Adams v. State
| Decision Date | 08 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | 2010.,435 Sept. Term,Nos. 352,s. 352 |
| Citation | 41 A.3d 572,204 Md.App. 418 |
| Parties | Michael Lee ADAMS v. STATE of Maryland.John Wesley Ray v. State of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David P. Kennedy (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
James E. Williams (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: GRAEFF, HOTTEN, JAMES A. KENNEY, III (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Maryland Code, sections 3–106 and 3–107 of the Criminal Procedure Article (CP) govern proceedings involving a criminal defendant who, by reason of mental retardation or mental disorder, is incompetent to stand trial. See Walker v. State, 392 Md. 1, 2, 9, 895 A.2d 1024 (2006) (). These consolidated appeals arise in the aftermath of Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 978 A.2d 736 (2009), in which the Court of Appeals enforced the mandate in CP section 3–107(a)(2) that felony charges must be dismissed when the defendant remains incompetent after five years. The novel question presented here is whether, following such a dismissal, the State may (a) re-indict the same defendant for the same crimes, even though he remains incompetent; and (b) on the basis of such re-indictment, continue to confine that defendant under a criminal, rather than a civil, commitment.
In these appeals, John Wesley Ray, appellant, returns and is joined by Michael Lee Adams, appellant, in challenging the State's actions in response to Ray. Although the original felony indictments against both appellants were dismissed in accordance with the Court of Appeals' decision in Ray and CP section 3–107(a)(2), the State re-indicted both appellants on the same charges even though they were still not competent to stand trial. Based on these re-indictments, moreover, appellants have remained confined, pursuant to CP section 3–106, under criminal commitments.
In their brief, Ray and Adams present a single issue for our review:
Can the State indefinitely confine a criminal defendant found incompetent to stand trial and who is not likely to regain competency in the foreseeable future, in violation of CP § 3–107 and due process of law, by simply re-indicting the defendant on the same charges that are required to be dismissed pursuant to § 3–107?
The State moves to dismiss these interlocutory appeals on the ground that they are not permitted by statute, rule, or the collateral order doctrine. On the merits, the State argues that these re-indictments and continued criminal commitments are permitted by language in the Ray opinion stating that, following a dismissal without prejudice under CP section 3–107(a), “the State may re-institute charges[.]” Id. at 420, 978 A.2d 736.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that both appeals are properly before this Court under the collateral order doctrine. In addition, we agree with appellants that their re-indictments, as well as their continued confinement under criminal commitments based on such re-indictments, violate CP sections 3–106 and 3–107 and their due process and equal protection rights protected by those sections. Accordingly, we shall reverse the orders denying appellants' motions to dismiss their re-indictments and remand for further proceedings, which may include civil commitment proceedings.
A review of constitutional and statutory principles applicable to incompetent defendants is helpful before considering the posture of the two appeals now before us.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738–39, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 1854, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), the Supreme Court held that, by subjecting Jackson, an incompetent defendant,
to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by [statute], Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment....
For reasons closely related to those ..., we also hold that Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.
(Footnote omitted.)
The Jackson Court explained that, “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Id., 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. at 1858. Thus,
a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.
Id. (footnote omitted). Although the Supreme Court declined “to prescribe arbitrary time limits,” citing the existence “of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record,” it did “note ... that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.” Id., 406 U.S. at 738–39, 92 S.Ct. at 1858.
Implementing the due process and equal protection principles recognized in Jackson, sections 3–106 and 3–107 of Maryland's Criminal Procedure Article establish a maximum period for holding an incompetent defendant under indictment and standards for confining such a defendant under a criminal commitment.
Section 3–107 limits the length of time criminal charges may remain pending against incompetent defendants. Although a court has discretionary authority to dismiss charges at any time “if the court considers that resuming the criminal proceeding would be unjust because so much time has passed since the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial,” the General Assembly has set specific times after which the court is required to dismiss charges against an incompetent defendant. Under CP section 3–107(a),
[w]hether or not the defendant is confined and unless the State petitions the court for extraordinary cause to extend the time, the court shall dismiss the charge against a defendant found incompetent to stand trial under this subtitle:
(1) when charged with a capital offense, after the expiration of 10 years;
(2) when charged with a felony or a crime of violence as defined under § 14–101 of the Criminal Law Article, after the lesser of the expiration of 5 years or the maximum sentence for the most serious offense charged; or
(3) when charged with an offense not covered under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, after the lesser of the expiration of 3 years or the maximum sentence for the most serious offense charged.
(Emphasis added.)
CP section 3–106(b) authorizes the court to involuntarily confine an incompetent defendant against whom criminal charges are pending, under what is known as a criminal commitment. It provides:
(1) If, after a hearing, the court finds that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial and, because of mental retardation or a mental disorder, is a danger to self or the person or property of another, the court may order the defendant committed to the facility that the Health Department designates until the court finds that:
(i) the defendant no longer is incompetent to stand trial;
(ii) the defendant no longer is, because of mental retardation or a mental disorder, a danger to self or the person or property of others; or
(iii) there is not a substantial likelihood that the defendant will become competent to stand trial in the foreseeable future.
(2) If a court commits the defendant because of mental retardation, the Health Department shall require the Developmental Disabilities Administration to provide the care or treatment that the defendant needs.
(Emphasis added.)
Defendants confined under criminal commitments receive at least annual judicial reconsideration of their incompetency, as set forth in CP section 3–106(c).1 When a reviewing court finds that an untried defendant is not likely to become competent in “the foreseeable future,” and that involuntary confinement is still necessary to protect the defendant and/or public,2 confinement may continue only if the State satisfies the “clear and convincing evidence” standard required for civil commitment. CP section 3–106(d) provides:
At a competency hearing under subsection (c) of this section, if the court finds that the defendant is incompetent and is not likely to become competent in the foreseeable future, the court shall:
(1) civilly commit the defendant as an inpatient in a medical facility that the Health Department designates provided the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(i) the defendant has a mental disorder;
(ii) inpatient care is necessary for the defendant;
(iii) the defendant presents a danger to the life or safety of self or others;
(iv) the defendant is unable or unwilling to be voluntarily committed to a medical facility; and
(v) there is no less restrictive form of intervention that is consistent with the welfare and safety of the defendant.
(2) order the confinement of the defendant for 21 days as a resident in a Developmental Disabilities Administration facility for the initiation of admission proceedings under § 7–503 of the...
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