Adams v. State Of Md..
| Decision Date | 03 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 13, Sept. Term, 2009.,13, Sept. Term, 2009. |
| Citation | 415 Md. 585,4 A.3d 499 |
| Parties | Tracy Wendell ADAMS, v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
415 Md. 585
4 A.3d 499
Tracy Wendell ADAMS,
v.
STATE of Maryland.
No. 13, Sept. Term, 2009.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Sept. 3, 2010.
George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Brenda Gruss, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, of Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J. HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
BELL, C.J.
I.
Tracy Wendell Adams, the petitioner, was charged both with possessing cocaine and distributing it to a Salisbury Police Department police officer, who was working undercover, in Salisbury, Wicomico County. The drug transaction was video recorded, although, because he never went to the passenger side of the undercover vehicle, where the video camera was situated, only the voice, and not the image, of the seller was reflected on the videotape. The petitioner was tried by jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Officer Drewer, the undercover officer, testified as to the authenticity and the contents of the videotape and, upon his sponsorship, the videotape was admitted into evidence. With regard to the petitioner's involvement in the drug transaction, he testified that the petitioner, whom he identified by description, in court and by photographic array, was the person who sold him the cocaine.
After all the evidence was in, the jury had been instructed and just before it was excused to begin deliberating, a juror inquired, “Judge Truitt, can we take the evidence with us?” The trial judge responded: “I'm going to send it in there.” The jury retired to deliberate.
Twenty-four minutes after the jury retired to begin deliberations, “the jury sent a note requesting to see the videotape that had been admitted as [an] [e]xhibit,” Adams v. State, 183 Md.App. 188, 201, 960 A.2d 1215, 1222 (2008), prompting the following colloquy:
“THE COURT: Mr. [Bailiff], you say you have a note.
“[BAILIFF]: They want to see the video.
“THE COURT: No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No?
“THE COURT: No.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if the video is part of the evidence-
“THE COURT: That's right.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You didn't want to let them look at it again?
“THE COURT: You want them to take all the witnesses in there and hear from them again? What's the difference? Hearing none. Tell them they will have to recall or you can bring them in and I'll tell them.
“[BAILIFF]: Bring them out?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, that's like saying you can't look at a document again. It's been admitted.
“THE COURT: It's singling out testimony....
(Whereupon the jury returned to the courtroom.)
“THE COURT: [Jury Foreman], what was the question?
“[JUROR FOREMAN]: If we could view the tape again.
“THE COURT: You'll just have to recall-
“[JUROR FOREMAN]: Okay.
“THE COURT:-what you saw.
“[JUROR FOREMAN]: Okay, that's fine.
“THE COURT: I can't single out any testimony. Then I'd have to let each witness come in.
“[JUROR FOREMAN]: Oh, I see. Okay.”
The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, concluding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion because the “trial court articulated an acceptable reason for refusing the jury's request.” Adams, 183 Md.App. at 206, 960 A.2d at 1225. The intermediate appellate court elaborated:
“[T]he trial court made a discretionary determination that allowing the jury to have the videotape of the alleged incident would overemphasize it.... [W]e are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in making that determination.”
Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1225. We granted the petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, Adams v. State, 407 Md. 529, 967 A.2d 182 (2009), to answer the question: whether the trial judge erred in refusing to permit the jury to review the videotape of an alleged drug transaction which had been admitted into evidence. We shall answer that question in the affirmative and, thus, hold that, where, as here, evidence has been admitted and the trial judge has not made a good cause determination as to its appropriateness to be taken into the jury room, the trial judge abuses his or her discretion when he or she thereafter denies the jury the right to review that evidence in the jury room. Accordingly, we shall reverse.
The issue to be resolved in this case is which section of Rule 4-326, “Jury-Review of Evidence-Communications,” applies when the jury asks to review an exhibit, which has been admitted into evidence, but has not been, although the court indicated to the jury that it would be, sent to the jury room. The question thus presented is one of Rule construction, the precepts of which are well established:
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is ‘to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.’ Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). The familiar point of departure for statutory interpretation is the plain language of the statute itself. Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997). When construing a statutory provision within a single statutory scheme, we must consider the statutory scheme as a whole to determine the legislative intent. See Marsheck v. Board of Trustees of the Fire & Police Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 403, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000);
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993); In re: Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298, 424 A.2d 153, 155 (1981). The same principles which are applied in statutory interpretation apply with equal force to our interpretation of the Maryland Rules. See Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000).”
In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001).
At the time of trial, Maryland Rule Section 4-326 provided 1 :
“(a) Jurors' notes. The court may, and upon request of any party shall, provide paper notepads for use by jurors during trial and deliberations. The court shall maintain control over the jurors' notes during the trial and promptly destroy the jurors' notes after the trial. A juror's notes may not be reviewed or relied upon for any purpose by any person other than the juror. If a juror is unable to use a notepad because of a disability, the court shall provide a reasonable accommodation.
“(b) Items taken to jury room. Jurors may take their notes with them when they retire for deliberation. Unless the court for good cause orders otherwise, the jury may also take the charging document and exhibits which have been admitted into evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken into the jury room without the agreement of all parties and the consent of the court. Electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing may be taken into the jury room only with the permission of the court. On request of a party or on the court's own initiative, the charging documents shall reflect only those charges
on which the jury is to deliberate. The court may impose safeguards for the preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors.
“(c) Jury request to review evidence. The court, after notice to the parties, may make available to the jury testimony or other evidence requested by it. In order that undue prominence not be given to the evidence requested, the court may also make available additional evidence relating to the same factual issue.
“(d) Communications with jury. The court shall notify the defendant and the State's Attorney of the receipt of any communication from the jury pertaining to the action as promptly as practicable and in any event before responding to the communication. All such communications between the court and the jury shall be on the record in open court or shall be in writing and filed in the action. The clerk or the court shall note on a written communication the date and time it was received from the jury.”
Although section (d) certainly is relevant to the question we are called upon to answer and, indeed, was in play in this case, as it prescribes the manner in which jury communications are to be handled, it does not address either what the jury may take to the jury room during deliberations, what it is privileged to review without court permission or when it must seek court permission to review evidence. Section (a) is not implicated by the issue presented in this case; it involves a discrete matter, juror notes, their control and use, that is in no way pertinent to its resolution. Thus, the sections relevant to the issue we are to address are sections (b) and (c).
Section (b) covers what the jury is permitted to have in the jury room when deliberating. With the exception of juror notes, for which there is no condition, the determination of what will accompany the
jury when it retires for that purpose is entrusted to the trial judge. Thus, the charging document and, with the exception of depositions, exhibits admitted into evidence may be taken into the jury room during deliberations, “[u]nless the court for good cause [ 2 ] orders otherwise.”
Depositions require “agreement of all parties and the consent of the court.” “[O]nly with the permission of the court,” may a jury have “electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions reduced to writing ... taken into the jury room.”
Section (c) applies to requests by the jury to review evidence to which it does not have access. Such evidence would include “testimony,” specifically identified in the Rule, and “other evidence.” The latter reference necessarily suggests that it contemplates and refers to evidence that was not admitted into evidence as an exhibit, i.e., evidence that was not...
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