Adcock v. Commonwealth , Record No. 101316.

• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Citation: 719 S.E.2d 304,282 Va. 383
• Docket Number: Record No. 101316.
• Parties: Edward W. ADCOCK v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ex rel. Mildred HOUCHENS, et al.
• Decision Date: 04 November 2011

282 Va. 383
719 S.E.2d 304

Edward W. ADCOCK
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ex rel. Mildred HOUCHENS, et al.

Record No. 101316.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Nov. 4, 2011.

[719 S.E.2d 305]

Michael W. Smith (W. Scott Street, III; A. Peter Brodell; R. Braxton Hill, IV, Richmond; Williams Mullen; Christian & Barton, on briefs), for appellant.

Craig M. Burshem, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General; Beth J. Edwards, Regional Senior Assistant Attorney General; Nancy J. Crawford, Regional Senior Assistant Attorney General; Janice W. McDaniel, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Gary P. Webb, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Social Services, Division of Child Support Enforcement.

No brief filed by appellee Mildred Houchens.

Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, and MILLETTE, JJ., and CARRICO, RUSSELL, and KOONTZ, S.JJ.

Opinion by Justice S. BERNARD GOODWYN.

[282 Va. 386] In this appeal, we consider whether the 20–year limitation on the enforcement of a judgment, stated in Code § 8.01–251(A), bars an attempt to collect child support arrearages created at least 24 years earlier when a spouse failed to make ongoing child support payments as ordered in a final divorce decree.

Background

The parties were divorced by a final decree entered in the Corporation Court of the City of Alexandria on October 20, 1966. The final decree ordered Edward W. Adcock (Adcock) to pay Mildred A. Adcock (now Houchens) child support in the amount of $30.00 per week, continuing until the parties' three minor children reached majority, became emancipated or the court otherwise decreed.

[719 S.E.2d 306]

It is undisputed that Adcock's child support obligation terminated on June 24, 1982, when the youngest of the minor children was emancipated. Houchens ¹ seeks to collect installments of child support that were due between the years 1967 and 1982.

On June 14, 2006, Houchens applied for DCSE to enforce the child support ordered from Adcock in the parties' final decree. Acting upon Houchens' request, on July 7, 2008, DCSE moved the Circuit Court of the City of Alexandria to re-open the parties' divorce, establish the child support arrearage and interest, and set a payment plan.

Adcock responded, pleading as an affirmative defense that the statute of limitations expressed in Code § 8.01–251 barred DCSE's attempt to collect the support arrearage due Houchens. The circuit court ruled that the statute of limitations did not bar the collection of child support arrears and interest. After hearing testimony, the court determined that the total amount of support arrearages, including principal and interest, due Houchens was $73,629.10.3

Adcock appealed to the Court of Appeals, and a divided panel affirmed the circuit court's determination. Adcock v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 56 Va.App. 334, 693 S.E.2d 757 (2010). Adcock appeals.

[282 Va. 387] Analysis

Adcock contends that the 20–year statute of limitations set forth in Code § 8.01–251(A) bars Houchens' enforcement of the 1966 child support order, because the unpaid child support installments owed by Adcock became judgments as a matter of law more than 20 years before the instant proceeding to collect those arrears. Houchens argues that the 20–year limitation in Code § 8.01–251(A) only applies to liquidated money judgments, and not, as here, to an unliquidated ongoing support obligation. Houchens asserts that judgments created by the failure to pay support obligations when due and owing, pursuant to an ongoing decree, are judgments but that such judgments are not subject to the statute of limitations in Code § 8.01–251(A) because they are different from “ordinary” money judgments.

In Bennett v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Waters, 15 Va.App. 135, 422 S.E.2d 458 (1992), the Court of Appeals held that the foreign judgment statute of limitations under former Code § 8.01–252 (now governed by § 8.01–251(A)) did not apply to the enforcement of a New Jersey spousal support order under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (former Code § 20–88.12 et seq.). Id. at 147, 422 S.E.2d at 465. The rationale was that the New Jersey order was an ongoing unliquidated support obligation, and that no statute of limitations applied to such judgments. Id.

In Bennett, the Court of Appeals stated that a support order or decree requiring the payment of money was a judgment pursuant to Code § 8.01–426, but, regarding whether such a judgment was subject to a statute of limitations, the court noted a distinction between support orders that adjudicate an ongoing unliquidated support obligation, and those that adjudicate a sum certain or liquidated amount due and owing for support. Id. at 141–42, 422 S.E.2d at 462. It held that statutes of limitations were applicable only to judgments that adjudicated a sum certain or a liquidated amount. Id. at 147, 422 S.E.2d at 465. The Court of Appeals reasoned that when an obligor fails to perform under the terms of an ongoing support order, a court has the inherent authority to enforce its order by rendering a judgment in favor of the obligee for the liquidated amount of the accumulated arrearages. Id. at 144, 422 S.E.2d at 463. It therefore...