Adanandus v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 27 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. SA-95-CA-415. |
| Citation | 947 F.Supp. 1021 |
| Parties | Dwight Dwayne ADANANDUS, Petitioner, v. Gary JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Stephanie L. Stevens, San Antonio, TX, for petitioner.
Gena A. Blount, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for respondents.
The State of Texas seeks to put to death one of its citizens, Dwight Dwayne Adanandus. In his petition for federal habeas corpus relief, Mr. Adanandus raises twenty-one points requiring constitutional review by this Court and examination of current law on the issues raised. For reasons stated herein, relief is denied.
* * * * * *
Although in more detail later, the Court first addresses generally the assertion of ineffective assistance of trial counsel Steven Hilbig and the historical professional obligation of lawyers in criminal cases. In a nation whose landscape is dotted with synagogues and churches, the entreaties of "thou shalt not kill" and "forgive your enemies" are challenged by retribution and revenge, understandable responses to violent crime. The divergence between what is said on the Sabbath and what is done on election day has given secular America its macabre politics of death, collectively imposed upon the predators among us through the might of the State. Having democratically given vent to normal human emotions in the face of incredibly heinous acts, the legal exercise of the power to end a life requires careful scrutiny by some objective entity bound by the rule of law. The alternatives to the imposition of the ultimate punishment within a framework of due process are the anarchy of a lynch mob or the whim of a dictator and the concomitant devolution of society to the level of those deserving execution.
For the Constitution to be more than mere words, even those accused of capital murder must have competent advocacy against the strength and resources of government. Though frequently and pejoratively quoted out of context, Dick the Butcher recognized lawyers as protectors of English rights; hence they must be killed to achieve illegitimate seizure of sovereignty.1 Based on the record before it, this Court concludes Mr. Hilbig and attorneys David Weiner, Julie Pollock and Stephanie Barclay Stevens ably fulfilled their professional responsibilities to Mr. Adanandus and to the rule of law which protects all citizens.
Before the Court are the following petitions and motions: (1) petitioner's second amended petition for federal habeas corpus relief, filed June 25, 1996,2 (2) respondent's answer and motion for summary judgment, filed September 12, 1995,3 (3) petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, filed July 26, 1995,4 (4) respondent's pleading opposing petitioner's motion for evidentiary hearing, filed September 12, 1995,5 (5) petitioner's reply to respondent's opposition to an evidentiary hearing, filed October 16, 1995,6 and (6) more than eight thousand pages of state court records from petitioner's capital murder trial, direct appeal, and state habeas corpus proceeding.7
On January 28, 1988, petitioner Dwight Dwayne Adanandus shot and killed Vernon Hanan while committing an armed robbery of the Continental National Bank ["CNB"] in San Antonio, Texas. Several eyewitnesses testified that bank teller Patricia Martinez began yelling she had been robbed immediately after petitioner left her window. Vernon Hanan entered the bank lobby, apparently heard the shouts, and lunged at petitioner as petitioner was attempting to exit the bank. The two men wrestled with each other from the bank lobby into the foyer where petitioner pushed Hanan away from himself and down, pointed his gun at Hanan, and fired the fatal shot. Bank security cameras recorded almost the entire series of events leading up to the fatal shooting. There has never been any genuine dispute as to the operative facts.8 Petitioner was indicted in cause no. 88-CR-1454 on a charge of capital murder on April 12, 1988.9
Jury selection in petitioner's state court trial began on March 29, 1989.10 The guilt-innocence phase of petitioner's trial began May 1, 1989.11 On May 9, 1989, the jury found petitioner guilty of the offense of capital murder.12 The next day, the punishment phase of petitioner's trial began, and two days later, May 12, 1989, the jury returned its verdict on the punishment special issues. The trial court sentenced petitioner to death.13
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. In an opinion issued June 16, 1993, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence.14 The United States Supreme Court denied petitioner's petition for certiorari on March 21, 1994.15
On September 7, 1994, petitioner filed his initial application for state habeas corpus relief.16 On October 21, 1994, petitioner filed an amended application for state habeas corpus relief.17 The state trial court held an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's state habeas corpus application on November 21, 1994. At the hearing, petitioner's counsel introduced extensive medical records relating to petitioner's childhood head trauma and also testified.18 In an Order issued January 9, 1995, the state trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended petitioner's state habeas corpus application be denied.19 On February 21, 1995, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner's state habeas corpus application in an unpublished per curiam opinion finding the state trial court's findings and conclusions were supported by the record and denied relief on the basis of those findings and conclusions.20
On May 3, 1995, petitioner filed his motion for leave to proceed In Forma Pauperis and for appointment of experts,21 motion for appointment of counsel,22 motion for stay of execution,23 and motion for time to amend,24 together with an initial petition for federal habeas corpus relief, setting therein some twenty-one (21) grounds for relief.25 In an Order issued May 4, 1995, this Court granted petitioner's motions for stay of execution, for appointment of counsel, and for leave and time to file an amended petition.26
On July 26, 1995, petitioner filed a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing.27 On that same day, petitioner also filed an amended petition for federal habeas corpus relief in which he asserted a single, multi-faceted ground for relief alleging ineffective assistance on the part of his trial counsel.28
On September 12, 1995, respondent filed a pleading opposing petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing29 and an answer and motion for summary judgment.30 On October 16, 1995, petitioner filed a reply to respondent's opposition to petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing and a reply to respondent's answer and motion for summary judgment. In each of these replies, petitioner argued he had not been provided an expert witness during his state habeas corpus proceeding.31 On November 6, 1995, this Court issued an Order directing petitioner to state on the record whether he was withdrawing all of the grounds for relief contained in his initial federal habeas corpus petition.32 Petitioner filed a responsive pleading on November 21, 1995, advising the Court he still wished to assert all of the grounds for relief contained in his initial federal habeas corpus petition and requesting leave to file a second amended federal habeas corpus petition.33 The Court granted this request on June 25, 1996.34
In his second amended federal habeas corpus petition, filed June 25, 1996, petitioner asserts some twenty-one grounds for relief consisting of the following arguments:
1. the petitioner's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (a) failing to introduce evidence showing petitioner had suffered a head injury during his childhood and (b) allowing his political ambitions to result in a conflict of interest in connection with petitioner's case;
2. the state trial court erroneously failed to define the term "reasonable doubt" in the jury charge;
3. the state trial court erroneously denied petitioner's requested jury instructions at the guilt-innocence phase of trial on the lesser-included offenses of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter;
4. the state trial court erroneously denied petitioner's requested definition of "deliberately" in the jury instructions at the punishment phase of trial;
5. the prosecution withheld potential exculpatory evidence from the defense relating to a prior competency hearing held in 1981 in another criminal proceeding against the petitioner;
6. petitioner's sentence was based on an invalid prior conviction;
7. the prosecution violated equal protection principles when it used a peremptory challenge to strike the last remaining black member of the jury venire;
8. the state trial court erroneously admitted the testimony of three prosecution witnesses regarding petitioner's bad reputation at the punishment phase of trial;
9. the jury instructions deprived petitioner's jury of the opportunity to make a reasoned moral response to mitigating evidence;
10. the state trial court erroneously denied petitioner's requested jury instructions regarding mitigating evidence;
11. the state trial court erroneously denied petitioner's requested jury instructions regarding the effect of a hung jury 12. the state trial court erroneously denied petitioner's right to call witness William Stolhanske;
13. petitioner's constitutional rights were violated by his forced medication during trial;
14....
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