Adams v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 18839

• Decision Date: 22 January 1957
• Docket Number: No. 18839,18839
• Citation: 139 N.E.2d 577
• Parties: Patricia G. ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. The REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION and Western Electric Company, Incorporated, Appellees. *
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 577

139 N.E.2d 577

Patricia G. ADAMS et al., Appellants, v. The REVIEW BOARD OF the INDIANA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DIVISION and Western Electric Company, Incorporated Appellees. ^*

No. 18839.

Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc.

Jan. 22, 1957.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1957.

Ralph N. May, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Williams S. McMasters, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for Review Board.

Barnes, Hickam, Pantzer & Boyd, Indianapolis, Walter Wm. Evans, New York City, Frederic D. Anderson, Kurt F. Pantzer, Jr., Indianapolis, for Western Electric Co.

KELLEY, Presiding Judge.

The appellants are employees of the Western Electric Company, Incorporated, and work at its Indianapolis plant. The corporation entered into an agreement, effective May 15, 1955, with a labor union representing appellants, as their duly designated and certified bargaining agent, covering their wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. Appellants seek to recover unemployment compensation for the period starting July 18, 1955 and ending July 31, 1955 on the ground that they were involuntarily unemployed and were eligible for benefit rights during said period. Said employer had designated said period as the Standard Vacation Period for 1955 and had shut down its plant, with no production work of any kind, during said time.

The appellee Review Board decided that appellants were voluntarily unemployed and unavailable for work during said period on the theory that said agreement provided that all employees, except those required to work due to the needs of the business, should take their vacations during said period; and that appellants, as parties thereto, were bound by such provision.

Said agreement provided for paid vacation eligibility, based on the term of employment of full calendar months as of July 1 of the current calendar year and incorporated a graduated schedule of vacation days allowed with pay. According to the schedule, employees with less than six months employment prior to July 1 of the current calendar year, in this case 1955, were not eligible for any vacation with pay. For the purposes of our determination, none of the appellants possessed sufficient months of employment to make them eligible for any days of vacation with pay. The question posed for our consideration is whether the agreement bound all of the employees of said employer to take a vacation during said Standard Vacation Period without regard to their eligibility or ineligibility for pay allowance during said vacation period.

There appears no question that the employer had the right under said agreement to declare a Standard Vacation Period and to close down its plant during the same. The vital question here pertains to the effect, under the contract, of such declared vacation and plant immobilization on appellants as employees ineligible for vacation pay. Did such employees, by the terms of the contract, agree to a payless vacation? If they did, then, as the Board found, they were voluntarily unemployed, without attachment to the labor market, and were not eligible for unemployment benefits. If they did not, then were involuntarily unemployed, with attachment to the labor market, and were entitled to unemployment benefits.

The Review Board rested its decision upon the following isolated provision of the agreement, namely:

'3. Scheduling Vacations

'3.1 Vacations shall be taken during the two week standard vacation period except for those employees who are required by the Company to work during that period due to the needs of the business. Vacations not scheduled during the standard period will be scheduled in accordance with the employee's wishes to the extent consistent with the needs of business, giving due consideration to term of employment.'

The solution to the problem presented depends, we think, upon the application of and the sense in which the word 'Vacations' was used in said provision; that is, did it refer and include all the employees or was it restricted to only those entitled to vacation with pay. In construing the contract, we look not solely to an isolated or special clause thereof but to the instrument as a whole. 'The true meaning of a contract is to be ascertained from a consideration of all its provisions in order to carry out the true intention of the parties gathered from the whole instrument.' Sindlinger v. Department of Financial Institutions of Indiana, 1936, 210 Ind. 83, 199 N.E. 715, 724, 105 A.L.R. 501. 'The mutual understanding and intent of the parties, as to purpose, scope, and ultimate object to be attained by the contract, * * * is controlling, and must be determined, not by detached provisions, but by viewing the instrument as a whole.' Ohio Oil Company v. Detamore, 1905, 165 Ind. 243, 73 N.E. 906, 908.

With these principles in mind, we have viewed and considered all the different parts and provisions of the agreement, and particularly those bearing upon or having reference to the subject of vacations for the employees covered by the contract. Our perusal has revealed no clause, term, or provision of the...