Adams v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 781,781
• Citation: 586 A.2d 810,86 Md.App. 377
• Parties: Troy Tyrone ADAMS v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 377

86 Md.App. 377

586 A.2d 810

Troy Tyrone ADAMS v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 781, Sept. Term, 1990.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 5, 1991.

Certiorari Denied June 21, 1991.

Michael R. Malloy, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Annabelle L. Lisic, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Alexander Williams, Jr., State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before BISHOP, ROBERT M. BELL and CATHELL, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Troy Tyrone Adams, the appellant, was convicted by a jury of common law robbery, common law assault and battery, and theft of property worth less than $300. The trial judge merged the theft conviction into the robbery conviction, and sentenced Adams to concurrent sentences of ten years for robbery and three years for assault and battery. The ten year sentence was subsequently reduced to seven years. Adams raises three issues on this appeal:

I. Did the lower court err by allowing the State to use a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner?

II. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Adam's convictions?

III. Did the trial court err by failing to merge Adam's conviction for assault and battery into his conviction for robbery?

We shall first discuss the sufficiency issue.

SUFFICIENCY

Adams attacks the sufficiency of the evidence in three ways. He argues first that Ms. Buckley had a "very [T]he standard to apply is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

limited opportunity to see the thief"; second, that he is facially scarred and the person described as Ms. Buckley's mugger was not; and that her testimony was contradicted by Adams' mother, who testified that Adams was with her at the time of the crime.

Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 717, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). See also Joiner v. State, 82 Md.App. 282, 294, 571 A.2d 844, cert. granted, 320 Md. 312, 577 A.2d 362 (1990). The weight assigned to the evidence presented is a matter for the jury to determine. Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 184, 502 A.2d 496 (1986). Identification by one eyewitness, if believed by the finder of fact, is sufficient to prove criminal agency. Id. at 183, 502 A.2d 496; Johnson v. State, 75 Md.App. 621, 628-29, 542 A.2d 429 (1988).

In the case at bar, Alice Buckley testified that on the night of June 6, 1989, she was walking along Rhode Island Avenue in Prince George's County when someone approached her from behind and began pulling at her purse. She struggled, and was pulled to the ground before the attacker succeeded in wresting the purse from her. Ms. Buckley "got a very, very clear look at him" as he stood an estimated four feet from her. She identified the appellant as her assailant. Ms. Buckley's testimony was sufficient to establish all the elements of the crimes charged. We perceive no error.

JURY SELECTION

Adams asserts that the State exercised one of its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner during jury selection.

The issue of racially discriminatory jury selection was discussed by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to strike African-Americans during jury selection in a criminal trial, where the defendant is of the same race, may raise an inference that the strikes were based upon impermissible racial motives.

The Maryland Court of Appeals following Batson in Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988), and in State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1989), summarized the preliminary requirements imposed on a defendant:

The guidelines by which a criminal defendant can meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination are clearly set out. The defendant

1) must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; ¹

2) is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate 3) must show that those facts and any other relevant circumstances raise [a rebuttable presumption] that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.

This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury establishes the requisite rebuttable presumption of purposeful discrimination. The trial judge must determine whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, considering all relevant circumstances.... If the trial judge finds that the defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case, there is no obligation on the prosecutor to offer any explanation for the use of a peremptory challenge and no entitlement on the part of the defendant to a hearing on the issue.

Id. at 410-11, 554 A.2d 1203 (bracketed material in original, citations omitted).

Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.... [this] explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors ... on the assumption--or his intuitive judgment--that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.... Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affim[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections."

Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972)). See also Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 247, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989) (once the burden shifts, the State must show "that 1) a reason other than the race of the juror did exist, and 2) the reason has some reasonable nexus to the case and was in fact the motivating factor in the exercise of the challenge.") A single racially discriminatory peremptory strike is a constitutional violation. Tolbert v. State, 315 During jury selection in the case at bar, the following colloquy ensued:

Md. 13, 22-23, 553 A.2d 228 (1989); Stanley, 313 Md. at 92-93, 542 A.2d 1267.

MS. BELTON [prosecutor]: I would like to strike Juror 12, Miss Dickerson.

* * * * * *

MR. SINGMAN [defense]: I would like a Batson challenge.

THE COURT: He wants to know why you are doing it.

MS. BELTON: The only--I don't know which one she was. The reason why I wanted to strike her was a--the location where she was from, Suitland. Okay.

And the second reason was because there are other jurors that I want to get on the jury. I didn't even know which one she was.

THE COURT: The Court is satisfied that it wasn't done for racial purposes.

MR. SINGMAN: Your Honor--

THE COURT: I am satisfied.

After closing arguments, the appellant was allowed to read into the record the jurors' towns of residence.

The appellant argues that the significance of Ms. Dickerson's town of residence was never explained by the prosecutor, and that the prosecutor's second reason only established that she wanted another juror in Ms. Dickerson's place.

Adams had established the first two elements of a prima facie case at the time of his challenge, as it was obvious that both he and Dickerson were black, and no act on his part was required to demonstrate his reliance on the presumption of opportunity to discriminate which is inherent in the exercise of a peremptory challenge. He did not, however, articulate any reasons as to why the prosecutor's We note that in Trice v. State, 310 Md. 695, 531 A.2d 682 (1987), the companion case to Stanley, the trial judge did not make an express finding of a prima facie case; instead, he asked the prosecutor to explain the reasons for the strikes. The Court held that the act of asking was an implied finding that a prima facie case of discrimination existed. Stanley, 313 Md. 50, 83, 542 A.2d 1267. Stanley (and Trice ) are distinguishable because there, the defense counsel supported the challenge by stating that the only black on the jury panel had been struck. Id. at 81-82, 554 A.2d 1203. See also Bailey v. State, 84 Md.App. 323, 330, 579 A.2d 774 (1990). In the case at bar, we cannot hold that the judge's request that the prosecutor justify her strike is an implied finding due to the complete lack of any reasons given to support the challenge. "[T]he elaborate responses of Batson are not intended to be a knee-jerk reaction every time a charge of discrimination is laid." ³ Bailey, 84 Md.App. at 326-27, 579 A.2d 774. We, therefore, hold that Adams did not present a prima facie case of discriminatory exercise of the State's peremptory strike. If we were to hold that a mere statement of challenge is sufficient to meet the burden, then in any situation where a juror of the defendant's race is peremptorily struck, the defendant will be able to establish a presumption of discrimination irrespective of the circumstances of the case. This would be Even assuming, arguendo, that the judge made a finding of prima facie discrimination, his ruling, made after consideration of the justifications given by the prosecutor, is accorded great deference.

                strike was discriminatory. 2  As a result, the trial judge made no finding of the existence of a prima facie case.   Indeed, given the paucity of justification for the "Batson challenge," it might not have been possible

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