Adams v. State
| Decision Date | 23 November 1923 |
| Docket Number | No. 24224.,24224. |
| Citation | 141 N.E. 460,194 Ind. 512 |
| Parties | ADAMS v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jay County; Alonzo L. Bales, Judge.
George W. Adams was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.Malcolm V. Skinner, and James R. Fleming, both of Portland, for appellant.
U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Mrs. Edward F. White, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.
The appellant was tried upon an indictment charging him with larceny of certain automobile tires and tubes, valued at $350. The larceny is alleged to have been committed in Jay county. The indictment was in one count, jointly charging George W. Adams and two others with the larceny. On his motion the appellant was tried separately upon a plea of not guilty. The trial was by jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned, upon which judgment was entered, from which this appeal is taken.
The only error assigned is on the court's action in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial. The appellant says that it was error for the court to give upon its own motion instructions numbered 5, 6, 7, 14, and 15; that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law; that the court erred in admitting improper evidence which influenced or caused the verdict.
[1] We will first consider appellant's objection to the introduction of evidence. Evidence was admitted over the objection of the appellant tending to show that the appellant after his indictment and before the trial of the cause had attempted to prevent one Angus Butcher, who was jointly indicted with this appellant, and who had confessed his part in the transaction and agreed to testify on behalf of the state, from testifying in the case; that the appellant by threats and intimidation had attempted to get such witness out of the jurisdiction of the court before the trial of said cause. The defendant objected to all such evidence, for the reason, as he stated, that by such evidence the state sought to prove an entirely separate and distinct crime other than that charged in the indictment, and that the evidence was with reference to an entirely collateral matter, and was wholly irrelevant to prove or disprove any of the issues presented by the indictment.
In Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, on page 499, 82 N. E. 1039, on page 1044, the court said:
“Evidence that an accused has procured or attempted to procure the absence of a witness and thereby prevented, or attempted to prevent, his testifying is admissible.”
An accused cannot be convicted for any offense other than the one for which he was on trial, and as a general rule evidence of other offenses is not admissible, but competent evidence will not be rejected because it tends to prove another offense. Baker v. State, 190 Ind. 385, 129 N. E. 468, and cases there cited. The evidence was properly admitted. Eacock v. State, supra.
Relative to the testimony admitted tending to show that appellant had attempted to prevent a witness from testifying in the case, the court of its own motion gave the following instruction, numbered 5:
“If you believe from the evidence in this cause beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 28th day of March, 1922, after an indictment in this cause was returned and while said cause was pending in this court, the defendant, George W. Adams, attempted to prevent the prosecuting witness, Angus Butcher, from being present and testifying as a witness on behalf of the state at the trial of this cause, and that such attempt upon the part of the defendant was made by means of threats and intimidation or by carrying or attempting to carry the said Angus Butcher beyond the jurisdiction of this court, then you may consider such attempt upon the part of the defendant as a circumstance along with all the other evidence in this cause in determining the guilt or innocence of this defendant, but such attempt upon the part of the defendant must first be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The objection to this instruction urged by the appellant is the same as he urges to the admission of the testimony showing his attempt to prevent the witness from testifying. For reasons stated in the discussion of the testimony, it was not error to give this instruction.
[2][3] Appellant urges that the giving of instruction No. 6, given by the court of its own motion, was erroneous, because he says that this instruction places an undue burden upon the appellant in that it required appellant to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to his guilt, and required him to assume the burden of establishing his innocence, or to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In support of appellant's objection he cites Dorak v. State, 183 Ind. 622, 109 N. E. 771. In that case the court below instructed the jury that, where the defendant attempts to justify the killing as having been done in self-defense-
“the burden is on the defendant to show he was justified in the act, and in the use of a deadly weapon, or to offer evidence sufficient to raise in your minds a reasonable doubt as to his justification in such acts.”
This instruction is totally different from the one in the instant case. In the instant case the instruction was given with reference to what is known in law as an alibi, and contains this language:
“And the court instructs you, if the evidence in support of this defense raises a reasonable doubt in your minds whether the defendant was at the garage of Riley Bryan or in his own home at the time when the larceny charged was committed, then you ought to find the defendant not guilty.”
But this clause to which appellant objects is immediately followed by the following:
“And the court further instructs you that, if all the evidence given in the cause relevant to the alibi, either when considered alone or when taken together, with all the other evidence in the cause, raises in your minds a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, then you should find the defendant not guilty.”
The way we read this instruction it does not place the burden upon the defendant to prove anything. It is in this state the law that the defendant, in a criminal case, is not required to satisfy the jury of the existence of any fact which, if true, is a complete defense. It is sufficient if he creates in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the existence of such fact. Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157.
In the case of Walters v. State, 183 Ind. 178, 108 N. E. 583, cited by apppellant, the court says, in discussing the instruction:
“It is sufficient to entitle the defendant to acquittal if the evidence in the case is such as to create or leave a reasonable doubt as to his guilt regardless of whether it is produced by the defendant or by the state.”
This instruction is not open to the objection urged against it. Walters v. State, supra.
[4] Instruction No. 7, given by the court of its own motion, is as follows:
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Turner v. State
...to be given the testimony.' The same Court in discussing the specific question of the testimony of an accomplice in Adams v. State (1923), 194 Ind. 512, 141 N.E. 460, stated that an instruction which provided specifically that the evidence of an accomplice is to be received and weighed by t......
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Foust v. State, 24406.
...in the discharge of their important duties. Its giving was not error. Keesier v. State, 154 Ind. 242, 56 N. E. 232;Adams v. State, 194 Ind. 512, 141 N. E. 460. The appellant claims that the court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 1 tendered by the appellants. This instruction does n......
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Taylor v. State
...of any other witness, and regard him as a witness in the cause. Metzger v. State, (1938) 214 Ind. 113, 13 N.E.2d 519; Adams v. State, (1924) 194 Ind. 512, 141 N.E. 460. The defect in the first group of instructions is that they subject a defendant's testimony to 'a different and harsher rul......
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Wilkoff v. State, 26049.
...witnesses. The instruction is substantially the same as instruction No. 14, set out and approved in the case of Adams v. State, 194 Ind. 512, at page 518, 141 N. E. 460. The appellant contends that the opinion in the case of Kleihege v. State (Ind. Sup.) 177 N. E. 60, supports his contentio......