Adams v. Succession of Mills

• Decision Date: 12 April 1897
• Docket Number: 12,382
• Citation: 49 La.Ann. 775,22 So. 257
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: LUCIEN ADAMS v. SUCCESSION OF FANNY S. MILLS

22 So. 257

49 La.Ann. 775

LUCIEN ADAMS v. SUCCESSION OF FANNY S. MILLS

No. 12,382

Supreme Court of Louisiana

April 12, 1897

Argued March 30, 1897

APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. King, J.

Lazarus Moore & Luce, for Plaintiff, Appellant.

Chretien & Suthon, for Defendant, Appellee.

Rogers & Dodds and Chas. F. Claiborne, for Intervenors, Appellees.

OPINION

NICHOLLS C.J.

Plaintiff seeks a judgment of twelve thousand dollars, with interest, against the succession of Fanny S Mills.

The demand is based upon allegations that for a period of eight or ten years prior to March, 1893, petitioner had been serving the late Mrs. Fannie Seymour Mills, in the capacity of business, professional and confidential adviser; that during the said period, from time to time, and from day to day, he performed divers and sundry services for her, with references to her business and household affairs, the trouble between herself and her late husband, and in various other similar ways, the said services having been performed continuously during that time; that she had no relatives or connections; that her acquaintance was very limited, and that she had, during that time, no person in whom she had confidence and to whom she could look for advice and assistance in the matters aforesaid, except petitioner, from whom she daily received aid and assistance; that she was addicted to drinking, and was of an exceedingly quarrelsome, violent and irritable disposition; that that fact made the services more onerous and valuable; that her husband was also addicted to drinking heavily, and that during said period he was often called upon to give attention, at her request, to her and her husband; that the services rendered were too numerous to specify in detail; that during the month of March, 1893, or thereafter, compensation for the services which petitioner had rendered was fixed and agreed upon between petitioner and Mrs. Mills, at the sum of ten thousand dollars, and she, at that time, and on numerous subsequent occasions, promised to pay petitioner said sum, but she failed to do so.

That during the latter part of 1893 and the years 1894 and 1895 petitioner continued to perform services as the business and personal adviser of Mrs. Mills as set forth, and considering the nature of the services and the fact that she had become an invalid and blind, they were fully worth the sum of one thousand dollars per annum, making an additional sum of two thousand dollars due him, besides the ten thousand dollars fixed between Mrs. Mills and himself.

That she having promised to pay the amount due petitioner, he refrained from bringing suit to enforce his demand, relying upon her promise as well as considering her condition. That by reason of the agreement between her and himself he was entitled to the sum of ten thousand dollars, and to two thousand dollars additional for the services rendered after the date of said agreement up to the time of her death, they being well worth that amount.

The public administrator, who was administering the succession of Mrs. Mills, was made defendant. As such he answered, pleading the general issue and the prescription of three years. Two parties, claiming to be a brother and sister of the deceased, joined the defendant in resisting the demand. The District Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for one hundred dollars, and he appealed.

On the trial parol evidence was permitted by the court over defendant's objections, to be introduced to support plaintiff's allegations as to the promises made by Mrs. Mills to plaintiff. It was allowed under a reservation by the court that it would ultimately give it only such effect as it was legally entitled to. The objection urged was that the testimony had for its object to prove an acknowledgment of a debt by a party deceased in order to take the same out of prescription, a kind of evidence inadmissible for that purpose under the provisions of Art. 2278 of the Civil Code.

In rendering its judgment the court held that the objection had been well taken, and that all parol evidence necessary and tending to interrupt or suspend prescription should be disregarded.

Considering the case as presented, it was of the opinion that the alleged verbal "contract" sued on was not a contract, but a verbal promise to pay a prescribed debt, and therefore the claim for services rendered prior to 1893 was prescribed by the prescription invoked.

In reference to the claim for services rendered since 1893 the court said: "The only services for which plaintiff could claim compensation were those rendered in his capacity as attorney at law in court, or by giving the deceased legal advice as to litigation, pending or threatened. It is proved that the only litigation deceased had since 1893 was in reference to the succession of her deceased husband, in respect to a tomb in the St. Louis Cemetery, and in regard to a threatened litigation...