Adams v. Landry
| Decision Date | 04 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-2153 |
| Parties | EASTERN AMY ADAMS v. ASHLEIGH LANDRY, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION “B” (4)
Before the Court are defendants Ashleigh Landry, Tina Babin, and the Lafourche Parish School Board's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction (Rec Docs. 23, 24), the defendants' motion for a more definite statement (Rec. Docs. 23, 24), plaintiff's response in opposition (Rec. Doc. 35), and defendants' replies in support of their motions to dismiss (Rec. Docs. 44, 45).
For the reasons discussed below, IT IS ORDERED that defendants Ashleigh Landry, Tina Babin, and the Lafourche Parish School Board's motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Rec. Docs. 23, 24) are GRANTED, dismissing plaintiff's claims against Tina Babin individually and in her official capacity as president of Lafourche Parish School Board with prejudice and dismissing plaintiff's federal law claims against Ashleigh Landry and the Lafourche Parish School Board without prejudice; and declining without prejudice supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff may seek leave to amend the complaint as to federal law claims against Ashleigh Landry and the Lafourche Parish School Board no later than Monday, May 30, 2022, to address below discussed deficiencies in the complaint. If leave to amend is allowed, the state law claims would be reinstated;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that motions for a more definite statement (Rec. Docs. 23, 24) are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 2, 2013, Jerry T. was awarded custody of his son minor TMT. Rec. Doc. 24-3. More than six years later on October 28, 2019, Jerry T. agreed to grant defendant Ashleigh Marcel Landry temporary custody of TMT, a minor under the age of seventeen. Rec. Doc. 24-2; Rec. Doc. 35 at 2; see also Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Landry is an adult resident of Lafourche Parish in Louisiana, who was an employee of the Lafourche Parish School Board (the “Board”) system and the principal of Lockport Middle School located in Lafourche Parish. Id. at 1-2.
Over the course of the fall 2020 semester, Landry engaged in a sexual relationship with TMT. Id. at 3. Landry “sexually exploit[ed]” TMT during normal school and employment hours of Lockport Middle School. Id. at 9. While Landry was principal of Lockport Middle School she would periodically transport TMT from the school to her home, where TMT also lived, to engage in sexual relations. Id. at 3; Rec. Doc. 35 at 2. In March 2021, she confessed to this relationship, as well as to exchanging lascivious/sexual text messages with TMT. Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Landry was then arrested for felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile in March 2021. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Board “was made aware of the sexual relationship between Landry and TMT . . . prior to Landry's arrest.” Id. at 4. On March 9, 2021, the Seventeenth Judicial District Court of Louisiana granted custody of TMT to plaintiff Amy Adams, an adult resident of Lafourche Parish, Louisiana and the biological mother of TMT. Rec. Doc. 35-1. Prior to March 2021, the Board allegedly failed to take action to protect plaintiff's son from Landry's sexual advances, intentionally allowed Landry to continue her sexual exploitation of TMT, and failed to properly monitor or supervise Lockport Middle School over the course of Landry's sexual exploitation. Rec. Doc. 1 at 4, 9. Plaintiff alleges that even after her arrest, Landry maintains an ongoing sexual relationship with TMT. Id. at 4.
On November 19, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court alleging that defendants Landry, individually and in her official capacity of principal of Lockport Middle School, Tina Babin, individually and in her official capacity as president of the Board, and the Board violated TMT's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 2, 9. Plaintiff also alleges defendants are liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, sexual misconduct, and intentional spoilation of evidence under Louisiana State law. Id. at 5, 9. Moreover, plaintiff asserts that Babin and the Board are vicariously liable for Landry's tortious conduct. Id. at 9. Accordingly, plaintiff claims defendants are liable for general and special damages, including emotional distress and mental anguish, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Id. On January 31, 2022, defendants filed the instant motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and in the alternative, a motion for more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Rec. Docs. 23, 24.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint “must contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, a plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 556 U.S. at 556).
When deciding whether a plaintiff has met its burden, a court “accept[s] all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements' cannot establish facial plausibility.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs must “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
In addition to their 12(b)(6) motion, defendants also move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Rec. Doc. 241 at 6-7. Plaintiff argues that “federal question claims can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (rather than failure to state a claim) only when the claim is not even ‘colorable,' i.e., it is wholly insubstantial and frivolous or is immaterial and made solely for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 7 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)). Defendants urge us to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than for failure to state a claim, because “there is a complete absence of facts which lead to a conclusion that Babin, or Landry for that matter, were acting under state law.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 13-14. Nevertheless, this case does not meet the standard for jurisdictional dismissal.
“The Supreme Court has enunciated a strict standard for dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the basis of jurisdiction is also an element in the plaintiff's federal cause of action.” Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981). However, there is an exception for a suit where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes “clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” WickFire, L.L.C. v. Laura Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83). “A claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous if it is foreclosed by previous decisions of the Supreme Court.” Id. Generally, “[i]f the challenge to jurisdiction is also a challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, a district court should assume jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case.” Stem v. Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The exceptions to this rule are narrowly drawn, and are intended to allow jurisdictional dismissals only in those cases where the federal claim is clearly immaterial or insubstantial.” Williamson, 645 F.2d at 416. “The nonexistence of a cause of action is no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal.” Stem, 813 F.3d at 210 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998)).
Here, defendants do not meet their burden of proving that plaintiff's claim against Landry is “clearly immaterial or insubstantial.” See id. at 416. Defendants assert that from 20192021, Landry was TMT's legal guardian. See Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 12; 24-2. Because Landry was TMT's legal guardian, allegedly “[e]ach time Landry exercised control over TMT, and particularly when she removed him from school to ‘transport TMT . . . to her home . . .,' she was exercising her authority as his legal guardian, not as his principal.” Rec. Doc. 24-1 at 13. Thus, defendants claim “Landry's employment with the LPSB is an ancillary fact, being used to gain federal jurisdiction over the LPSB, ” and Landry was “not in her official capacity as the principal of Lockport Middle School or as a state actor.” Id. at 11, 13.
However even assuming Landry was TMT's legal guardian during the time period in question, we cannot say that plaintiff's claim that Landry was acting under color of state law is frivolous or is clearly “foreclosed by previous ...
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