Adamson v. Chiovaro

• Decision Date: 04 February 1998
• Citation: 308 N.J.Super. 70,705 A.2d 402
• Parties: Beverly ADAMSON, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Rosario CHIOVARO, C & G Imported Car Repairs, and John Does A through Z (fictitious names), Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 70

308 N.J.Super. 70

705 A.2d 402

Beverly ADAMSON, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Rosario CHIOVARO, C & G Imported Car Repairs, and John Does

A through Z (fictitious names),

Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey,

Appellate Division.

Argued Nov. 6, 1997.

Decided Feb. 4, 1998.

Norman S. Karpf and Joseph Buttafuoco, Kearny, for defendants-appellants/cross-respondents (Buttafuoco, Karpf & Arce, attorneys; Mr. Buttafuoco, on the brief).

Wayne D. Greenfeder, Springfield, for plaintiff-respondent/cross-appellant (Kraemer, Burns, Mytelka & Lovell, attorneys; Douglas E. Burns and Mr. Greenfeder, of counsel; Mr. Greenfeder, on the brief).

Before Judges BROCHIN, WEFING and BRAITHWAITE.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WEFING, J.A.D.

This case revolves around an automobile accident that occurred on September 18, 1991 shortly after 7:00 p.m. on Woodland Avenue in West Orange, New Jersey. The site of the accident was immediately in front of Montclair Riding Academy. Plaintiff Beverly Adamson, who had several horses stabled there, served as the volunteer leader of a 4-H club which met at the stables. On the date in question, she left a 4-H meeting and went to her car, a Range Rover, which she had parked facing westbound on the north side of Woodland Avenue.

Woodland Avenue runs in an east-west direction. When cars are parked on either side of the road, as they were that evening, there is room for one lane of travel in both directions. The lanes are divided by a double yellow line.

As she started to pull out of her parking space, she realized that she had left certain papers at the Academy that she needed. Rather than pulling back into the space she had just vacated, she decided to pull into the driveway of the Academy's main building and run into the office to retrieve the papers she needed. She proceeded in a westbound direction on Woodland Avenue for four to five car lengths until she pulled opposite to the driveway.

Some distance past the driveway, Woodland Avenue curves. The parties differed in their testimony as to the distance from the driveway to the curve. Plaintiff estimated 200 to 300 feet while defendant ¹ said it was closer to 800 feet.

As plaintiff began her turn into the driveway, she saw defendant's car coming around the curve, heading eastward. She maintained she brought her car to a complete stop, with its left front portion approximately two feet over the double yellow line. The two cars collided. Defendant was driving a much smaller car, a Fiat, that went under plaintiff's Range Rover. The force of the impact moved plaintiff's car sideways approximately one and one-half feet and popped the rear seats out of their locked position.

Plaintiff estimated defendant's speed at fifty-five to sixty miles per hour. The posted speed limit on the road is twenty-five miles per hour. At trial, defendant maintained that he was driving twenty-five to thirty miles per hour and that plaintiff improperly made a left turn right in front of him.

Plaintiff contended that the force of the impact threw her body to the left side of the vehicle and that her head struck the door and the frame. She refused any medical assistance at the scene, however. After several days, she commenced an extended course of treatment with a chiropractor. When that did not provide relief, she went to an orthopedist, a neurosurgeon, a neurologist, two psychiatrists and a neuropsychologist. Her neurosurgeon, Dr. Hoppenstein, diagnosed a herniated disc in her cervical spine with spinal cord compression, for which he recommended surgery.

Within this lawsuit, plaintiff alleged that she also suffered a closed head injury which resulted in significant cognitive impairment that interfered with her ability to function either socially or at work. She had worked for years in the color lab business. Several months before the accident, she had started her own brokerage business, serving major companies that needed photographic and graphic services and the color labs that provided those services. She testified that in the nine months before the accident she had a net income of approximately $190,000. As a result of her cognitive deficits, however, she was no longer able to function in the same manner and her income therefore steadily declined to $58,000 by 1994. As of the trial, she testified she had only one client left.

