Adams v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-6152 (GEB) |
| Parties | JACOB S. ADAMS, JR., Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Hon. Garrett E. Brown, Jr.
This matter comes before the Court upon the petition for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner Jacob S. Adams, Jr. (hereinafter "Petitioner"). (Doc. No. 12). Respondent the United States of America (hereinafter the "Government") has answered Petitioner's petition, and argues that it should be denied. (Doc. No. 14). The Court has considered the parties' submissions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. Having done so, Petitioner's petition will be denied for the reasons that follow.
On November 27, 2002, Petitioner was convicted of three counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, and three counts of using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (Government's Answer ¶ 4, hereafter "Answer"). The robberies occurred in 1995 and 1996. ). On April 7, 2003, the Court sentenced Petitioner to 610 months incarceration. (Answer ¶ 3). On April 24, 2003, Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal and on July10, 2006, the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction but remanded the case to this Court for re-sentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). (Amend. Pet. P. 2). On June 29, the Court re-sentenced Adams to 610 months. (Answer ¶ 3). Petitioner again appealed his sentence, which the Third Circuit affirmed on September 8, 2008. (Answer ¶ 9). On December 4, 2009, Petitioner filed his initial petition pursuant to § 2255. (Amend. Pet. P. 2). Subsequently, Petitioner retained counsel and filed an amended § 2255 petition on September 3, 2010. (Docket #12). The Government replied with its Answer on December 6, 2010, to which Petitioner responded on December 21, 2010. (Docket #14 and #15).
In his present petition, Petitioner requests that this Court vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255 because he contends: (1) that the Court's admission of DNA evidence at trial constituted a violation of his constitutional rights pursuant to the Confrontation Clause; and (2) that his defense counsel provided him ineffective assistance. (Amend. Pet. P. 520). The Government has moved to dismiss Petitioner's petition on the grounds that Petitioner has failed to satisfy the burden of proof required to support both claims and obtain relief pursuant to § 2255. (Answer ¶ 35). Specifically, the Government asserts that Petitioner's first claim is substantively without merit because Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the recent Supreme Court decision upon which Petitioner primarily relies, does not apply retroactively. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009). In the alternative, the Government argues that the admission of DNA evidence at trial in this case complied with Melendez-Diaz. Finally, the Government argues that Petitioner's second claim fails because Petitioner does not establish that counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Having reviewed the parties' various submissions, the Court agrees with the Governmentand will deny Petitioner's petition for the following reasons.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a court to vacate, correct or set aside a sentence that was "imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, or that the Court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to a collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Generally, "claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). However, the Court of Appeals has expressed a strong preference that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim be brought before the district court in the first instance in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See DeRewal, 10 F.3d at 103 (citing United States v. Rieger, 942 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir. 1991)). Since it is appropriate to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under § 2255, rather than on direct appeal, "the failure to raise such a claim on direct appeal should not be treated as a procedural fault." Id. This Court must accept the truth of the petitioner's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous based on the existing record. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989).
As noted, Petitioner seeks relief pursuant to § 2255 under two separate theories. First, Petitioner argues that his Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated at trial when the Court admitted the results of certain DNA tests via expert testimony, absenttestimony by the lab technician who prepared the DNA samples. (Amend. Pet. P. 5) Petitioner claims that Melendez-Diaz v. Massachussets, 557 U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), the Supreme Court's recent decision that addresses testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause, is the controlling law in this case, and its application in this case militates relief under § 2255. (Amend. Pet. P. 14). The Court disagrees.
When reviewing a habeas claim pursuant to § 2255, the Court applies the "clearly established federal law" at the time when a petitioner's conviction becomes final. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). At the time of Petitioner's conviction, November 27, 2002, Ohio v. Roberts controlled whether admission of a hearsay statement against a criminal defendant violated the Confrontation Clause. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Before Petitioner's conviction became final, however, the Supreme Court overruled Roberts with its decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In Crawford, the Court held a witness' testimony inadmissible if the witness does not appear at trial, "unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54. Thereafter, applying Crawford, the Third Circuit denied Petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal, finding that "appellants were not denied their constitutional right to confrontation when the District Court permitted the government's expert witness to testify." U.S. v. Adams, 189 Fed.Appx. 120, 124 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. Ultimately, Petitioner's conviction became final on September 9, 2008, before the Melendez-Diaz decision in June of 2009. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009).
Although the Third Circuit has yet to address the retroactivity of Melendez-Diaz, persuasive precedent from district courts in both E.D.N.Y. and W.D.Pa declined to apply the case retroactively. See Vega v. Walsh, 2010 WL 2265043 (W.D.Pa); see also Frankenberry v. Coleman, 2009 WL 3734140 (E.D.N.Y). Furthermore, Crawford is not retroactive, and where the Court stated that Melendez-Diaz was essentially an application of Crawford, there is nothing to suggest that Melendez-Diaz should be applied differently. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1184 (2007) (); see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S._( that the facts required "little more than the application of our holding in Crawford"). Therefore, this Court finds that Crawford controls and that Melendez-Diaz does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case.1
Further, even if this Court considers the merits of Petitioner's claim under Melendez-Diaz, that claim fails.2 At issue in Melendez-Diaz were "certificates of analysis," or swornaffidavits admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony, which the Court held to be "functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct examination.'" Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 (internal citations omitted). The Court held that the affidavits were testimonial under the Sixth Amendment because they were sworn declarations of fact made for the sole purpose of proving a fact at trial. Id. Accordingly, the analysts who prepared the affidavits were witnesses subject to confrontation by the defendant. Id. at 2532, 2542.
In this case, at Petitioner's trial, the Court allowed a lab supervisor to testify to his expert opinion, which was based on his independent review of the DNA tests and notes from the lab technicians. (Answer ¶¶ 56, 57). The lab technicians were not called as witnesses, and their reports, notes, and the other information they prepared were not submitted as sworn declarations of fact and were not used to prove a fact at trial. (Id.). See United States v. Moon, 512 F.2d at 362 (7th Cir. 2008) (). Here, the purpose of the lab technicians' work was to generate test results, from which the expert could draw independent conclusions as to the likelihood that the DNA on the mask matched Petitioner's DNA. See United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2010) ().
At trial, the Court allowed into evidence those conclusions, not the raw technical datafrom the lab tests. (Answer 56, 57). The "raw data" is non-testimonial and therefore...
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