Adams v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 June 1963
• Docket Number: No. 17902.,17902.
• Citation: 318 F.2d 861
• Parties: Alonzo A. ADAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

318 F.2d 861 (1963)

Alonzo A. ADAMS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 17902.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

June 10, 1963.

Milton Wichner, Hollywood, Cal., for appellant.

Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Billingsley Hill and Edmund B. Clark, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., and Melvin C. Blum, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before BARNES, HAMLEY and BROWNING, Circuit Judges.

HAMLEY, Circuit Judge.

In the summary judgment here under review it is declared that the United States is the sole owner of certain National Forest lands, to the exclusion of any asserted mining claims or locations of Alonzo A. Adams. Under the judgment Adams is enjoined from using, occupying or maintaining structures on these lands, or from entering upon the lands for the purpose of claiming or asserting the existence of mining claims or locations. Two counterclaims, under which affirmative relief was sought, were dismissed.

On appeal, Adams presents three lines of argument: (1) summary judgment was not a proper method of disposing of the case; (2) the administrative proceedings leading to the agency determination which the court accepted were not conducted in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and were violative of the Administrative Procedure Act and the rules and practices of the agency; and (3) the determination in the administrative proceedings was arbitrary and capricious, constituted an abuse of discretion, and was not in accordance with law, was made without or in excess of statutory jurisdiction or authority, and was not supported by substantial evidence.

The case involves asserted mineral rights in four hundred and fifty acres of land located in Charlie Canyon, Angeles National Forest, Los Angeles County, California. The land in question is owned by the United States in fee, having been acquired from Mexico on February 2, 1848, by Article V of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, 926.

Adams, in partnership with one McRae, began exploring, developing and working placer gold deposits in Charlie Canyon in 1929. McRae died in February, 1937. Adams succeeded to McRae's interest and continued his somewhat sporadic operations in the area, continuing to make some improvements. On April 8, 1952 and January 28, 1953, Adams filed applications for the issuance of mineral patents on eight placer mining claims which he asserted to exist in Charlie Canyon. These applications were based upon the mining laws of the United States, particularly upon 30 U. S.C. § 29, which provides for the issuance of mineral patents.

The issuance of mineral patents was contested on May 27, 1953 by the United States at the instance of the United States Forest Service.¹ The reasons given for the contest were that no bona fide discovery of mineral had been made on any of the claims; the land comprising all of the claims was non-mineral in character; and the applications for the mineral patents had not been made in good faith for mining purposes. In addition it was alleged that the requisite five hundred dollars in development work had not been expended on or for the benefit of five of the claimed locations.

After Adams had been given notice of the contest by the United States Forest Service, a hearing was held on January 27 and 28, 1954. In a decision dated October 13, 1954, Paul Witmer, Manager of the Los Angeles Land Office, concluded that "the Government's charge is fully sustained" and recommended that the application for patent be denied and the mineral entry cancelled.

This decision was appealed to the Director, Bureau of Land Management. The decision of the Los Angeles Land Office Manager was affirmed by the Acting Director on April 2, 1956, on the grounds that the land comprising all eight of the claims was non-mineral in character and that no bona fide discovery of mineral had been made on any of the claims. In addition to rejecting the mineral patent applications as recommended by the Los Angeles Land Office Manager, the Acting Director also declared Adams' claims null and void. This ruling was considered necessary in view of the findings that the land was non-mineral in character and that bona fide discoveries had not been made on the claims.

Adams took a further appeal to the Secretary of the Interior. Prior to that hearing, Adams made a motion to set aside the prior decisions and remand the contests for rehearing, contending that the proceedings had up to then did not comply with the pertinent provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. This motion was denied by the Deputy Solicitor on June 3, 1957. United States v. Alonzo A. Adams et al., 64 I.D. 221.

On the merits, the decision of the Acting Director of the Bureau of Land Management was affirmed for the Secretary by the Deputy Solicitor, in a decision dated July 1, 1957. It was held, in effect, that under the evidence the mineral content of the lands embraced within the claims was not such as to constitute the lands a valuable mineral deposit entitling Adams, as the discoverer, to patents to his mineral claims thereon.

Following the Secretary's decision, the United States Forest Service, through District Ranger Berriman, sent to Adams a letter dated September 20, 1957. In it, Adams was requested to remove certain cabins and structures which he, his agents and his employees maintained on the land in question. The letter further stated that if the cabins and structures were not removed by January 1, 1958, they would be deemed abandoned to and become the property of the United States.

Adams did not comply with the request stated in the letter of September 20, 1957. He continues to maintain, use and occupy the buildings to the present time, asserting that they are reasonably necessary to the operation of what he contends are valid, bona fide, subsisting mineral locations.

On October 28, 1957, Adams brought a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division, seeking to restrain and enjoin District Ranger Berriman from interfering with his possession of the land and buildings and other structures situated on it. The prayer for this relief was predicated upon the alleged invalidity of the preceding administrative proceedings and the impropriety of the Secretary's decision. The suit was, in effect, one for judicial review of the administrative action.

This suit was dismissed by the district court for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal this court reversed, it being held that the agency action came within the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011, and so was subject to judicial review. Adams v. Witmer, 9 Cir., 271 F.2d 29. This court ruled that Adams had waived, by failing to enter a timely objection, the procedural irregularities of which he complained. It was further held, however, that upon remand the record, or such portion of it as any party might cite, should be reviewed for defects of a nonprocedural nature.²

After the cause in Adams v. Witmer had been remanded and while it was pending in the district court, the Government commenced the present suit. Adams answered, denying some of the Government's factual allegations and denying the validity of the Secretary's decision upon which the Government's claim for relief is based. By way of counterclaims, Adams affirmatively sought a de novo judicial determination as to the validity of his claims and his right to mineral patents or, in the alternative, a review of the administrative proceedings and an adjudication that they were invalid, together with a declaration that he is entitled to the continued use and occupancy of the mining claims and to the issuance of mineral patents as applied for.

On July 20, 1961, the cause in Adams v. Witmer was dismissed without prejudice, "it appearing that all of the issues which are raised or could be raised in Adams v. Witmer * * * are included within the issues * * * of the present case * * *." The Government thereafter moved for summary judgment in its favor in the case now on appeal and, in support of the motion, filed the entire administrative record. Adams resisted the motion and supported his opposition with an affidavit stating the substance of what his testimony would be if a trial were held. A list of proposed exhibits was also lodged with the court by Adams. The granting of summary judgment responsive to this motion led to the appeal now before us.

Contending that the district court erred in disposing of the case by summary judgment, appellant first argues that the motion on which the court acted was in reality one for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than for a summary judgment under Rule 56 of those rules.

Appellant is mistaken. The Government did not move for "judgment on the pleadings," nor did it rely exclusively upon the pleadings to support the motion. It moved for "summary judgment" and based its motion not only on the pleadings but also on "the exhibits lodged and filed herein." The exhibits so lodged consisted of the entire administrative record. The motion was therefore one for a summary judgment under Rule 56(b) and (c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.³

Appellant next argues that the administrative record which the Government lodged with the court was not properly presented for consideration by the court because it was not identified by affidavit.

No objection of this kind was made in the district court and it may not be advanced for the first time in this court.

Appellant contends that it was improper to dispose of the case on motion for summary judgment because the pleadings presented genuine issues as to material facts. This has reference to Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which precludes the granting of summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions...