Adams v. Riley

• Decision Date: 27 May 1887
• Citation: 30 L.Ed. 1207,7 S.Ct. 1208,122 U.S. 382
• Parties: ADAMS and others v. RILEY, Assignee, etc
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

122 U.S. 382

7 S.Ct. 1208

30 L.Ed. 1207

ADAMS and others v. RILEY, Assignee, etc.

May 27, 1887.

On the twenty-fifth day of September, 1863, Benjamin B. Barnes made his deed conveying to certain of his children several tracts of land in the counties of Crawford and Houston, in the state of Georgia. The deed was witnessed by three persons,—one of whom was a justice of the peace,—who certified that it was signed, sealed, and delivered in their presence. It was duly recorded in Crawford county, where most of the lands are, on the twenty-sixth of March, 1864; in Houston county, September 30, 1874. The grantor, upon his own petition, was, March, 1874, adjudged a bankrupt by the district court of the United States for the Southern district of Georgia. His schedule of real estate embraced these lands. He was in the actual possession thereof at the time of filing his petition in bankruptcy. In June, 1874, immediately after an assignment, in the usual form, by the register of the estate of the bankrupt, his assignee in bankruptcy went into possession of the lands, and thereat er took to himself, as such assignee, the rents and profits thereof. On the nineteenth of January, 1876, the assignee filed his petition in the district court, in bankruptcy, setting forth the above facts, and stating that the title to the lands was in dispute between him and the grantees in the deed of September 25, 1863. The petition alleged that the deed was wholly voluntary, and that, from its date to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, the grantor was in the continuous, uninterrupted possession of the lands, using and controlling the same as his property, and enjoying the rents, issues, and profits thereof. The prayer of the assignee was for notice to the claimants as required by section 5063 of the Revised Statutes, and for a sale of the lands, the proceeds to be held to answer any suit which might be instituted by the claimants.

That section of the Revised Statutes provides: 'Whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the title to any portion of the estate, real or personal, which has come into possession of the assignee, or which is claimed by him, is in dispute, the court may, upon the petition of the assignee, and after such notice to the claimant, his agent or attorney, as the court shall deem reasonable, order it to be sold, under the direction of the assignee, who shall hold the funds received in place of the estate disposed of; and the proceeds of the sale shall be considered the measure of the value of the property in any suit or controversy between the parties in any court. But this provision shall not prevent the recovery of the property from the possession of the assignee by any proper action, commenced at any time before the court orders the sale.'

The claimants appeared, and answered the petition. They asserted title to the property under the deed of 1863, claiming (1) that the grantor made the deed to his children in good faith, by way of advancement, and without any intent to delay or defraud his creditors, these lands constituting, at the time, an inconsiderable part of his estate, and his other property being largely more than was necessary to meet any indebtedness he then or thereafter had; (2) that the deed was delivered to the grantees by the grantor at or about the time of its execution; (3) that the grantor's possession, at any time thereafter, of the lands, was held for the grantees; (4) that the grantor was entirely solvent when adjudged a bankrupt, and was induced to go into bankruptcy by the fraudulent conduct of others, who, taking advantage of his feeble health, persuaded him into taking that step, and to include these lands in his schedule of real estate. They prayed that the assignee be required to account to them for the rents and profits received by him.

Upon the issues thus made the parties went into proofs, in accordance with the rules of the court; but for reasons not disclosed by the record, the assignee, by leave of the court, and without notice to the defendants, withdrew his petition 'without prejudice to either party, or to any other proceeding he may be advised to institute touching the subject-matter of said petition,' In a few days thereafter, to-wit, on December 1, 1879, the defendants presented a petition to the district court, sitting in bankruptcy, reciting the foregoing facts, and praying that the assignee be required to surrender the possession of the premises to them, and account for rents and profits received by him. To this petition the assignee demurred for want of jurisdiction in the district court to give the relief asked. No further steps seem to have been taken in that proceeding.

The present suit was commenced by the assignee in the circuit court on the sixteenth day of December, 1879. Its object is to obtain a decree requiring the surrender by the defendants of the title deed for these lands, and ordering their sale. The bill sets out, substantially, the same facts as those alleged in the petition filed by the assignee in the district court. The relief asked is based upon the following grounds: (1) That these lands were the property of the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy. (2) That the deed of 1863 was never delivered by the grantor to the defendants, or to any of them, in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, nor 'until he became so greatly involved that he feared his creditors could reach said lands.' (3) That the deed was wholly voluntary. (4) That, if the defendants ever had a right to recover the lands from the assignee, their cause of action is barred by section 5057 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: 'No suit, either at law or in equity, shall be maintainable in any court between an assignee in bankruptcy and a person claiming an adverse interest, touching any property or rights of property transferable to or vested in such assignee, unless brought within two years from the time when the cause of action accrued for or against such assignee. And this...