Adc v. Holladay

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
• Decision Date: 03 October 2018
• Docket Number: No: 4:16-cv-00093 SWW-PSH,: 4:16-cv-00093 SWW-PSH
• Citation: Jackson v. Holladay, No: 4:16-cv-00093 SWW-PSH (E.D. Ark. Oct 03, 2018)
• Parties: MICHAEL JACKSON ADC #122135 PLAINTIFF v. CHARLES HOLLADAY, et al. DEFENDANTS

MICHAEL JACKSON ADC #122135 PLAINTIFF v. CHARLES HOLLADAY, et al. DEFENDANTS

No: 4:16-cv-00093 SWW-PSH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION

October 3, 2018

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Proposed Findings and Recommendation have been sent to United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright. You may file written objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Michael Jackson filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on February 22, 2016, against Pulaski County Sheriff Charles Holladay and Deputy Christopher Gipson (the "Defendants") in both their individual and official capacities. Doc. No. 2. Jackson was a convicted inmate during the time he was housed in the Pulaski County Detention Center ("PCRDF"). Id. at 3. Jackson alleges that on September 14, 2015, Gipson told him to take his break in an upstairs area. Id. at 4. Jackson informed Gipson that he had a lower level bunk medical restriction and could not go upstairs. Id. Jackson claims that Gipson gave him a direct order to go upstairs. Id. Jackson fell on the stairs and was taken to the hospital in an ambulance and diagnosed with a concussion. Id. Jackson sues for injunctive and monetary relief.¹ Id. at 5.

The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, a brief in support, and a statement of facts asserting that they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to Jackson's claims (Doc. Nos. 45-47). Jackson filed a response, a brief in support, an affidavit, and a statement of disputed facts (Doc. Nos. 54-57). Jackson subsequently filed two affidavits (Doc. Nos. 63 & 64), and Defendants filed a reply (Doc. No. 65). For the reasons described herein, the undersigned recommends that that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but must demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party's allegations must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must be supported by materials in the record such as "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of themotion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials . . .". Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact is disputed or undisputed by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2010).

III. Facts

The facts listed below are taken from those submitted by Defendants that are supported by documents attached to their statement of facts (Doc. No. 46) which include the Affidavit of Robin Ballard (the "Ballard Affidavit") and numerous exhibits (Doc. No. 46-1). Facts disputed by Jackson are also described.

1. Jackson was booked into the PCRDF on November 18, 2014. Doc. No. 46-1 at 1 (Ballard Affidavit); id. at 6 (Jackson's November 18, 2014 PCRDF Book-in Sheet).

2. During Jackson's intake screening on November 18, 2014, the intake nurse noted that Jackson had lower level/lower bunk paperwork from the Arkansas Department of Correction. Id. at 2 (Ballard Affidavit) & 20 (November 18, 2014 Intake Screening Form).

3. If an inmate has mobility issues, medical personnel may issue a medical communication form restricting the inmate to lower level/lower bunk. Id. at 2 (Ballard Affidavit).

4. On March 15, 2015, Jackson received a lower level/lower bunk restriction. Id. at 3 (Ballard Affidavit) & 23 (Jackson's Miscellaneous Booking Report).

5. A lower level/lower bunk restriction indicates that the inmate should only be housed on the lower level of his assigned unit and on the lower bunk of his cell. Id. at 2 (Ballard Affidavit).

6. Visitation booths at the PCRDF are located on the second floor of each unit. Id. at 3 (Ballard Affidavit).

7. If medical personnel issue a medical communication form stating that an inmate cannot go upstairs due to mobility impairment, officials will arrange an alternate accessible visitation area. Id. at 2 (Ballard Affidavit) & 17 (PCSO Branch Directive D10-0040).

8. On September 14, 2015, Jackson went upstairs in the U-Unit. Doc. No. 2 at 4.²

9. He alleges that before going upstairs he told Gipson that he had a lower level/lower bunk restriction and could not go upstairs. Id. The parties dispute whether Jackson elected to go upstairs or was ordered to go upstairs. Doc. No. 46 at 3; Doc. No. 57.

10. As Gipson escorted Jackson to his cell on the first floor of U-Unit from the second floor, Jackson slipped and fell down the last three stairs. Doc. No. 46-1 at 31 (Deputy Christopher Gipson's September 14, 2015 Incident Report).

11. Gipson immediately called a code red (medical emergency) and medical personnel reported to U-Unit and assessed Jackson. Doc. No. 46-1 at 31 (Gipson report).

12. Medical personnel decided that Jackson should be transported to the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences ("UAMS") for further assessment. Id. at 31 (Gipson report) & 31 (September 14, 2015 PCRDF Emergency Room Referral).

13. A doctor at UAMS diagnosed Jackson with a closed head injury resulting in a concussion and back pain. Id. at 3 (Ballard Affidavit) & 39 (September 14, 2015 UAMS Discharge Instructions form).

14. Jackson filed a grievance regarding his September 14, 2015 fall. Doc. No. 2 at 6-7. The grievance officer responded:

This matter is being looked into by Medical, however, at this time your inmate information states lower level/lower bunk, which is your housing assignment. There is nothing stating you cannot climb stairs. You climb stairs to go to visitation as well as go on breaks. Should Medical determine your status needs to be changed we will do so. . . . .

Id. at 7. In the grievance appeal attached to Jackson's Complaint, Jackson wrote:

Ignoring my medical restriction of LLLB staff bend the rules by letting me and other LLLB inmates go up the stairs to visit to make their job easier. In general they say "we'll just walk you up to your visitation." On 9-14-2015 @ approx. 7:30 p.m. I tried to tell the deputy I was LLLB and he said there was nothing indicating that and said quote "Either go up top or back in your room." Then he gave me a direct order to go to the upper back subday!

Id. The appeal response concurred with the grievance officer. Id.

15. Jackson alleges that after his fall, he received visitors in the intake area of the PCRDF so he would not have to go upstairs. Doc. No. 11 at 3.

16. Prior to September 14, 2015, Jackson received visitors in visitation booths in U, Q, H, and G, Units. Doc. No. 46-1 at 3 (Ballard Affidavit) & 43-47 (Jackson 2015 PCRDF Visitation Records). Jackson acknowledges he went upstairs on several occasions before his fall on September 14, 2015. Doc. No. 11 at 2; Doc. No. 43 at 1.

17. According to Ballard, Jackson received visitors in upstairs visitation booths on several occasions after September 15, 2015. Doc. No. 46-1 at 3 (Ballard Affidavit) & 43-47 (Jackson 2015 PCRDF Visitation Records). Jackson disputes that he ever received visitors upstairs after his fall. Doc. No. 57. Jackson submitted affidavits from two of his visitors, Linda andChiquina Henson, who state that after Jackson's fall on September 14, 2015, they visited Jackson in the intake area of the PCRDF on six occasions. Doc. Nos. 63 & 64.

IV. Analysis

A. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants argue that Jackson fails to state an official capacity claim. Official capacity claims are "functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity." Veach v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010). Thus, a suit against the defendants in their official capacities is in essence a suit against the county itself. See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2010); Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). A municipality cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior, or simply by virtue of being the employer of a tortfeasor. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, Mo., 709 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, as county employees, the defendants can be held liable in their official capacities in this case only if Jackson can establish that a constitutional violation was committed pursuant to "(1) an 'official municipal policy,' . . . (2) an unofficial 'custom,' . . . ; or (3) a deliberately...