Adams v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 31 January 1873
• Citation: Adams v. Reeves, 68 N.C. 134, 12 Am.Rep. 627 (N.C. 1873)
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: E. M. ADAMS v. R E. REEVES and M. C. REEVES.

68 N.C. 134

12 Am.Rep. 627

E. M. ADAMS

v.R E. REEVES and M. C. REEVES.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

January Term, 1873.

A voluntary payment, with a knowledge of all the facts, cannot be recovered back, although there was no debt; a payment, under a mistake of fact, may.

If one knowing that he has no claim upon another, sues out legal process against him and seizes his person or property, and the defendant, acting upon the false representations of the plaintiff, and not being able at the time by reasonable diligence, to know or to prove that such representations are false, pays the demand, he may recover it back in a subsequent action.

If the instructions, asked on a trial in the Superior Court, and given in the precise words asked for by the Court, are so vague and obscure as to admit of two different constructions, one of which may possibly mislead the jury, it is error, and a good cause for a venire de novo.

( Pool v. Allen, 7 Ired. 120; Newell v. March, 8 Ired. 441; White v. Green, 5 Jones 47; Islay v. Stewart, 4 Dev. & Bat. 160; Young v. Jeffries,Ibid. 216; and Horton v. Green, 66 N. C. Rep. 596, cited and approved.)

CIVIL ACTION tried before Cloud, J., at Spring Term, 1872, of the Superior Court of FORSYTH county.

The action is brought to recover money which the plaintiff alleges he paid to defendants through their fraudulent representation, and paid under the compulsory process of law. On the trial, certain issues were submitted to the jury, to-wit:

1. Was J. H. Richards the agent of the defendants in the sale of the tobacco mentioned in the pleadings?

2. Did the defendants or either of them induce the plaintiff, by false representation, to pay defendants any money, the proceeds of the sale of the tobacco?

3. What is the amount of the plaintiff's damage, if any?

Richards, the alleged agent, in relation to his agency, among other things testified: That in a conversation he had with R. E. Reeves, one of the defendants, at Dobson, in the Summer or Fall of 1871, he asked Reeves, “Do you deny that I was your agent to buy and sell tobacco for your firm?” That Reeves answered: “No, I will admit it before any court or jury.” Again he asked him: “Did you deny that you employed me, as your agent, to sell the tobacco sold by me to Adams (the plaintiff) as my own, and to do the best I could with it?” To which, Reeves replied, “I have never denied it”; that the conversation took place in the presence of one White. White being examined on the trial, corroborated Richards, and further testified, that he knew Reeves and that Reeves knew him, had conversations with him, &c.

R. E. Reeves, the defendant, in regard to this conversation, testified that he had a conversation with Richards at the time and place, giving a different version of it, and denying the truth of Richards' statement; but that no such man as White was present, that he hid not know him, nor had he ever seen him until the day before the trial, when he was pointed out to him as being one of the witnesses. On his cross-examination, Reeves was asked if he had not seen White with one Bass at his own house (Reeves') last Christmas; and did he not at that time offer to purchase White's crop of tobacco. Reeves recollected seeing Bass there about that time, but had no recollection whatever of White, or his offering to buy tobacco from him; nor did he ever see him at other times.

In reply to Reeves, White was recalled, and asked about being at Reeves's house, &c. Defendants objected to this question. Objection overruled. White stated that Bass and he were at the house of Reeves last Christmas; that Reeves knew him, called him by name, and offered to buy his tobacco. Bass being examined, sustained White.

It was further proved on the part of the plaintiff, that Reeves told him, the plaintiff, that Richards was not his agent, nor had any authority to sell the tobacco, nor had he any control of it. That Richards was a great scamp, and was only permitted by the firm to go along with their wagon, to visit his relations in Virginia; that Richards had practiced a fraud upon the plaintiff and himself, and offered to assist the plaintiff in bringing Richards to justice.

For the defendants, it was further proved, that they had brought suit against the plaintiff in Danville, Va., and had attached some funds of his, the plaintiff's, which were in bank; that this suit was compromised by the plaintiff's paying the amount to defendants for the tobacco sold by Richards. The defendants insisted that the money was paid upon a compromise of that suit, and not by reason of any misrepresentation.

There was other evidence introduced, which is not material to the points involved. The instructions asked by the parties, and those given by his Honor, are fully set out in the opinion of the Court.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Rule for a new trial; rule discharged. Judgment and appeal by defendants.

Scales & Scales, for appellants .

Blackmer & McCorkle and Masten, contra .

RODMAN, J.

A voluntary payment, with a knowledge of all the facts cannot be recovered back, although there was no debt. But a payment under a mistake of fact may be. Pool v. Allen, 7 Ired. 120; Newell v. March, 8 Ired. 441; White v. Green, 5 Jones 47; Marriot v. Hampton, 2 Smith L. C. 237, and notes.

And this is not the less true if the mistake as to the fact, was caused by the false representation of the defendant: provided, the plaintiff could not by reasonable diligence under the circumstances, have informed himself of the truth. It is on this principle that the plaintiff puts his right to recover in this case.

It is said however for the defendants, that money paid under compulsion of legal process cannot be recovered back, and for this is cited Marriot v. Hampton, ubi sup., and other cases which have followed in its track. In that case the defendant had recovered judgment against the plaintiff for a sum which plaintiff alleged he had paid, but he was unable to produce any evidence of the payment, and paid the demand, at what stage of the action does not appear; afterwards he found the defendant's receipt, and brought his action to recover back the money.

It was held, on the principle that there must be an end of litigation, that the plaintiff could not recover. The decision has been repeatedly followed, and it is settled law as a general rule, that if one compromises a demand after action brought, by paying it in whole or in part, he cannot in a subsequent action, recover back the money paid, upon any ground of which he might have availed himself as a defence to the original action. But this rule is subject to the qualifications: 1. That the process was bona fide sued out, and was not accompanied by circumstances which amounted to duress or extortion. 2. That the debt demanded was not false to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Probably the two qualifications are in the substance the same; but for the present purpose, the division is convenient.

In the present case, the fact which is an essential part of the plaintiff's case, viz: that Richards was the authorized agent of the defendants to sell the tobacco, would, with other facts which do not seem to be disputed, have been a complete defence in the original action.

There was no evidence of actual duress or oppression. The mere facts that the original action was begun by an attachment of property, or that property was attached in the course of it; or, that it was brought in a neighbor though foreign State, do not of themselves constitute or imply duress. We must assume that the plaintiff, although a resident of North Carolina, would have received in the courts of Virginia the same justice that he would have received in his own State. These matters are mentioned only to be put out of the way as not affecting the case. It remains only to consider whether the second qualification of the rule...