Adamson v. Raymer

• Decision Date: 04 November 1896
• Citation: 94 Wis. 243,68 N.W. 1000
• Parties: ADAMSON v. RAYMER ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

94 Wis. 243

68 N.W. 1000

ADAMSON

v.RAYMER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 4, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Dane county; Robert G. Siebecker, Judge.

Action by John E. Adamson against George Raymer and others for libel. From an order striking out portions of two separate answers of defendants, and requiring other parts to be made more definite and certain, defendants appeal. Reversed.

This is an appeal from two orders striking out portions of two separate answers of the defendants as irrelevant and redundant, and requiring other parts to be made more definite and certain. The appeal was taken before the enactment of chapter 212 of the Laws of 1895. The action is for the publication in the newspaper of the defendants, the Madison Democrat, of certain articles alleged to be libelous of the plaintiff. The complaint sets forth three alleged libels as so many separate causes of action. The plaintiff was chief of police of the city of Madison. The first alleged libelous article is entitled “Our Tricky Police,” and contains a particular charge of official misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, and closes by charging the police force of the city of Madison with being officials “who look out for their own selfish concern, regardless of consequences.” The second of such alleged libelous articles is entitled “Police Sharpers,” and repeats the charge in the former article, and in addition charges that the police force of the city of Madison are “police sharpers” and are “at it again, * * * or, rather, a new species of corruptness practiced by it has just come to the surface”; that “a clear case of corruption against Chief Adamson” was proved; that the police were “a pretty pack of shameless, selfish intriguers, these, who, before a case even gets into court, deliberately set about to make money for themselves, utterly regardless of the demands of justice”; that the plaintiff's “past conduct has been most disgraceful to the city administration,”--and closing with the charge that the execution of the law “is locally in the hands of a coterie of selfish, unconscionable sharpers who ply their vocation under the guise of policemen.” The third alleged libelous article is entitled “A Travesty on Justice.” It is quoted here in full, in order the better to illustrate the exact character of the questions presented by this appeal:

“A Travesty on Justice. The Police Scandal Intensified. Since the Democrat has exposed a few of the tricks of Chief of Police Adamson and at least of one of his subordinates, it has come into possession of information showing scandalous conduct in other directions which, in its audacious crookedness, far surpasses what has already been told. It is of such a character as places absolutely beyond question the criminal dishonesty of the police department of the city, even if that has not already been proven by the attempts on the part of the police to surreptitiously secure a change in the form of a complaint regardless of the matter of justice. The information is open to a court of inquiry, and it is the bounden duty of the mayor to have one established to investigate the police department. If this is not done, the public must of necessity believe that the city administration is willing to sanction such scandalous conduct as that which has been fastened upon the police department, and indorsing the perversion of justice which the police are constantly promoting. In no other city in the nation is it probable that an investigation would be resisted by the mayor under such circumstances as have been brought to light in Madison. A prima facie case has been made out against the chief of police, and yet he is permitted to continue to perform his functions as a public official. The very leniency shown toward him is itself a scandal. It is an outrage on public sentiment and public decency that an officer should for even a single day be permitted to serve warrants and make arrests when he himself has been convicted at the bar of public opinion of conduct of the most questionable character. It is nothing short of a travesty on justice, and an insult to all citizens who have a right to expect that public officials are honorable and faithful in the performance of their duties. Chief of Police Adamson has in manifold ways proved his absolute unfitness for the office he fills, or for any other office of a public nature where honor counts for aught. His suspension pending an investigation is imperatively demanded. The mayor should act at once. Every day's delay is a serious reflection on the honesty of purpose of an administration which all Democrats especially desire to see vindicated, and which all good citizens, irrespective of party, would be pleased to see proved.”

The defendant Raymer answered separately. The defendants Brandenburg and the Democrat Printing Company served a joint answer. The answers, though separate, were in substance identical. Both answers set out specific instances of what was claimed to be corrupt and scandalous conduct on the part of the plaintiff, in connection with his office of chief of police, with much prolixity and detail. These were pleaded both by way of defense and in mitigation of damages. The answers are very long, and would cover many pages of the Reports, with little profit to any, if copied at length. A brief statement of their general character, with some examples, must suffice. One is an instance where it is alleged, in effect, that when the district attorney, in pursuance of his duty, had advised the county board of supervisors against the allowance of certain fees claimed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff publicly and in a boisterous and disorderly manner reproved the district attorney, and sought in that way to coerce him to certify to the correctness of the bill, and to advise its allowance. Again, it is alleged that, for the purpose of increasing his fees, the plaintiff procured the issuance of warrants for the arrest of persons without proper cause, and against the advice of the district attorney, and alleging specific instances. Another was the case where plaintiff went to Chicago to arrest and bring to Madison a boy; became drunk while there; chained the boy to himself with handcuffs; visited saloons in Chicago, with the boy so chained to him;...