Adams v. State
| Decision Date | 09 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21A-CR-2332 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
| Parties | Marlin D. Adams, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable John Bohdan Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 02D04-2011-CM-4016
Attorney for Appellant
Mark A. Thoma
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma, & Terrill
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee
Attorney General for Indiana
Catherine E. Brizzi
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
[¶1] Marlin D. Adams was convicted of (1) public intoxication, as a Class B misdemeanor, [1] and (2) resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.[2] Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.
[¶2] As to public intoxication, Adams argues that there is insufficient evidence of a breach of the peace or an imminent danger of a breach. As to resisting law enforcement, Adams admits that he resisted arrest. However, Adams argues that he was improperly convicted because the officers used excessive force.
[¶3] We affirm.
[¶4] One afternoon in November 2020, Officer Lance Wilker of the Fort Wayne Police Department was dispatched to a residential area. Reportedly, there was a black male-potentially mentally ill-yelling at houses and children. When Officer Wilker responded to the call, he saw a woman tightly clutching a child. A group of people pointed down an alley, where Officer Wilker saw someone wearing clothing fitting the reported description. Concerned about the person, Officer Wilker approached him. The person was later identified as Adams.
[¶5] Officer Wilker told Adams he was "coming to check" on him and "make sure [he's] okay." Tr. Vol. 2 at 105. Adams became "[v]ery aggressive by yelling" at Officer Wilker. Id. at 104. Officer Wilker smelled a "heavy odor of alcohol" emanating from Adams. Id. at 104. Officer Wilker also noticed that Adams had bloodshot, watery eyes and "his balance was a little off[.]" Id. at 105.
[¶6] Officer Wilker requested immediate backup assistance "due to the situation being tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Id. Specifically, Officer Wilker was concerned about the "level of aggression" Adams exhibited after Officer Wilker had "explained . . . that [he] was there to help[.]" Id. Officer Wilker "didn't know where it was going to go" and "felt more comfortable with another officer getting there a little bit more quickly." Id. Officer Wilker asked Adams for his identification. Adams at first refused to provide identification.
[¶7] When a backup officer arrived by vehicle, Adams "took off at a very fast pace towards" the vehicle. Id. at 106. Based on that behavior, Officer Wilker pulled out his taser in case he might need it. Officer Wilker also used his radio to inform the arriving officer that there was someone "running up to him[.]" Id. When the arriving officer got out of the vehicle, Adams stopped running and began to yell at the officer. A third officer eventually responded to the scene.
[¶8] When the third officer arrived, the officers attempted to arrest Adams for public intoxication. Officer Wilker did not inform Adams that he was under arrest. Officer Wilker did not do so because he "did not have time due to [Adams's] level of aggression" and because "there was so much going on[.]" Id. at 107.
[¶9] Officer Wilker tried to place handcuffs on Adams and asked him "numerous times" to comply. Id. at 108. Adams refused to comply, "tensing up his arm" and "pulling away[.]" Id. To place handcuffs on Adams, it took the efforts of three officers, which Officer Wilker attributed to Adams's "state of aggression." Id. Amid the struggle, Adams "kept yelling that he's a Marine, a devil dog." Id. at 109. One officer "put [his] hands on [Adams's] shoulders just to calm him down" and so other officers "could assist in putting [the] handcuffs on[.]" Id. at 127. The officer believed that if Adams "tried to do anything aggressive" this positioning would allow the officers to "take him into control a lot better." Id. The other two officers applied force to "get [Adams's] arms behind his back to get him placed into handcuffs." Id. at 108. After handcuffing Adams, law enforcement searched Adams's person and found an alcoholic beverage up one sleeve. Adams was also carrying a bag that contained alcoholic beverages.
[¶10] The officers decided to "play[] it safe" by having two officers escort Adams to a police vehicle. Id. at 110. While walking to the vehicle, Adams "became dead weight," essentially "dropp[ing] all of his weight causing [the officers] to carry him[.]" Id. at 109. Once at the vehicle, Adams "used the [vehicle's] frame and opening to prevent [the officers] from getting [Adams] inside[.]" Id. As Officer Wilker would later explain, Adams was "[f]ighting us, kicking, not wanting to go in, preventing us from shutting the doors and everything." Id. at 110.
[¶11] The State charged Adams with public intoxication, as a Class B misdemeanor, and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Adams was tried by a jury and found guilty as charged. The trial court then entered judgment and imposed an aggregate sentence of 365 days in jail with 275 days suspended.
[¶12] Adams appeals.
[¶13] "A person may be convicted of an offense only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt." I.C. § 35-41-4-1(a). When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1283 (Ind. 2019). We "consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence." Id. (quoting McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018)). If substantial evidence supports the judgment, we will affirm. Id.
[¶14] As charged, Adams could be convicted of public intoxication only upon sufficient evidence that, while intoxicated by alcohol in a public place, he "breach[ed] the peace" or was "in imminent danger of breaching the peace[.]" I.C. § 7.1-5-1-3(a). On appeal, Adams does not dispute that he was intoxicated by alcohol in a public place. Rather, he focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence that he breached the peace or was in imminent danger of doing so.
[¶15] As this Court has observed, the public intoxication statute does not define a breach of peace or an imminent danger "[n]or has our Indiana Supreme Court defined these terms in conjunction with the amended public intoxication statute." Ruiz v. State, 88 N.E.3d 219, 225 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017). "When we interpret a statute, we give its undefined 'words their plain meaning and consider the structure of the statute as a whole.'" WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187, 1191 (Ind. 2002) (quoting ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep't, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016)). In giving words their plain meaning, we may consult a dictionary. See, e.g., Hartman v. BigInch Fabricators & Constr. Holding Co., Inc., 161 N.E.3d 1218, 1224 (Ind. 2021) ().
[¶16] Drawing on precedent from other contexts, this Court has determined that a breach of peace "is a violation or disturbance of the public tranquility or order and includes breaking or disturbing the public peace by any riotous forceful, or unlawful proceedings." Ruiz, 88 N.E.3d at 225 (quoting Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)); cf. Breach of the Peace, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ( that a breach of peace generally includes "creating a public disturbance or engaging in disorderly conduct, particularly by making an unnecessary or distracting noise"). As to imminent danger, we apply the ordinary meaning of the terms and conclude that danger is imminent when "threatening to occur immediately," "dangerously impending," or "[a]bout to take place[.]" Imminent, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
[¶17] According to Adams, "[w]ithout actual or threatened violence," he "could not have been found to have breached the peace or be about to breach the peace." Br. of Appellant at 19. Adams directs us to Lemon, 868 N.E.2d 1194. In Lemon, this Court looked to a footnote in an Indiana Supreme Court decision and ultimately determined that "violence, either actual or threatened, is an essential element of breaching the peace." Id. (citing Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 n.6 (Ind. 1993)). We note that the Supreme Court decision did not analyze the public intoxication statute; it focused on a constitutional challenge to the statute criminalizing disorderly conduct. See Price, 622 N.E.2d at 956-67. Still, we will proceed assuming arguendo that evidence of actual or threatened violence is necessary to support the instant conviction of public intoxication.
[¶18] The evidence shows that Adam was visibly intoxicated in a residential area with his behavior leading to a police report. When law enforcement responded, a bystander was tightly clutching a child. A group of people pointed toward Adams. When Officer Wilker approached Adams to check on his wellbeing, Adams was very aggressive-so aggressive that Officer Wilker sought the immediate assistance of backup. As Officer Wilker explained at trial, the situation was "tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Tr. Vol. 2 at 105. When another officer arrived in his vehicle, Adams took off...
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