentiary hearing followed. The issue raised is one of first impression in this court: is a procedural default under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) an independent and adequate basis for refusing to consider a federal habeas petition? Because the court answers this question in part in the negative, Adams' petition will be remanded to Chief Magistrate Judge Melinson for further proceedings on the merits.
Adams was convicted on March 18, 1998, following a non-jury trial before Common Pleas Court Judge Glazier. A sentencing hearing on May 12, 1998, resulted in a 240 to 480 month term of incarceration for third degree murder, a consecutive sentence of 30 to 60 months for carrying a firearm, but no sentence for possessing an instrument of a crime.
The court appointed new appellate counsel, J. Michael Farrell, Esquire ("Farrell"), to represent Adams on his direct appeal. Adams nevertheless failed to file a timely appeal.1 On November 6, 1998, Judge Glazier reinstated Adams' appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On November 13, 1998, Adams filed his direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
On December 8, 1998, Judge Glazier ordered Adams, through Farrell, to submit a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, under Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure ("Rule 1925(b)") within two weeks of the availability of the trial notes of testimony. Rule 1925(b) provides:
(B) Direction to file statement of matters complained of. If the lower court is uncertain as to the basis for the appeal, the lower court may by order direct the appellant forthwith to file of record in the lower court and serve on the trial judge a concise statement of the matters complained of on appeal. A failure to comply with such direction may be considered by the appellate court as a waiver of all obligations to the order, ruling or other matter complained of on appeal.
On March 4, 1999, Adams having failed to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, Judge Glazier issued a post-trial opinion. Judge Glazier found that the notes of testimony had been available since February 1, 1999, but that Farrell had not "as per his usual practice" filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on Adams' behalf.2
Judge Glazier found that because Adams had failed to file a Rule 1925(b) statement "despite ample opportunity to do so[,] . . . all potential issues are waived." Trial Court Op. at 4. Nevertheless, the court analyzed and rejected any claim that the evidence was insufficient for conviction.
Adams had raised three issues on appeal to the Superior Court: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel (in four different ways); (2) denial of right to a public trial; and (3) abuse of discretion in sentencing. His brief on appeal contained an unverified statement that Farrell had not received the notes of testimony until March 10, 1999.3
On December 10, 1999, the Superior Court held that Adams' claims on appeal had been waived by his failure to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement with the trial court. Adams then petitioned for allocatur to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The petition raised the same three claims made to the Superior Court, but also claimed that the failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement should be excused.4 On May 24, 2000, the Supreme Court denied Adams' petition for allowance of appeal without opinion. Adams did not file for collateral review under the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541, et seq.5
Adams filed this petition for habeas corpus, pro se, on February 7, 2001. He claimed: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) denial of due process and equal protection; and (3) denial of the right to appeal. The Commonwealth responded that the claims were unexhausted and/or procedurally defaulted.
The R&R adopted the Commonwealth's position. Adams objected, and the court refused to adopt or approve the R&R without an evidentiary hearing. Alan J. Tauber, Esquire, was appointed counsel, and given leave to file supplemental arguments on Adams' behalf. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 30, 2002.
The principal requirement for habeas review is petitioner's prior exhaustion of all available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Federalism concerns require exhaustion; the state must be given a chance to correct its own alleged mistakes before the federal habeas court is asked to do so. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999).
To exhaust a claim the petitioner must first "fairly present" it to the highest state court. To "fairly present" a claim, petitioner must assert the factual and legal grounds of the federal claim with sufficient precision to give the state court notice. See Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408, 413 (3d Cir. 2001). An unexhausted claims is not reviewable by a federal habeas court except in exceptional circumstances.
If a state prisoner presents a federal claim to the state court, but the state court refuses to review that claim on procedural grounds (i.e., the claim was presented out of time), the prisoner's claim is "procedurally defaulted." Ordinarily, procedural default precludes federal habeas review of the defaulted claim. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
A claim is only procedurally defaulted if the state procedural rule is independent of federal law and adequately provides the state court with grounds to bypass review of federal issues. A purported procedural default that is not independent and adequate may be disregarded; the claims are to be treated by the federal court as exhausted and ripe for merits based review. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
The "independent and adequate" requirement is based on the Constitution's prohibition against advisory opinions. The federal habeas court's remedy is limited to reversing and remanding on a federal ground. If the state court has decided against petitioner on an independent and adequate state ground, any federal habeas relief would be merely advisory, because it would not change the outcome of the state court decision. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523 (1997). However, because the absence of federal review might undermine federal constitutional rights, requiring an independent and adequate state ground ensures that this does not happen. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945).
If an asserted state ground is not independent of federal law, then a federal habeas writ would not be an advisory opinion, because the federal writ would, through the Supremacy Clause, supersede the state court's determination of federal law. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, the Supreme Court held that federal court review remains available when the asserted state ground is not independent of federal law. An asserted alternative state ground is not independent of federal law if it:
fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or [is] . . . interwoven with the federal law, [or when] . . . the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion. . . . [But if] a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041.
When a state court refuses to reach the merits of a federal constitutional challenge because that challenge did not satisfy a state procedural rule, a federal court will defer to that judgment so long as the state procedural rule is "consistently or regularly applied," Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 589 (1988), and is "firmly established and regularly followed." James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348 (1984).6 If a state Supreme Court occasionally forgives procedural default, but applies it in the "vast majority" of cases, then the federal habeas court ordinarily should give the state rule preclusive effect. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n. 6 (1989).
A procedural default is adequate only if: "(1) the state procedural rule speaks in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts refused to review the petitioner's claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts' refusal in this instance is consistent with other decisions." Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir. 1996). Adequacy is evaluated as of the date of the default. Id. at 684.
If a procedural default is both independent and adequate, a federal habeas court may still undertake merits based review if the petitioner demonstrates "cause" for the default and resulting "prejudice," Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000), or the petitioner shows that the federal court's refusal to hear the claim would result in a "miscarriage of justice." Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91. To show cause, a petitioner must show that a factor "external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). To show prejudice, the...
To continue reading
Request your trial