At trial, she produced her psychiatrist, neurosurgeon and neuropsychologist. Defendant produced no medical evidence at all.

After a seven day trial, the jury found that defendant was negligent and proximately caused the accident. It found no negligence on the part of plaintiff. It awarded her $20,000 for non-economic damages, $80,000 for past lost wages and $500,000 for future lost wages.

Defendant has appealed and plaintiff has cross-appealed. After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, and considering the arguments presented, we affirm.

Defendant has raised eleven points on appeal. Six of these deal with the trial itself and the post-trial motions; the balance relate to the form of judgment entered and whether it properly accounts for collateral sources available to plaintiff.

I.

Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and the damages demonstrate it was a product of sympathy and bias. The trial court's consideration of defendant's motion was governed by R. 4:49-1(a) which provides that a trial court should grant such a motion "if, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." We, of course, may not reverse the decision of the trial court on such a motion "unless it clearly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-1. Further, we must defer to the trial court's assessment of such things as witness credibility and the "feel of the case." Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 6-8, 258 A.2d 706 (1969). In this regard, we note merely the trial court's observations during the argument on the motion that "you could clearly find a lack of candor" on defendant's part and that he considered some of the testimony proffered by defendant "outrageous." We have no basis to interfere with the trial court's handling of this motion.

Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the jury, completely unsupervised, to visit the scene of the accident. While we admit to some surprise that this was done, it was done with the consent of both counsel. Counsel having consented at the time, we decline to interfere on appeal. We strongly caution the trial court, however, against employing such a procedure in the future. Because of the informal manner in which this was handled, it is impossible to know how many of the jurors visited the scene and how many did not. If any members of the panel did not visit the scene, they were dependent on their fellow jurors who would, in effect, become witnesses. The record is also silent whether there were any differences in lighting or weather conditions which may have affected the jurors' views and analysis. We note in this regard that while the accident occurred on a September evening, the trial and the jury visit took place in June. We understand that the trial court's action was well-intentioned, but it posed a needless risk of interjecting extraneous matters into the jurors' deliberations.

During the course of the trial, plaintiff presented the testimony of Dr. Wayne A. Gordon, a neuropsychologist. Dr. Gordon holds a Ph.D. in psychology, not a degree in medicine. Over defendant's objection, Dr. Gordon testified about the psychological testing he performed upon plaintiff and his conclusions regarding the cognitive deficits from which plaintiff suffered, and he expressed the opinion that those deficits were causally linked to this accident. Defendant maintains that Dr. Gordon was not qualified to express such opinions since he lacks a medical degree.

The decision whether a witness has the requisite experience and credentials to qualify as an expert witness rests in the trial court's sound discretion. Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993). In light of Dr. Gordon's extensive background, we perceive no abuse by the trial court. We note, for instance, that Dr. Gordon is a diplomate in neuropsychology, serves as the director of the traumatic brain injury program at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City and is a professor of rehabilitation medicine at Mount Sinai, in which position he teaches both medical residents and graduate psychology students. Nothing within Crespo v. McCartin, 244 N.J.Super. 413, 582 A.2d 1011 (App.Div.1990) or Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 229 N.J.Super. 230, 551 A.2d 177 (App.Div.1988), upon which defendant relies, would preclude Dr. Gordon from testifying in the manner in which he did. To the extent that Florida has expressed a contrary view in GIW Southern Valve Co. v. Smith, 471 So.2d 81 (Fla.App.1985), we do not agree.

Defendant claims that two comments by plaintiff's counsel in his summation constitute reversible error and that the verdict for future lost wages cannot be sustained since plaintiff did not present an expert in economics. Neither claim has any merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We note only in regard to the second claim that defendant had every opportunity in discovery and at trial to challenge plaintiff's income assertions but did not do so.

II.

The balance of defendant's arguments revolve around the calculation of credits to which he was entitled as a result of New Jersey's collateral source rule. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-97. The issues do not lend themselves to easy resolution for plaintiff was a resident of New York and was insured under two separate policies, providing...