Adamson v. City of Provo, Utah

Decision Date22 March 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-C-546A.,91-C-546A.
Citation819 F. Supp. 934
PartiesDavid ADAMSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PROVO, UTAH, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Utah

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Michael P. Zaccheo, Nathan R. Hyde, Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiffs.

Fred D. Howard, Linda J. Barclay, Howard, Lewis & Petersen, Provo, UT, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

ALDON J. ANDERSON, Senior District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The court heard the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February 19, 1993. This dispute involves the payment of employer contributions by the defendant, Provo City, on the plaintiffs' overtime compensation to the plaintiffs' retirement program. In their Complaint, the plaintiffs assert state law violations, as well as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that Provo City denied them "equal" employer retirement contributions as required by a Provo City Ordinance. The defendants, Provo City and several Provo City employees, moved for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this dispute are current and former Provo City police officers who enrolled in the Public Safety Retirement System (Plaintiffs). The Plaintiffs voluntarily selected to participate in the Public Safety Retirement System (PSRS), as opposed to other available retirement systems, because the PSRS benefits suited their particular needs. The retirement programs used by Provo employees, including the PSRS, are governed by state law. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-1-101 to 49-9-408 (1992). The various retirement systems require different contributions from the city and pay the beneficiaries different allowances. See Pl's Mem. in Supp. of Pl's Mot. for Summ. J., Exhibit 4.

This dispute arises from a Provo City Ordinance, enacted in 1985, which requires that:

Total employer contributions by Provo City for employee retirement programs, including, but not limited to, FICA and state or other retirement programs, which are in excess of the amounts described in the Pay Range Table, shall be equal in amount for all employees at the same Grade and Step on the Pay Range Table. This section shall apply to all full-time regular employees of the City. The Administration shall adjust payments made by the City and the withholding of funds for employees as necessary to accomplish the objectives of this section. This section shall not govern contributions for workers compensation, unemployment compensation, health or life insurance, or other nonretirement benefits.

Provo City, Utah Ordinance § 4.04-1.040 (1992) (emphasis added).

During 1985 and 1986, the defendants (collectively "Provo" or "Provo City") attempted to pay retirement contributions for overtime work by the Plaintiffs. However, the PSRS rejected Provo City's contributions and returned the payments to the city. In fact, the PSRS accepts employer contributions only based on the Plaintiffs' "base pay" as determined by the PSRS's terms. In fact, the PSRS's terms exclude employer contributions for overtime or bonus pay. Provo City ceased attempts to pay employer contributions for overtime for the Plaintiffs enrolled in the PSRS after 1986. Currently, Provo City pays overtime employer contributions for other municipal employees enrolled in the contributory program of the Utah State Retirement System. However, Provo City has never paid employer contributions on any bonus pay for any employee.1

Mary Taylor, the Provo City employee assigned the duty of paying employer retirement contributions, stated that Provo City acquiesced to the PSRS's refusal to accept overtime payments. See Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Exhibit 3. From the evidence submitted by the parties, it is unclear whether Provo City engaged in an independent decision-making process to assess the propriety of not making employer contributions for overtime for the Plaintiffs. In other words, Provo City may, or may not, have made specific determinations regarding the propriety of paying overtime contributions beyond the PSRS's refusal to accept those contributions.

In compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with Provo City on November 30, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1991). Provo City rejected Plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1991). Subsequently, following an investigation, Plaintiffs filed this action on May 29, 1991,2 within one year after Provo City rejected the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-30 (1992).

Plaintiffs assert that they became aware of the "discrepancy" in Provo's payment of retirement contributions in December of 1989. See Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Aff. of Mark West, ¶ 5. In fact, Plaintiffs have been aware of Provo's employer contributions since at least 1985. Specifically, Plaintiffs received a bi-monthly "pay stub," as well as semi-annual retirement interest statements, which showed relevant employer contributions to the PSRS during their employment with the police department. See Def's Mem. in Supp. of Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Aff. of Mary Taylor, ¶ 6. Additionally, the terms of the different retirement programs were available to the Plaintiffs through publicly disseminated brochures.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs assert state law violations as well as a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon Provo City's alleged failure to pay "equal" retirement contributions to the Plaintiffs enrolled in the PSRS. In response, Provo City filed this Motion for Summary Judgment. Provo City asserts several procedural and substantive bars to the Plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, Provo City argues that (1) Plaintiffs' section 1983 claim and state law claim are partially barred by the applicable statutes of limitation; (2) Plaintiffs fail to allege any constitutional violations that would entitle them to section 1983 relief; (3) Plaintiffs' state law claims should be barred by governmental immunity; and (4) Plaintiffs failed to file an undertaking required by Utah law when commencing an action against a governmental entity. This court will address each of these issues separately.

I. Statutes of Limitation
A. Application of the "Discovery Rule"

Before considering the relevant limitation periods' effect on Plaintiffs' claims, this court must address Plaintiffs' assertion that the "discovery rule" applies to their claims. Pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with Provo City on November 30, 1990. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1991). Provo City rejected Plaintiffs' claim in compliance with Utah Code section 63-30-14.3 Subsequently, Plaintiffs properly filed this action on May 29, 1991, within one year after Provo City rejected the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-30 (1992). Section 78-12-30 provides a one-year limitations period for Plaintiffs' state law claim for negligence. Id.

Under Utah law, a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). Provo City contends that Plaintiffs' claims accrued on a bi-monthly basis because each failure of Provo City to contribute provided the Plaintiffs with a cause of action.4 Thus, Plaintiffs should be permitted to pursue only those claims accruing within the one-year period preceding the notice of claim on November 30, 1990. Likewise, Provo argues that Utah's two-year limitations period bars all of Plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising prior to two years before this action was filed. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(3) (1992).

In response, Plaintiffs contend that, because they were unaware that other Provo employees received employer contributions on overtime pay, they could not have known that Provo had violated the Ordinance. Plaintiffs argue that they were unaware of the disparity in Provo City's contributions for overtime until December of 1989. See Pl's Mem. in Opp'n to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Exhibit 2 (Aff. of Mark West). Under Plaintiffs' argument, Plaintiffs' causes of action would not accrue until December of 1989.

It is clear, however, that "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the limitations period." Canadian Indem. Co. v. K & T, Inc., 745 F.Supp. 661, 664 (D.Utah 1990) (citing Becton Dickinson, 668 P.2d at 1257). To temper the application of this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to the general principle that a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. Id. The court has found several particular exceptions.

In some areas of the law, the discovery rule is incorporated into the statute whereby the statute does not begin to run until the facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered. In other circumstances, concealment or misleading by a party prevents that party from relying on the statute of limitations. Finally, where there are exceptional circumstances that would make application of the general rule irrational or unjust, this Court has adopted the discovery rule by judicial action.

Id. (citing Becton Dickinson, 668 P.2d at 1257).

From the facts presented in this case, none of these exceptions apply to Plaintiffs' claims. First, the applicable statutes of limitation lack any reference to circumstances under which the limitations period should be tolled. Second, the Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Provo City concealed or misled the Plaintiffs regarding the payment of employer contributions for overtime. Thus, neither of these exceptions applies to Plaintiffs' claims.

Finally, no "exceptional circumstances" exist which would make the application of the general rule "irrational" or "unjust." To determine whether exceptional circumstances exist, this court...

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