Adamson v. Volkmer

Decision Date18 December 1987
Docket NumberNo. 83 C 3616.,83 C 3616.
Citation680 F. Supp. 1191
PartiesRobert ADAMSON, Plaintiff, v. Richard VOLKMER, individually and as the Mayor of the City of Warrenville, IL., Chester Hall, Robert LaDeur, Police Officer for the City of Warrenville, City of Warrenville, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stanley Jakala, Berwyn, Ill., for plaintiff.

Barry L. Moss, Moss & Bloomberg, Bolingbrook, Ill., Howard T. Brinton, Roderick A. Palmore, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANN C. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

Robert Adamson is a Warrenville, Illinois resident who charges that in 1982 and 1983 the Warrenville police conspired to intimidate and harass him in violation of his first, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Adamson now seeks both compensatory and punitive damages1 from the City of Warrenville ("City"), Warrenville Mayor Richard Volkmer, Warrenville Chief of Police Chester Hall, and Warrenville Police Officer Robert LaDeur. A number of motions are presently pending before this court. Before the court addresses the merits of those motions, however, a detailed review of the facts and procedural history of this case is in order.

According to his amended complaint, Adamson's problems with the Warrenville police began on November 23, 1982. On that date Adamson was driving his truck in Warrenville when suddenly a car driven by Chief Hall forced Adamson off the road and into a nearby ditch. After he maneuvered his truck out of the ditch, Adamson, apparently frustrated by Chief Hall's reckless driving, drove in pursuit of the police officer. Eventually Adamson somehow convinced Chief Hall to stop his car and discuss the incident. Adamson alleges that Officer LaDeur exited Chief Hall's car, approached Adamson and advised Adamson to forget about the incident. While the parties talked, two unnamed officers arrived at the scene. Eventually, according to Adamson, Chief Hall ordered the other officers to arrest Adamson and charge him with disorderly conduct and following the vehicle in front of him too closely. Adamson claims that Chief Hall knew at the time that those charges were unfounded and that Adamson overheard Chief Hall tell Officer LaDeur "Too bad I didn't kill the son of a bitch then I wouldn't have this hassle." First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Other Relief ¶ 12 at 3. Subsequently, Chief Hall and Officer LaDeur allegedly filed two other baseless-charges against Adamson concerning the November 23, 1982 incident — reckless driving and reckless conduct. It is undisputed that after his trial on the charges related to the November 23, 1982 incident that a jury returned a verdict in Adamson's favor on all counts.2 See Affidavit of Stanley H. Jakala (August 22, 1985) at 1.

On an unspecified date after the November 23, 1982 incident, Adamson attended a disciplinary hearing pertaining to Warrenville Police Officer William Phillips. Although not alleged in his amended complaint, Adamson must believe that his attendance at the meeting irritated other officials in the City of Warrenville because Adamson claims that as a result of the November 23, 1982 incident and his attendance at the disciplinary hearing, a rash of improper activity ensued. Specifically, Adamson at various times was subjected to police surveillance by Warrenville police. Furthermore, Mayor Volkmer publicly described Adamson as a "trouble maker" and instructed Warrenville police officers "to drop everything whenever Adamson is on the street." First Amended Complaint ¶ 20 at 5. According to Adamson's amended complaint, Mayor Volkmer also ordered the owners of a Warrenville restaurant not to serve Adamson.

The alleged intimidation continued on December 15, 1982 when certain Warrenville police officers arrested Adamson for driving while under the influence of alcohol. Adamson claims the charges were baseless. But Adamson's "false arrest" claim in this instance is undermined at least in part by a subsequent verdict stating that Adamson was guilty of the crime charged.

Adamson further alleges that on April 6, 1983 he served a subpoena on Officer Phillips for the purpose of having Officer Phillips testify in Adamson's behalf at a scheduled judicial hearing.3 Adamson claims that Chief Hall, after learning of the subpoena, "intimidated" Officer Phillips and "threatened Phillips with disciplinary action" if Phillips testified on Adamson's behalf. Id. ¶ 15 at 3. Adamson does not state in his amended complaint whether Officer Phillips eventually testified or what the nature of that testimony was if Phillips did testify.

The last act on the part of Warrenville officials related to their alleged scheme to intimidate and harass Adamson occurred on May 15, 1983 when Adamson claims he was falsely arrested for driving under the influence. Adamson does not dispute that on that date a complaining citizen called the Warrenville police to the scene where Adamson's car was in a ditch in front of the citizen's home. Nor does Adamson dispute that the citizen had seen someone urinating on the citizen's yard.4 When the police arrived, Adamson told the police officer that he had consumed two shot-glasses of peppermint schnapps during the prior eight hours but that he had also eaten during that period. Affidavit of Robert T. Adamson (August 22, 1985) at 1. Adamson initially refused to submit to a breathalyzer test because of all the intimidation he had been subjected to. Id. But later, apparently after his arrest, Adamson requested but was refused such a test. Id. Adamson claims he was not under the influence of alcohol that evening and that this arrest, like his other arrests, was unfounded and designed to harass him.5 Subsequently, a trial judge found Adamson to be not guilty of the charges against him based on the May 15, 1983 incident. Affidavit of Stanley H. Jakala (November 6, 1985).

In his amended complaint, Adamson alleges, in a somewhat disorganized manner, a number of constitutional deprivations. Because Judge Nordberg dismissed Adamson's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3),6 Adamson's § 1983 claims are all that remain in the amended complaint. This court has already denied the City of Warrenville's first motion for summary judgment.7 Now the defendants jointly seek summary judgment on their behalf or, in the alternative, a ruling in their favor on certain motions in limine. The court will address the motion for summary judgment first.

I Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendants have jointly moved for summary judgment in this case. Before the court can address the motion, however, the court must first clarify the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff in his complaint. For purposes of this motion and the remaining proceedings in this case, the court will proceed under the assumption that the following § 1983 claims are being asserted in the amended complaint:

1. Count I — a fourth amendment claim based on the false arrest of November 23, 1982;
2. Count II — a first amendment claim based on the defendants' harassment of Adamson after Adamson attended the disciplinary hearing;
3. Count III — a fourth amendment claim based on the police surveillance of the plaintiff;
4. Count IV — a fourth amendment claim based on the false arrest of December 15, 1982;
5. Count V — a sixth amendment claim based on Chief Hall's intimidation of Officer Phillips;
6. Count VI — a fourth amendment claim based on the false arrest of May 15, 1983.8

In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants attack every count but Count II. Before addressing the merits of the motion as it pertains to the five counts at issue, the court will briefly restate the principles it must follow when resolving the motion. For this court to enter an order of summary judgment on a count, the court must find that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment on that count as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining whether any issues of material fact are in dispute, the court must view the inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bartman v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 799 F.2d 311, 312 (7th Cir.1986). Once the moving party has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must show through affidavits or other materials that a specific factual issue exists. Valentine v. Joliet Township High School Dist., 802 F.2d 981, 986 (7th Cir.1986). Generally, the inquiry that the court must perform is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finding of fact because they may be reasonably resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the court determines a trial is necessary, the court "shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actively and in good faith controverted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d).

A. November 23, 1982 False Arrest

As interpreted by the court, the amended complaint alleges that on November 23, 1982 the individual defendants arrested the plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the plaintiff's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. An arrest made in violation of the fourth amendment does give rise to a cause of action under § 1983. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1563-65 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 16, 92 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986); Baltz v. Shelley, 661 F.Supp. 169, 178 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (Williams, J.). In a case such as this, the issue is whether, at the moment of the arrest, the arresting officers had probable cause to make...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Millspaugh v. WABASH CTY. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana
    • 31 Julio 1990
    ...but rather to practices outside of the policy dictates under Indiana statutes and IDPW directives. See generally Adamson v. Volkmer, 680 F.Supp. 1191 (N.D.Ill.1987). A similar line of analysis follows with regard to the service of process on, and notice to, the plaintiffs and evidentiary pr......
  • Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 25 Mayo 1990
    ...Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Wilson, 800 F.2d 232, 233 (10th Cir.1986); Adamson v. Volkmer, 680 F.Supp. 1191, 1199 (N.D.Ill.1987).14 Liberty Lobby, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; McKee v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 220 (6th Cir.1989); Laningham, 813 F.2d at......
  • Quinn v. Cain
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 19 Mayo 1989
    ...translate into prima facie evidence of probable cause, as one judge in this district seems to suggest. See Adamson v. Volkmer, 680 F.Supp. 1191, 1199 (N.D.Ill.1987). Just because a person committed a crime does not mean that the police had probable cause to believe that he did so when they ......
  • Wheeler v. City of Macon, Civ.A. 5:96-CV-434.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • 16 Junio 1999
    ...what happened, or is this a case where the City could not have done anything to prevent the harm that occurred?" Adamson v. Volkmer, 680 F.Supp. 1191, 1197 (N.D.Ill. 1987). In making this determination, which is a question of law, the Court must look to state law, as well as local ordinance......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT