Adams v. Vanderbeck
| Decision Date | 25 May 1897 |
| Docket Number | 17,740 |
| Citation | 47 N.E. 24,148 Ind. 92 |
| Parties | Adams et al. v. Vanderbeck et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Original Opinion of December 23, 1896, Reported at: 148 Ind 92.
The first point made for a rehearing is that we erred in the original opinion in following and adhering to the doctrine laid down in Wert v. Naylor, 93 Ind. 431.
That case concedes that he who takes a mortgage or conveyance as a security for the payment of a precedent debt is not a bona fide purchaser for value, as against the holder of a secret equity in the land, because he parts with nothing. But it holds that where he takes a conveyance of such land in payment and satisfaction of a precedent debt that he is a bona fide purchaser for value, and entitled to hold such land, as against the holder of the equity of which such purchaser has no notice or knowledge.
While counsel for appellees do not deny that the rule thus laid down in that case is in harmony with the weight of authority elsewhere, yet they contend that such rule is in conflict with other decisions by this court, and is unsound and unjust, and opens the door to great fraud, and impliedly insist that it ought to be overruled. We have already seen in the original opinion that the case is not in conflict with our other cases.
The fraud to which they claim that the doctrine there laid down opens the door is that the holder of an equity in the land may be deprived of the entire value or purchase price paid for the land, where he has not taken a deed by one who ignorant of such equity, and who takes the land in payment and satisfaction of an antecedent debt; that is to say, the one who has thus taken a deed, by one who ignorant of such equity, and changed his position, because he has parted with no value, as they contend, and hence not a bona fide purchaser. And it is insisted, in effect, that if the holder of the equity is allowed to enforce his equity and hold the land, the purchaser in consideration of the antecedent debt, has lost nothing, because he may then enforce his debt, though he may have surrendered and cancelled the evidences thereof, for the reason that the consideration which he was to receive therefor has failed. But that is a mistake. He may have taken a quitclaim deed, and in any event he receives a conveyance of the legal title to the land. This cannot be said to be of no value whatever. If by warranty deed, he has the warranty of title of his grantor.
It is said in Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39, that: This language was quoted by Elliott, J., speaking for this court in Wolford v. Bowers, Admx., 85 Ind. at page 296, where it is further said that: ." And we add Laboyteaux v. Swigart, 103 Ind. 596, 3 N.E. 373; Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5 N.E. 683; Keller v. Orr, 106 Ind. 406, 7 N.E. 195.
When, therefore, land is conveyed by the owner to another in payment and satisfaction of a debt due from the owner to that other who is ignorant of an equity in the land in favor of a third person, the enforcement of that equity against the land does not revive the indebtedness for the payment and satisfaction of which the land was conveyed. Therefore, a purchaser of land in consideration of the payment and satisfaction of a debt due the grantee is as much a bona fide purchaser for value, as if he had paid cash. And if he is not to be protected as such, the rule which appellees' learned counsel invokes and asks us to adopt opens a wider door for wrong and fraud than the rule laid down by this court in Wert v. Naylor, supra, which he asks us to overrule. We think we ought to adhere to the rule laid down in that case.
The only other point made for a rehearing is that we erred in holding that "we are bound to presume that there was evidence to which...
To continue reading
Request your trial