Adams v. Tribley

• Decision Date: 04 January 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:13-CV-10735
• Parties: JOHN ADAMS, Petitioner, v. LINDA TRIBLEY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

JOHN ADAMS, Petitioner, v. LINDA TRIBLEY, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:13-CV-10735

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

January 4, 2016

HONORABLE GEORGE CARAM STEEH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

John Adams, ("petitioner"), confined at the Central Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan, seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his conviction for 13 counts of child sexually abusive activity (CSAA), M.C.L.A. 750.145c(2), and two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC III), M.C.L.A. 750.520d(1)(a)(sexual penetration with a person between the ages of 13 and 16). For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the Oakland County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

The evidence presented established that from 1998 to 2005, defendant lured various girls aged 14-17 into his house by allowing them to drink alcohol, smoke cigarettes, and ingest drugs at his house. It was further revealed that defendant would purchase the aforementioned illegal substances for the various underage girls, purchase cell phones for the girls, allow the girls to use his car, and give the girls cash in exchange for the girls allowing defendant to videotape them while they posed nude. Several of the underage girls also testified that defendant would give them extra money if they recruited new girls to come pose for him.

People v. Adams, No. 272751, 2008 WL 203653, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2008).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.; lv. den. 483 Mich. 893, 760 N.W. 2d 461 (2009).

Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. Seq., which the trial court denied. People v. Adams, No. 05-201551-FH, Op. & Order (Oakland County Cir. Ct. Nov. 30, 2010). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Adams, No. 307427, Order (Mich. Ct. App. June 12, 2012); lv. den. 493 Mich. 892, 822 N.W. 2d 555 (2012).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. The use of amended statute MCL 750.145c in this case violates petitioner's constitutionally protected rights against ex post facto application of the law. In addition MCL 750.145c is void for vagueness thus violating the 1st and 14th Amendments.

II. The petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel when appointed defense counsel was conflicted, failed to adequately present available defense(s) and his counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, violating petitioner's constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

III. Petitioner was denied under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments his constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel where appellate counsel refused to investigate, research, issues supplied by petitioner and to request full documentation and transcripts to properly file petitioner's appealable issues in appeal of right and insure indigent client had copies of these same 'tools' to file in propria persona.

IV. Is the trial court required by the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of Michigan and United States Constitutions, to provide transcripts of hearings and copies of motions, briefs to indigent defendants on appeal[?]

V. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel, due process, fair trial confrontation of states proofs, by the action of the prosecutor, all rights that are guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and similar rights under Michigan Constitution.

VI. Petitioner was denied due process, fair trial, quick and speedy trial, effective assistance of counsel, confrontation of [the ] state's proofs and other rights under Michigan and United States Constitutions by the actions of the trial court.

VII. The trial court committed reversible error when it denied petitioner's pre-trial motion for severance thus denying petitioner's right to a fair trial.

VIII. Petitioner was denied due process of law and a fair trial where the prosecutor failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

IX. It was an abuse of discretion for trial judge to first compel petitioner to trial with appointed defense attorney who sabotaged defense because relationship was completely hostile to petitioner. Second upon realizing petitioner's accusations had merit, not to stop trial and inquire of counsel as to petitioner's accusations.

X. Petitioner was denied a properly instructed jury the jury instructions as given violated due process and a fair trial defense attorney was ineffective in a failure to protect petitioner's right to due process and a fair trial by allowing the jury to be misinformed as to the elements of the offense violating petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and similar rights under the Michigan Constitution.

XI. Petitioner's sentence was invalid because it was based on inaccurate information, improper scoring of the legislatively imposed sentencing guidelines, use of improper burden of proof and insufficient fact, and petitioner was represented by ineffective counsel, therefore violating petitioner's due process and Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions.

XII. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant relief on the basis of entrapment.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

III. Discussion

A. Claims ## 2, , , , , , and 12. The procedurally defaulted claims.

The Court will discuss petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims together for judicial economy and clarity. Respondent claims that six of petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted for various reasons. The Court will also discuss petitioner's third claim alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because petitioner attempts to use this claim to excuse the default of several of his claims.

When the state courts clearly and expressly rely on a valid state procedural bar, federal habeas review is also barred unless petitioner can demonstrate "cause" for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged...