Adams v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. of U.S. & Canada, Local 198

• Decision Date: 18 July 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-400-JWD-RLB
• Parties: CHARLES ADAMS, ET AL. v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 198, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

CHARLES ADAMS, ET AL. v. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN ANDAPPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE

UNITED STATES AND CANADA, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 198, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 98-400-JWD-RLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

July 18, 2019

RULING AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, Local 198's ("Defendant" or "Local 198") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 639). There are 99 total Plaintiffs (collectively "Plaintiffs"). The motion does not apply to 17 of the 99 Plaintiffs.¹ Pursuant to the Court's Notice Regarding Reasons for Judgment (Doc. 698) and Oral Reasons for Judgment issued on July 16, 2019, 42 of the 99 Plaintiffs have been dismissed,² and five of the 99 Plaintiffs have had their claims pursuant to Title VII only dismissed.³ There are 35 Plaintiffs opposing Defendant's motion, whose claims are the subject of this Ruling. Plaintiffs submittedmemoranda in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 646, 648, 660). Defendant replied. (Doc. 654, 668). At the request of the Court, the parties submitted a joint chart documenting the names of the 99 Plaintiffs, whether the motion pertained to him/her, who represents each Plaintiff, and whether the Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion. (Doc. 685). After a status conference with the Court, the Court ordered supplemental briefing and the submission of a revised, joint chart prior to the Court's ruling on the motion. (Doc. 686). Plaintiffs supplemented their oppositions. (Doc. 687, 688). Defendant replied. (Doc. 693-1). A final, revised chart was jointly submitted. (Doc. 690-1). A brief telephone conference was conducted by the Court to address a few outstanding issues on May 31, 2019. A third chart was jointly submitted by counsel on June 24, 2019. (Doc. 696-1). Oral argument was previously referenced by this Court in its Minute Entry signed April 12, 2019, documenting the Court's status conference that took place on April 11, 2019, (Doc. 686); however, the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Relevant Factual Background

A. Introduction

This case arises out of Local 198's alleged violations of: (1) the Civil Rights Act of 1866 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981; (2) Louisiana state law for acts of racial discrimination pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 23:332(C)(1) and (2) and (D); (3) Louisiana state law for acts of negligence, gross negligence and/or willful and wanton negligence; and (4) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is limited to the sole issue of the timeliness of Plaintiffs' claims. This ruling addresses 35 of the 99 Plaintiffs' claims.⁴

B. Plaintiffs' Claims and Procedural Background

Various Plaintiffs⁵ filed a "Class Action Complaint" on May 1, 1998. (Doc. 1). The proposed class of Plaintiffs are all African Americans who: are or have been members of the Local 198; have sought and been denied membership in the Local 198; have been or are currently enrolled in the Local 198's apprenticeship program; or have sought admittance and been denied admission to the Local 198 apprenticeship training program. (Doc. 1 at p. 7). The sole remaining Defendant is Local 198. Plaintiffs allege that Local 198 discriminates based on race in the following ways: job assignments; job referrals; lay-offs; board leadership; maintaining a hostile work environment; using racial slurs and epithets; training; compensation; hiring; benefits; representation; recalls; job opportunities; retaliation; preventing work in supervisory positions; lack of assistance in disputes and providing defense; and admissions. (Doc. 1 at pp. 9-19).

On July 28, 1998, Plaintiffs moved to certify the class. (Doc. 27). Magistrate Judge Dalby recommended that the action not be certified as a class action on August 31, 1999. (Doc. 185). The Court adopted this recommendation and denied the motion to certify the class on October 29, 1999. (Doc. 196).

The Court ordered a discovery deadline of March 29, 2002. (Doc. 224).

Plaintiffs amended their original complaint on July 27, 2001, adding additional Plaintiffs.⁶ (Doc. 227). Two additional amending complaints were filed on December 3, 2001, naming additional Plaintiffs.⁷ (Doc. 274, 283). On February 14, 2002, Plaintiffs amended the complaint again, naming additional Plaintiffs.⁸ (Doc. 335). Plaintiffs were added in the amended complaint filed on November 4, 2002,⁹ (Doc. 493). A final amended complaint was filed on April 15, 2003, (Doc. 518); however, no new Plaintiffs were named in the final amendment.

The Court conducted a status conference on April 26, 2018, at which time counsel for some Plaintiffs, Mr. Wilson, expressed a concern that many of the Plaintiffs' claims were untimely. At that time, all parties agreed to address the issue of timeliness. (Doc. 625). The Court also determined that it was appropriate for the parties to exchange information to assist the parties in evaluating the timeliness of certain Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. 630). The Court did not extend the previously ordered discovery deadline and did not set a new discovery deadline associated with the briefing related to timeliness. The Court ordered deadlines for parties to brief the issue of timeliness. (Doc. 632).

II. Relevant Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the mover bears his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, "itsopponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citations omitted). The non-mover's burden is not satisfied by "conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a 'scintilla' of evidence." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)(citations and internal quotations omitted). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not sit on his hands, complacently relying on the pleadings. Weyant v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 917 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1990). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. General allegations that fail to reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment. Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1352 (5th Cir. 1994). Further:

In resolving the motion, the court may not undertake to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable jury drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in that party's favor, the court must deny the motion.

Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).

III. Discussion

A. Parties' Arguments

1. Defendant's Memorandum in Support (Doc. 639-2)

Defendant's motion is limited in scope to the sole issue of timeliness of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant argues that: the alleged discriminatory acts occurred outside of the relevant time period to render the Plaintiffs' filing timely; many of the allegations and complaints were not of Local198's making or having anything to do with Local 198; and/or Plaintiffs were not members or applying to be members of Local 198 at the relevant time period of his/her complaints. (Doc. 639-2 at pp. 8-11).

With respect to Plaintiffs' state law and Section 1981 claims of racial discrimination, Defendant argues that the one-year statute of limitations applies. As such, Plaintiffs' complaints must have arisen or occurred within the year preceding the complaint filing date in which that Plaintiff is named. (Doc. 639-2 at p. 13, citing Whatley v. Dept. of Education, 673 F.2d 873, 874 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 32, 35, 36, (5th Cir. 1982), on reh'g withdrawn in part, 688 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951 (1983)).

Additionally, Defendant argues that some of the Plaintiffs were not members of Local 198 or applying for membership to Local 198 during the relevant time period. Defendant further argues that the continuing violation exception does not apply because: (1) this exception cannot apply to give a claim to an individual who was not a member or applying to be a member of the union; and (2) if the alleged discriminatory acts did not occur within one year of filing suit, then the "continuing violation" did not "continue" into the relevant time period and the exception does not revive the stale claim. (Doc. 639-2 at p. 14, citing Glass v. Petrotecs Chemical Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1561 (5th Cir. 1985).

Defendant also argues, with regard to the state law claims and Section 1981 claims, that some Plaintiffs did not respond to any discovery in any form and are simply named in a complaint. Therefore, Defendant argues, these Plaintiffs can not make a prima facie case, and their claims should be dismissed. (Doc. 639-2 at p. 15).

As to the racial discrimination claims under Title VII, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' action is time-barred because no alleged discrimination occurred in the 300 days before Plaintiffsfiled the EEOC charge. Further, Defendant argues that only 17 of the Plaintiffs produced notices of EEOC charges and right...