Adams v. Wise
| Decision Date | 14 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:21-cv-01248-JMC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | David Adams, Petitioner, v. Warden Samuel Wise, Respondent. |
Petitioner David Adams, proceeding pro se, [1] seeks habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) D.S.C., the matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. On December 7 2021, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (ECF No. 27) in which she recommended the court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons below, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 27) GRANTS Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15), and DISMISSES the Petition (ECF No. 1) with prejudice.
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which this court incorporates herein without a full recitation. Petitioner was indicted in June 2014 for second-degree criminal sexual conduct (“CSC”) with a minor. (ECF No. 14-3 at 134-35.) Petitioner, represented by plea counsel, pleaded guilty to the offense before a circuit court judge. (ECF No. 14-1 at 21 et seq.) The circuit court sentenced Petitioner to an eighteen-year term of imprisonment. (Id. at 137.) Petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was dismissed because he failed to provide a sufficient explanation as required by Rule 203(d)(1)(B)(iv) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. (ECF No. 14-2.)
On September 15, 2015, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in state court, alleging, among other claims, involuntary guilty plea and ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 14-1 at 5.) Because there was no transcript of Petitioner's guilty plea hearing, the PCR court first heard testimony from plea counsel and the prosecutor to reconstruct the transcript of Petitioner's guilty plea. (ECF No. 14-1 at 21-59.) Immediately thereafter, the PCR court heard evidence related to Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief, where Petitioner and plea counsel testified. (ECF No. 14-1 at 60-116.) The PCR court subsequently filed an order rejecting Petitioner's claims and denying his PCR application. (Id. at 125-33.) Petitioner appealed the PCR court's decision and filed a Johnson petition for writ of certiorari before the South Carolina Supreme Court. See Johnson v. State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988). (ECF No. 14-3 at 3.) Petitioner's counsel then certified the petition as without merit and requested to withdraw from the case. (ECF No. 14-4.) The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the petition to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which subsequently denied certiorari and issued a remittitur on December 16, 2020. (ECF No. 14-9.)
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner argues he is entitled to relief for four reasons: (1) involuntary guilty plea in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (id. at 5), (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for plea counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation of the DNA results, including the seizure of Petitioner's DNA (id. at 7), (3) denial of Petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights with respect to the collection of his DNA (id. at 8), and (4) the State's failure to provide medical records and statements of the victim in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (id. at 10).
Respondent filed a Return and Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 14 & 15), to which Petitioner filed a Response (ECF No. 23), and Respondent replied (ECF No. 25). The Magistrate Judge recommends this court grant summary judgment for Respondent because Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on any of the four grounds raised in the Petition. The Report addressed each ground separately.
First, the Magistrate Judge explained that Petitioner had failed to submit “clear and convincing evidence to rebut the PCR court's credibility findings or other factual findings.” (ECF No. 27 at 20.) The Magistrate Judge summarized testimony from the reconstruction/PCR hearing and reiterated that the PCR court's credibility determinations are entitled to deference. (Id. (citing Cagle v. Branker, 520 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2008); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).) While Petitioner contradicted the testimony of the prosecutor and plea counsel at the hearing, he could not point to specific facts demonstrating that the court's credibility findings were in error. Petitioner's challenge to the adequacy of the record was similarly without merit. (ECF No. 27 at 20.) The Magistrate Judge dismissed Petitioner's argument on this ground because Petitioner could cite no law establishing that testimony from the plea judge, court reporter, and Petitioner himself was constitutionally required for a proper reconstruction of plea hearing. (Id. at 21-22.) Noting that Petitioner had the opportunity to testify during the reconstruction portion of the joint hearing but chose not to do so, the Magistrate Judge concluded that he had not met his burden to rebut the PCR court's findings of fact and could not support his contention that his plea was involuntary. (Id. at 25.)
As to the remaining three grounds, the Magistrate Judge determined Petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that the PCR court's factual and legal findings were unreasonable. She recommended this court grant Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismiss the Petition with prejudice. (Id. at 33.) Petitioner filed Objections on January 3, 2022. (ECF No. 31.)
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides that a federal district court has jurisdiction to entertain a § 2254 petition when the petitioner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court reviews de novo only those portions of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which specific objections are filed and reviews those portions which are not objected to-including those portions to which only “general and conclusory” objections have been made-for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governable law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. Further, to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must set forth facts beyond “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Id. at 252. The non-moving party must present evidence sufficient to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party to avoid summary judgment. See Id. at 248.
State prisoners have a statutory right to seek habeas relief in federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). However, a court's review of a § 2254 petition filed after April 24, 1996, is limited by provisions of The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Each of Petitioner's three...
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