Adams v. Swarthout

• Decision Date: 08 August 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:10-cv-01290-AWI-SKO-HC
• Parties: MARLON VINCENT ADAMS, Petitioner, v. GARY SWARTHOUT, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

MARLON VINCENT ADAMS, Petitioner,

v.GARY SWARTHOUT, Respondent.

Case No. 1:10-cv-01290-AWI-SKO-HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: August 8, 2013

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TO DENY THE PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1),

ENTER JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT,

AND DECLINE TO ISSUE

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE: 30 DAYS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 through 304. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on July 9, 2010, and transferred to this Court on July 20, 2010. Respondent filed an answer with supporting documentation on April 13, 2011, and Petitioner filed a traverse on August 22, 2011, and November 1, 2012.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).

A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). Petitioner claims that in the course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he suffered violations of his constitutional rights. The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Kern (KCSC), which is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d).

Respondent filed an answer on behalf of Respondent Gary Swarthout, Warden of the California State Prison at Solano, California (SOL), where Petitioner has been incarcerated during the course of this proceeding. Petitioner has thus named as a respondent a person who has custody of the Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the person of Respondent Swarthout.

II. Procedural Summary

At a jury trial in the KCSC, Petitioner was found guilty of having inflicted corporal injury upon the mother of his child in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 273.5(a) and having personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of the corporal injury in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.7(e). The trial court found that Petitioner had suffered a prior serious and violent felony conviction for first degree robbery in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(a) through (i) and 1170.12 (a) through (e) and had served a prior prison term within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code § 667.5(b). Petitioner was sentenced to nineteen years in prison. (Ans., Ex. A, doc. 21-1, 3.)

Petitioner appealed the judgment, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District (CCA) on January 28, 2009. (Ans., Ex. A, doc. 21-1.)

On April 15, 2009, the California Supreme Court (CSC) summarily denied Petitioner's petition for review without a statement of reasoning or authority. (Ans., Ex. B, doc. 21-2.)

III. Factual Summary

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a stateappellate court's decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). The following statement of facts is taken from the unpublished opinion of the CCA in People v. Marlon Vincent Adams, case number F054378, filed on January 28, 2009:

FACTS

The victim testified that she had been in a relationship with defendant since 1998 and they had a seven-year-old son together. They lived separately for a while, but on October 15, 2006, defendant moved back in with the victim. The next day, the victim went to work, and then she and their son went to the store to get food for dinner. She was expecting defendant and his friend that evening for a barbeque dinner and a movie. She had told defendant that she wanted no alcohol at the barbeque, but defendant brought vodka with him and he was already intoxicated when he and his friend arrived.

The victim told defendant not to bring the vodka in, but he ignored her. They started arguing and she told him to leave their son alone. The victim screamed at defendant to get out of their son's room and she told defendant to leave. As they argued, defendant pulled the victim's hair and grabbed her face. She pushed away from him and walked away toward the back door. As she did, defendant pushed her from behind, causing her to fall. When she fell, her finger got caught in the doorway and the tip of it was severed. She found the tip and went to the hospital, but the tip could not be reattached.

An investigator spoke to defendant in jail. Defendant was very remorseful and started crying. He told the investigator he got angry that day because the victim was "mouthing off in front of his friend." Defendant pulled the victim's ponytail. As she walked toward the kitchen, defendant pushed her and her finger got caught in the door. Defendant told the investigator he was sorry for what had happened and he wanted to keep his family together.

(Ans., Ex. A, doc. 21-1, 3-4.)

IV. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. Pinholster, - U.S. 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court's decision contravenes clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively unreasonable manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legalprinciple to a new context in an objectively unreasonable manner. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407.

An application of clearly established federal law is unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or inaccurate application is not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief as long as it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even a strong case for relief does not render the state court's conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on a claim was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87. The standards set by § 2254(d) are "highly deferential standard[s] for evaluating state-court rulings" which require that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, and the Petitioner bear the burden of proof. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground supporting the state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under the AEDPA. Wetzel v. Lambert, --U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court's legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, "review... is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v.Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400.

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden...